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ABSTRACT
The preferences of individuals over working conditions may have profound effects on 
organizations and labour markets, and yet their impact has, for the most part, been 
marganalized. We argue that, in light of evolutionary developments in the workplace, 
a re-thinking of the impact of supply-side influences on specific labour market segments 
and organizations is called for. To this end, this study evaluates contemporary human 
resource issues, specifically — preferences of individuals to control working-time and the 
impact this may have on labour market segmentation theory and organizations.
An analysis of data on such things as demographics, technology, payment systems and 
ethical views suggests an environment conducive for a more time-sensitive employee. 
We hypothesize that this time-sensitive employee may search for an organization, like the 
temporary agency, which provides the control over working-time that they prefer. Thus 
forming a unique supply-side driven labour market segment. We also assert that job 
forms like this, rather than being a peripheral secondary level job form, may be forming 
a new labour market segment that is neither primary nor secondary just atypical. Our 
hypotheses are derived from an approach that focuses on supply-side rather than demand- 
side influences, and a new adaptation and aplication of a more general time-sensitive 
model.
We tested our hypotheses using a three tiered approach: (i) a secondary analysis of past 
data sets, (ii) analysis based upon our interviews with 17 managers from London 
temporary accountancy agencies and (iii) our own data set drawn from 175 employees 
of a Large London accountancy firm and 50 employees of a London temporary
accountancy agency.
We found that temporary agency employment when compared to large firm employment 
was associated with greater control over working-time and was associated with employees 
who exhibited a greater preference for control over working-time. Therefore, we found 
evidence for supply-side driven job-form choice. We also found that those employees 
related to the internal labour market’s "core" exhibited a preference for control over 
working-time and received control over working-time in their compensation packages.
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PART 1 - Background
Chapter 
1
Introduction
BACKGROUND OF TIME AND WORK
In the past, work, for the most part, was performed according to the daily rotations of 
the earth and the seasonal influences of its varying orbit around the sun. If it was light 
outside, one was able to work, usually labouring in agriculture. As the sun set and the 
darkness became prohibitive, other activities were pursued. During the summer, longer 
days meant more hours of work. During the winter, shorter days meant fewer hours of 
work.
However, for one hundred years or so, neither the daily rotation of the earth, nor its 
seasonal position, have meant as much to most people who work. Other considerations 
are more important to the subtle timing of their activities: mainly, the man-made
organisational structures which impose rules and restrictions on the hours of work. As 
far as deciding when to work is concerned, man, rather than elements from nature, may
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now be the prime determinant. We no longer work strictly according to natural cycles 
and rhythms, but according to the rhythms of either the industry, the firm, or the boss.
This fact may derive from the relatively recent industrialisation of the Western world in 
the mid 19th century, and the increased practice of capitalism. The accompanying 
complex organisational structure and its more time specific demands on employees 
compelled a greater connection between time and rewards. The repetitiveness and 
simplification of tasks involved in the new industrialised factories generated a 
commodification of time for man — an hour of one’s time was (and is) worth a specific 
amount of pecuniary compensation (see Taylor, 1947 for example)1. Ultimately, this 
connection influenced employees to demand a reduction in their working hours. In brief, 
a shorter work day was achieved2. Thus, the debate over working-time has shifted from 
one concerned with quantity of time to one of flexibility of time?.
How changing the quantity of hours worked changes consumption and utility has been 
written about extensively. Most notably Becker (1965) wherein he, by introducing home 
production, shows the alterations in working hours as wages change, as forgone earnings 
change and as wealth changes. However, the effects of flexibility of working-time are
1 Hammond and Hammond (1920) note that "the changes the industrial revolution produced ... were 
so important that when the weaver in Oldham or the cropper in Halifax or the woolcomber in Bradford 
looked back to 1820 or 1830 to the beginning of his life, he thought he could remember the time when in 
all senses the worker was free" (Footnote 3 page 2).
2 There has been a general decline of 13.7 per cent in working hours between 1950 and 1987 in the 
United Kingdom (Owen, 1988 and Stafford, 1980). Now, more than ever, the total time spent at work is 
at its lowest (see also Metcalf, 1987).
3 As Blyton (1989) notes "... the issue of duration is increasingly being ... upstaged by the call for 
greater working-time flexibility" (page 125). For an historical discussion on the arrival of flexibility at 
work see Hardman (1982).
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less formalised4. Exactly what are the costs to the employee of the standard 
arrangements of time and work and how might these costs be inducing changes in the 
structure of both labour markets and organizations? These problems motivate the inquiry 
of this thesis.
Recently, discussions about flexibility have been centred around the demand-sided 
influences of organizations on the characteristics of working conditions. These influences 
result in a variety of job forms, for example "core" job forms and "periphery" job forms 
(temporary or part-time). Flexibility, in this construct, means flexibility for the firm. 
This argument is heralded in the labour market segmentation literature (See Curson, 
1986; Atkinson, 1984; Loveridge and Mok, 1979). On the supply-side, the discussions 
are much more anecdotal as to the various atypical working-time structures, and are most 
frequently described in terms of flexi-time work arrangements (See Gannon, 1984; 
Orpen, 1981). Here there is room for development.
This thesis departs from these general notions of time and work, and looks at working­
time arrangements as an important part of the compensation package as described by the 
attitudes of employees within an occupation. It approaches working-time control not as 
a demand-sided benefit from work handed out by the employer, nor as an element of the 
compensation package disregarded by employees, but as an element which may be the 
consequence of employee job choice decisions. It also suggests that the timing of work 
can have various repercussions on employee performance, and possibly repercussions on 
the value employees place on their pecuniary compensation. It also incorporates the
4 Some of Becker’s results are ambiguous (see Hill, 1989 page 61).
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complementary aspects of work-time and time utilized for activities outside of work, into 
an overall time framework that treats time not as a commodity but a format which allows 
work to occur within time.
This is an important step in treating time and work in that it challenges ideas that are 
becoming ensconced in literature about temporary work, and firm internal stratification. 
On a broader scale, our treatment of time and work, in light of current evolutionary 
changes, may also necessitate a reworking of labour market segmentation analysis. The 
employment situations that motivated the writing of that literature may no longer hold 
true: much work is now service industry / knowledge industry based, technology like 
the micro-chip has altered the way work is performed, pecuniary compensation is 
evolving toward profit related pay, and the demographics of expert employees are 
changing. All of these may have profound consequences on working conditions5. 
Analysing working conditions through a theory in which the framework of time is based 
on notions about work that no longer predominate could produce spurious results, and 
inappropriate labour market segmentation labels.
Thus, a recognition that employment conditions have changed is essential to developing 
an appropriate theoretical approach to work. This is what this thesis attempts — a 
theoretical approach which incorporates contemporary aspects of working-time into the 
compensation package. In light of the economic constraints that now surround 
organizations, new forms of compensation packages that can be both sensitive to the
5 See the introductory chapter of Bradley’s (1992a) Phone Wars for a concise discussion about the 
changes which are effecting the labour market and organizations.
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employees’ preferences as well as sparing firms financial strife, will be increasingly 
important in maintaining the commitment of knowledge based expert employees, while 
preparing firms for competition in the future. Showing how employees are compensated 
via control over working-time is an important part of this thesis.
Here, control over working-time is not restricted to those employees who have overtly 
different job forms, like temporary workers. We investigate a larger set of job forms 
within an occupation, including not only temporary workers but employees working in 
a traditional large firm setting, and compare the working-time circumstances that 
surround all of them. The significance and necessity of widening the scope of 
investigation into control over time at work is supported by a recent Employment Gazette 
Article (Wareing, 1992). There it was reported that 75 per cent of the working 
population in Great Britain are employed in arrangements that have working-time 
flexibility aspects attached to them6. Still, many people may wonder when the working- 
time flexibility revolution that was so hotly proclaimed as the future of work is going to 
appear? Where are all the tele-commuters that were forecasted? Perhaps the answers to 
these questions are masked by the traditional approaches used to study the elements of 
time and work and traditional labour market segmentation analysis7.
6 This is in contrast to Dey (1989), who believes negotiations for patterns of working-time is minimal.
7 Perhaps a need to recognize the "development of the concept of time", as noted by Norbert Elias 
(1992, pp 92-93). A development not towards a superior life style but a development toward a different 
"time concept".
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OBJECTIVES
Because this thesis is shaped by inquiries into time and work in contemporary labour 
markets it is incumbent that one of its preliminary objectives is
•  to look, in general terms, at the current labour market situation and to 
identify areas of change which might be influencing the working-time 
preferences of individuals in the labour force.
Because this thesis relies on the supply-side time preferences of individuals, even more 
importantly it needs
•  to develop an approach that allows segmentation of job forms to occur in 
various manners including segments which occur via supply-side 
(preference) influences.
In opening up the discussion to supply-side influences, we make available a format which 
is conducive to structuring a framework in which the supply-side influences of the 
individual’s unique time-preferences can be analyzed. That is, we are able
•  to utilize a time sensitive-model which treats work as an activity which 
occurs within time.
The significance of the objectives outlined above can only be made clear if we
•  show some of the recent overemphasis of demand-sided influences in 
literature on temporary work and labour market segmentation.
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Finally, our three sources methodological approach was designed
•  to investigate the possibilities of intra-occupational supply-side influences 
and to re-look at labour market segments with the time-sensitivity of the 
employee in mind.
It is important to keep in mind that the general objective of this thesis is not to develop 
new models of organizations, nor is it to wholly discredit demand-sided influences. We 
do not deny the existence of demand-sided influences, we merely highlight the existence 
of some supply-sided influences. The general objective is to fill a widening gap in the 
analysis of work and compensation packages. A gap which leaves the structures between 
time and work on the side-line. A gap which does not allow compromise between 
demand-side influences and supply-side influences. A gap we hope to begin to fill by 
correcting the imbalance and asserting the importance of time in compensation packages 
and the resulting supply-side (time-preference) driven influences on labour market 
segmentation.
ORGANIZATION
This thesis is organized into four parts. Part 1 consists of Chapter 1 (this chapter) and 
Chapter 2. Chapter 2 introduces the subject of working-time freedom by looking at some 
changes which may have begun to alter employee preferences toward a more liberal 
working-time arrangement.
Part 2 is the theoretical portion of this thesis and consists of Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
Chapter 3 looks at labour market segmentation with an approach that allows for the
20
coexistence of both demand-sided labour market segmentation and supply-sided labour 
market job form choice. In Chapter 4 we utilize a time-sensitive model that embraces 
supply-side labour market job form choice by allowing for personal preferences over time 
by the labour supply. This generates two hypotheses. Chapter 5 investigates these 
hypotheses in closer detail.
Part 3 reports our findings of our own investigation on labour market segments. It draws 
from three different forms of data. The first is a secondary analysis of data used by past 
researchers which gives evidence for the relevance of our supply-side investigation of 
labour markets and organizations. The second is an examination of temporary agency 
managers opinions about the accountancy labour market, which also tests our own 
hypotheses. The third data set reports the results of employees’ opinions about working 
conditions from a large, London-based accountancy firm and a London-based temporary 
accountancy firm. It employs this data to test the hypotheses generated in parts 1 and 2. 
Part 3 begins with Chapter 6, which explains our methodological approach and its 
appropriateness. Chapter 7 reports our findings from past work, while Chapter 8 reports 
results from our interview data. Chapter 9 explicitly defines the variable indices 
constructed from our questionnaire, which is followed by an analysis of the results from 
the questionnaire in Chapters 10 and 11.
Part 4 is Chapter 12, which is a conclusion of this thesis as well as a brief section on the 
implications of our results. Several appendices follow.
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Chapter
2
Evolutionary Changes — 
The Time-Sensitive Employee
"The steam engine has relieved them of much of the exhausting and 
degrading toil; wages have risen; education has been improved and 
become more general; the railway and the printing press have enabled 
members of the same trade in different parts of the country to 
communicate easily with one another,... while the growing demand for 
intelligent work has caused the artisan classes to increase so rapidly that 
they now outnumber those whose labour is entirely unskilled. ... some of 
them already lead a more refined and noble life than did the majority of 
the upper classes even a century ago." - Alfred Marshall Principles o f 
Economics - 1890
INTRODUCTION
In the late nineteenth century social scientists recognized the important effects that the 
changes in technology had on compensation to labour. In their terms, the new technology 
meant a real increase in the ability to purchase and consume an increased variety of 
goods and services, resulting in a "steady progress for the working classes". This was 
seen to be accompanied by an "emancipation from custom, and the growth of free 
activity..." resulting in a special character of business (Marshall, 1946 pp 3-4).
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More recently changes not only in technology but also in demographics, industries and 
organizational behaviour have prompted discussion about contemporary compensation 
packages. Now, there is an increased concern regarding the new forms of working 
conditions that employees work under as well as an increased debate about the intrinsic 
value of the work performed1. In tandem to these debates is the question of the 
effectiveness of new forms of pecuniary compensation (most importantly employee stock 
options and performance pay).
We begin our discussion by suggesting how these changes may effect employee attitudes 
to the working-time aspects of working conditions. In later chapters these postulates 
about working-time conditions serve as a backdrop in developing our approach to 
employment job form choice influenced by preferences for control over working time.
THE TIME-SENSITIVE EMPLOYEE
It has been said that the employee of today, and of the future, will find that flexibility 
and adaptation within the work place and within their personal careers is a necessary first 
step to an improvement in their personal and professional selves (Handy, 1984). This 
may be a direct result of organizational and technological changes that have enhanced the
1 Caston and Bratio (1985) find that "when perceived importance of intrinsic factors are taken into 
account in a multivariate design, support is obtained for the contention that intrinsic, not extrinsic, factors 
contribute to job satisfaction" (p 269). In other words, pay and possibilities of promotion are not as 
important as being able to do the job that one desires to do (see also Allison, 1991).
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yield to the employee of an autonomous personal and professional life2. Furthermore, 
with the ever increasing ease of access to consumer durables like cars, washing machines 
and televisions there has been an increased emphasis on the psychological and intangible 
levels of "success"3.
This combination of the external influences of changes in technology and the internal 
influences of changes in personal values in determining "success", forms the basis for our 
definition of the "protean" employee4. They are characterized by (a) the desire or ability 
for variation and (b) the desire for control over working-time and/or other aspects of their 
working conditions.
In the past, the traditional employee has had a more passive stance in relation to their 
employment history. Once they had become committed to a particular career ladder, they 
simply let the organizational rules and strategies plot their career course. As Hall and 
Hall (1979) state, "It was a passive stance; there was little need to think about attitude, 
identity, or adaptability unless, of course, the career ladder began to wobble". Along 
with this steady relationship and stable career came the commitment from the firm of life 
long job security. This is the basic "salaried model" of organizational relationship and 
has, in the past, characterized much of white collar work (Osterman, 1988).
2 E. P. Thompson (1967) suggests that, in the past, there was greater temporal freedom. Now it may 
be the case that workers with market power are attempting to regain control over working-time.
3 As Hill notes in Blyton and Hill (1989), "continual improvements in household production conditions 
have reduced the satisfaction of further improvements relative to that obtained from improved working 
conditions, so that some of an increase in wage rates is taken in the form of improved working conditions" 
(page 57 - 58).
4 "Protean: adaptable, flexible; from the Greek god of the sea, Proteus, who was able to change his 
shape at will" Hall and Hall, 1979.
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When comparing the protean professional employee with the traditional professional 
employee, the protean employee ids defined as opting for greater control and accepting 
of (or gives less regard for) the insecurity and chance for failure that greater personal 
freedom entails. They are not as likely to take refuge in the corporate womb. They view 
security less as a function of the corporation, than as a function of market circumstances 
or of their own personal attribute5.
This opinion about job security may be linked to the protean professional employee’s 
sense of their own scarcity and their increasing importance to the organization. In this 
sense they may be intrinsically tied to the "expert*' employee as described by Caruso, 
1990 and Caruso, 19926. They are the "human capital" of the organization. By this 
definition alone their scarcity is implied7.
For Western organizations the two concepts work well together8. The expert employee 
has, either by luck or effort, found themselves in a position of scarcity in the labour
3 Osterman (1988) has an interesting point to make in that he states 'there is considerable soft evidence
that white collar employment has become increasingly less secure" (p 80).
6 Caruso (1990) notes that" In organizations such as advertising, publications, management consulting, 
software houses etc. both management and essential employees are expert individuals. The professional 
represent the core expertise, and the managers represent the ability to enhance organizational value.
Organizational success is a function of both the core expertise relative to competition and the ability of 
expert management to motivate the expert professionals and other expert employees to work together for 
the benefit of the organization" (p 53).
7 The idea of Protean professionals works best when one defines the term "professional" as those 
engaging in new expert work. However, older organizations of employees, like solicitors, which exercise 
market power, may be a determinant in who will wield the power of expert work. Still, many of these 
organizations are experiencing an increased amount of personal specialization within their profession which 
may be considered a form of new expert employee. Therefore the term protean professional may apply 
to these groups as well.
1 See Pascale and Athos (1986) wherein they note that Japanese managers rely on dependence from 
their employees compared to Western systems which encourage individual development.
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market. This has quickly brought the rewards necessary for a comfortable life style with 
regards to the basic necessities: clothing, housing and food. Beyond this, the employee 
then looks for compensation in other forms. For the protean employee this means greater 
control over their working conditions.
How this part of the labour force (the expert protean employee) is compensated, both via 
the internal labour market and the external labour market, will be one of the chief 
considerations for employers and employees (see Bradley, 1992b and Tolfree, 1990). 
This too then should be an equally important aspect of labour markets for academics to 
appraise, and is the thrust of this thesis. However, analysis of compensation is reserved 
for Part 2 of this thesis. Here we explore the proposition that expert protean employment 
is an important labour market segment to study. This is done by detailing the changing 
circumstances around employment.
What then are the changing circumstances which may influence employees to become 
protean? And what are the factors which we believe influence employee’s attitude toward 
the composition of their compensation package in the future (namely an increase in 
control over working-time)? Furthermore, what are the factors which may make this an 
increasingly important part of the labour market to investigate? These questions are 
addressed in the next section.
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EVIDENCE FOR CHANGES IN THE LABOUR MARKET
The current influences that are discussed below can be broken down into four broad 
categories: demographic changes, industrial changes, technological changes and
organizational changes. Each of these will be taken up in turn, firstly suggesting the 
impact the changes might have on the work force itself, and secondly detailing some of 
the relevant data.
Demographics
Changing demographics can be a potent influence on the way labour markets are 
structured and the way labour markets operate. Currently the demographics of the labour 
force are changing acutely. These demographic statistics imply that there will be a 
critical shortage of people becoming available for employment. This means that fewer 
and fewer people will enter the workforce as years pass. This puts increasing pressures 
on employers to find new areas of the population from which to recruit skilled 
employees. Two of the most accessible pools from which these employers might draw 
from are the large group of non-industry employed women and the increasing proportion 
of older people, as well as immigrants and minorities. Still, though, the projected 
increase in the number of women in the workforce may be the single most important 
demographic change. In summary, these changes mean that there will be fewer men and 
younger workers, and more women and older workers9.
9 Rose and Baker (1991), believe that "with the younger element of the work force a shrinking 
resource, companies with the foresight to offer flexible working patterns will have the pick of the emerging 
labour pool" (page 465).
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Tables A. 1 and A.2 give some indication as to the changes in the labour force in Great 
Britain and the United States by age (All tables are given in Appendix A). In Great 
Britain (Table A.l) there is expected a 21.6 per cent decrease in the 16-24  age group 
between 1988 and 2000, accompanied by an 18.0 per cent increase in the 45 - 59 age 
group. In the US (Table A.2) there is a similar pattern, with an even greater accentuated 
increase in the 45-64 age group of 52.0 per cent.
The consequences of this shift are significant. Because the larger group of older workers 
may be more than before able to anticipate many years of active life, rather than plan for 
a complete retirement, they may take on work in non-standard job forms (See P. Johnson 
in Bradley (ed), 1992b). They may prefer a flexible working-time arrangement. They 
may even make radical changes in their career plans. If this is the case, the projected 
increase in this part of the labour force becomes important to the proportion of protean 
employees in the labour force. Indeed, as this segment of the labour force increases so 
too may the numbers of employees pursuing protean employment compensation packages, 
either via firm-internal compensation or via external market-offered compensation 
packages10.
Tables A.3 and A.4 show the projected increase in women in the labour force for Great 
Britain and the United States respectively. In Great Britain (Table A.3) there was an 
increase in participating women between 1986 and 1990 of 7.9 per cent, compared to an
10 KPMG management consultants concludes in a London Sunday Times' article (4-11-90) that 50+ 
year old people want a "flexible retirement decade". In another London Sunday Times' article (28-10-90) 
it is noted that IBM has set up a company that uses retired executives on a temporary basis, which is a 
further indication of a flexible retirement period.
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increase of only 2.2 per cent for men. In the United States (Table A.4) there was an 
increase in participating women between 1985 and 1988 of 7.2 per cent, compared to an 
increase of only 3.9 per cent for men.
The consequences of this shift again rely on the potential influences the different 
composition of the labour force may have in altering work-time patterns and work 
structures. As more women enter the work force, the traditional western family structure 
may transform. This means that former household patterns and arrangements will be 
altered for both women and men. They may find it necessary to rearrange the timing of 
their activities as well as the structure of their family unit (see Galensen, 1991 page 117). 
This may imply a transformation in the structure of work arrangements as well. This 
transformation, it is proposed here, may take the form of an increased protean 
compensation package (again either via the firm or the external labour market)11.
Even more significant than the general feminization of work is the feminization of the 
expert employee portion of the work force. Assuming formal education and "expert" 
ability are positively correlated, an examination of the demographics of education will 
give an indication of the potential changes in demographics of the expert employee.
Tables A.5 through A. 12 show the dramatic increase in formally educated women in the 
1980s for Great Britain and the United States. In Great Britain (Tables A.5 and A.6),
11 A London Times’ article (28-6-91) reports that MP’s working hours will be brought under review 
"because of the growing pressures of women and those with young families". An Employment Gazette 
article (2-92) on firms that have changed their employment policies reveals the importance to women of 
flexible hours in order to return to work. Another more controversial article by Felice Schwartz (1989) 
is also very informative on the subject. This is the article that gives us the new term - the mommy track.
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between the years 1977 and 1989, there was a 39.7 per cent increase in first degrees 
obtained by women and a 155 per cent increase in higher degrees obtained by women. 
When compared to the men’s increases of 6.6 per cent and 34 per cent, the relative 
increase by women is staggering. When using a more detailed investigation of the 
composition of this increase (Tables A.7 and A. 8) the relevance of this increase to expert 
occupations becomes clear. Between 1986 and 1990 there was a 43.8 per cent increase 
in women enrolled in undergraduate engineering and technology as well as a 30 per cent 
increase in business and financial studies. Graduate enrolment for women between these 
years was highlighted by a 14.3 per cent increase in medicine and dentistry, a 35.7 per 
cent increase in business and financial services, and a 48 per cent increase in architecture 
and related studies.
The United States (Tables A.9 - A. 12) shows similar, if not more significant, patterns. 
Between 1980 and 1990 there was an increase of 13.2 per cent of women enrolled in 
higher education compared to just a .3 per cent increase of men (Table A.9). Again, the 
more detailed analysis shows the polarization of these women into specific areas (Table 
A. 10). Between 1980 and 1987 there was an 80 per cent increase in women receiving 
bachelor’s degrees in business and management and a 96 per cent increase in engineering. 
This is compared to an over all increase for women of 12 per cent.
These numbers are echoed in the numbers of higher degrees (masters and doctorates) 
awarded to women (Table A. 11). There was an 81.4 per cent increase in business and 
management and a 152 per cent increase in engineering. The growth rate of women in 
selected professions (Table A. 12) is again phenomenal. There was a 35.1 percent
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increase in degrees for law, a 45 per cent increase in degrees for medicine and a 62.5 per 
cent increase in degrees for dentistry.
These numbers suggest that although there is a general feminization of the civilian labour 
force in both Great Britain and the United States, the largest impact may occur in the 
employment of expert individuals. In other words, if an increase in women in the 
workforce will alter the ways in which work is arranged, ie toward a protean style, the 
most significant area to look for this change may be in the expert and professional fields.
Industries
The significance of these increasing numbers of educated women becomes intensified 
after looking at the shift in industries where work is performed. The change in the type 
of work done is primarily registered by the evolutionary increase in the amount of white 
collar, professional, highly skilled employment. This may be due to, in large part, the 
shift away from manufacturing industries toward knowledge based industries12.
Alchien and Demsetz (1972) in their famous article, Production Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, submit that employees who primarily think or perform their tasks 
in their minds (expert protean employees) are, due to the nature of their tasks, very 
difficult to monitor. They conclude that "artistic or professional inputs ... will be given 
relatively freer reign with regard to individual behaviour" (p 786). Their hypothesis, of 
course, will not "produce" protean personalities directly, but, it is proposed here, it will,
12 This increased demand for specialized business services may arise from "the greater financial and 
administrative complications of increasing levels of international integration of trade, company structures 
and, in the case of Europe, legislation" (Spence, 1991a).
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in conjunction with an increase in knowledge based industry jobs, increase the observable 
protean behaviour. The increase in knowledge based industries increases the costs of 
monitoring the employee therefore firms are less likely to do so13. This increases the 
availability of protean behaviour by employees.
Because of the nature of knowledge based industry employment, employers might alter 
compensation to include control over working-time and other controls for the expert 
protean employees (see Galenson, 1991)14. As expert employee employment increases, 
the idea of protean employment may not appear as foreign to other employees. Thus, 
a multiplier effect occurs which may create more and more protean employees. In other 
words, the less easily monitorable work environment of knowledge based work presses 
employers to provide an increasingly more open contract of employment. These new 
contracts make protean employment less strange and other employees follow. This might 
increase the provisions of facilities at work for protean flexibility, as well as provisions 
in the community, so that protean employment becomes ever more attainable for more 
than just the expert knowledge based employee.
Both of these arguments suggest that with an increase in knowledge based professional 
service industry work, the protean employee will become an increasingly important 
phenomenon. This is because knowledge based work will make protean employment
13 Taken further, the firm with its highly structured monitoring functions (through management) might
become less necessary as a result.
14 Still, one must be cautious of these statements since knowledge that is marketable can be relative
to its timing, thus forming some time constraints.
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more acceptable to a larger portion of the work force and/or knowledge based work will 
increase directly the number of observable protean employees.
Table A. 13 shows that in Great Britain, between 1984 and 1991, there was a 12.5 per 
cent increase in service industries. This growth is marked by the higher growth rates in 
the professional expert employee dense industries like: legal services, business services, 
accountants and computer services. All of these knowledge based industries have growth 
rates above 40 per cent. This is far above the total industries average of 3.5 per cent. 
Remarkably, computer services grew at a 97.5 per cent rate, and was the only industry 
to continue to grow at 20 per cent through the down turn in 1989-90.
In the United States (Table A. 14) expert employee dense industries like legal services, 
accounting, management consulting and computer services registered significantly large 
growth rates between 1980 and 1986, most near the 50 per cent rate. Again, as in Great 
Britain, computer services lead all. In the US, computer services grew 82.5 per cent.
To conclude, Silvestri and Lukasiewciz (1991) report, while predicting future job growth 
in the Monthly Labor Review, that there will be a
"continuing above average growth rate for jobs that require relatively 
higher levels of education or training. This is reflected primarily in the 
increasing proportions of executive, administrative, and managerial 
workers; professional specialty occupations; and technicians and related 
support occupations. These three major occupational groups ... are 
expected to account for 41 percent of the increase in employment between 
1990 and 2005."
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Technology
The growth in these knowledge based industries has not occurred in isolation from 
changes in technology. Whereas in the last century the emphasis on the impact of change 
for the employee was regarding (a) the infrastructure of the state (roads, canals, trains, 
planes etc.), and (b) the tempering of the working conditions of manual employment, this 
is no longer the case. The infrastructure to move products is well established (albeit still 
improving), and the advances in automation technology (robotics in the workplace etc.) 
have made manufacturing work primarily a "human free" mechanized job. We must look 
elsewhere for the most recent technological influences on working conditions.
As employment increases in industries dense in knowledge based (or expert based) 
employees greater than in other industries (see table A. 13), the important change in 
technology may be in the manner in which it impacts the ability of employees to transport 
information or knowledge from one person to another, one department to another and 
even one industry to another. The modes of this transportation are the basis for the 
"information infrastructure" of an individual, firm or country. Indeed, increasingly, 
information systems are formed in a person to person manner. Thus technology is 
applying pressures on traditional organizations and their role as communications 
facilitator. The last decade has seen vast developments in the infrastructure of these 
knowledge based industries. This is where changes in information technology may have 
the largest impact on working conditions.
The most important changes in the infrastructure of information, ultimately changing 
knowledge based industries, are grounded in, but not limited to, the silicon chip and the
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information storing and retrieval capacity that such devices allow. They are seen innate 
to new products like: computers, printers, improved and more complex telephone 
services, satellite links, portable telephones, faxes, and copiers, to name a few. Each 
of these devices has improved the infrastructure of communication and delivery of 
information or knowledge. These changes are coupled with increasing standardization 
across trading blocks which increases the ability of these technologies to facilitate the 
information highways15. All of this may aid the expert employee in composing the 
pattern of their own work16.
These issues could ultimately alter the process of producing information based goods and 
services. They could have the effect of relaxing some of the production time constraints. 
This, when compared with traditional production, may have the consequence of allowing 
the producer (in this case the knowledge based or expert employee) a more working-time 
flexible environment17.
13 The executive chairman of Cable and Wireless UK, Lord Young, in a London School of Economics
Business Performance Group lecture Series (1992) stated that "over one half of the telephone traffic over
the Pacific is fax", and that video phones will become commonplace and that electronic newspapers are on 
the horizon. The executive chairman of Motorola Inc., George Fisher, in another LSE Business 
Performance Group lecture emphasised the complications and necessity of standard setting.
16 The influences of technology may even be as far reaching as a recent development where, 
"forecasters are considering putting screens in the foyers of offices" that display likely weather changes in 
the few minutes or hours ahead. "People will decide whether to go to lunch now or wait depending on the 
likelihood of rain" (London Times, 12-07-91). They can only do so if they have some working-time 
control.
17 Of course the effects of technology may be a consequence of how they have been implemented by 
an organization. Few technologies have properties in them which cannot be altered by the way in which 
they are implemented, (see Austrin, 1991; Burnes, 1989; Buchannan, 1984; and Dy, 1990). But in this 
thesis the stress is on the "expert" professional employee. The power that this type of worker can have 
in determining how technology is used is assumed to be strong.
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Without labouring the point, a few examples may help. Since knowledge producing 
industries are largely serviced by the computer its impact may be intense. The computer 
can be linked with other computers (networking) and information can be transported 
easily from one terminal to another. The prodigious printing capabilities of the computer 
allow a near final knowledge based product to be completed solely by the expert 
employee. The abilities of fax systems to almost immediately transport this product 
across the telephone lines links the employee in a physical manner as well.
Of course this all relies upon the standards setting practices of firms developing and 
producing these products. For without a standards setting policy the links may break 
down as one piece of equipment is incompatible with another. And this is on the 
increase. The industry has recognized the necessity of standards and different firms* 
equipment is becoming increasingly integrateable with others. These factors may 
essentially make the office, and all of the working-time restrictions that office hierarchies 
impose, if not obsolete, at least diminished in importance (See Hakim, 1984a and 1984b; 
Huws et al, 1990; and Kinsman, 1987 for related discussions on home working).
Still, the consequences do not have to be as severe as the abolishment of centrally located 
places of work. The important fact is that within these places of work (be they at home 
or in a centrally located office) the time constraints of production have become more 
relaxed due to the technology developed. No longer is sequenced production so 
constraining over working-time. If "functional specialization requires synchronization of 
various parts" resulting in a fixed timed pattern (Hassard, 1989b; p 94), then knowledge 
based jobs, a consequence of technology, with their more general functions may
36
inherently require less synchronization, or specified sequencing18. Concurrent 
production between processes in a knowledge based industry may take place miles away 
from each component and even at different times19. Timed production (externally 
imposed deadlines) is most constraining on products that are non-storable (the product if 
non-storable must be produced, in time, close to deadlines). Knowledge can now be 
stored, updated and retrieved quite easily so that deadlines do not as severely constrain 
production backwards in time. Production duration (the time necessary to complete a 
task) is less constraining in that stopping and start up costs continue to shrink as 
knowledge becomes more readily accessible through increased powers of technology20.
In light of these changes though, one must be aware that knowledge as a marketable 
product is intertwined in the timing of production. Having knowledge first is an 
important competitive advantage, and therefore this aspect of knowledge based work may 
develop increases in time constraints.
Still the time constraints that were most severe in manufacturing production have become 
less severe in knowledge based industries because of the technology driven changes in
18 Sequencing a knowledge based product with the advent of computers with their large memory 
systems may be unnecessary. Data or knowledge collection, considered to be a first step in many 
knowledge based products, now, with computers, is a continually updated phenomena. It is no longer 
necessarily a sequenced precursor to a knowledge based product.
19 A knowledge based discussion (production) can take place "concurrently" through the transportation 
of information from one user to another through the computer. This can happen not only at different places 
but also at different times. The information is stored and can be withdrawn to be used concurrently at any 
time.
30 The important consequence of this freeing up of production processes in time is not that they 
necessarily dismember the employee from the employer and the firm, or that they entirely relieve work of 
all of its time constraints, but that the production process itself of an expert employee (now more likely to 
be knowledge based) may be radically altered.
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the production process of knowledge based products. This is a fertile environment from 
which the protean expert employee may flourish, either within the firm or in the external 
labour market.
Tables A. 15 and A. 16 gives some numbers relating to the increase in technology in the 
United States and Great Britain. The most relevant and illuminating of available data is 
for the US. Table A. 15 shows the increase in the ratio of personal computers to desk 
workers. In 1984 this ratio was just over .05 and in five years to 1989 the ratio had 
increased to .34. This shows the transformation of the office in the US. Data for 
computer use in GB is less easily obtained. We must rely on sales figures (total sales =  
sales at home +  (Imports - Exports). Using this as an indicator we see in Table A. 16 
that sales of computers (this includes mainframe, micro, home computers and printers) 
more than doubled from 1986 to 1991.
Organizations
Technology may be the backbone of the new work environment but there have been some 
almost equally important organizational changes that will feature large in the future - 
namely the method in which pecuniary payment is made. The interest in new payment 
systems that are linked to the performance of the individual and/or of the company in 
which one is employed has been growing steadily in both Great Britain and the United 
States. Their impact on the employee may not be just in the form of payment received 
for work but also, indirectly, in the way that the employee is controlled or monitored.
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With a change in payment structures away from compensation solely consisting of an 
hourly or salary based pay, there may be some alterations in the employment environment 
as well. The type of control and monitoring that is necessary for someone who is being 
paid by the hour may be extremely different from the type of monitoring that is needed 
for someone who is being paid through company performance related pay. This thesis 
is not the place to examine the exact consequences of performance pay; others have done 
so thoroughly (Clark, 1992; Nalbantian, 1987; Stiglitz, 1987; Bradley and Gelb, 1986). 
In general, there are some who say that with an increased proportion of payment linked 
to some type of company performance there is less need for the employee to be 
monitored. The logic is simple. There will be a direct impact on the employee’s own 
income if shirking occurs. There is less direct impact if the employee is being paid via 
the salary system or an hourly system21.
For the expert protean employee the consequences are hypothesised to be, once again, 
a general liberation of the workplace. This liberation comes not only in how work is 
completed, but also in the working-time restrictions that are placed on the employee. 
There is less concern for when the employee is working and under what schedule or 
regime, and more concern for the final product or the bottom line. Thus, profit related 
pay may act to release the expert protean employee from time constraints.
Tables A. 17 through A.20 show the rapid increase in employee share schemes and profit 
related pay schemes in Great Britain. Between 1985 and 1990 there is evidence for
21 Of course this does not prohibit some shirking since when working as a team there may still be 
incentives to shirk. The point is that, marginally, there should be less need to monitor the employee. See 
Alchien and Demsetz (1972) for more on this topic.
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growth in the number of schemes from a low estimate of 28.5 per cent to a high estimate 
of 92.6 per cent. At the same time there was growth in the number of employees 
participating in the schemes from a low estimate of 55 per cent to a high estimate of 171 
per cent. Between 1988 and 1991 the number of profit related pay schemes increased 
107 per cent and the number of employees in these schemes increased 288 per cent.
In the United States (Tables A.21 and A.22) there is comparable evidence for growth. 
Between the years 1980 and 1991 the number of employee stock ownership plans grew 
by 97.4 per cent. The number of employees involved in such plans increased 179.8 per 
cent.
These sets of numbers for both Great Britain and The United States give some indication 
as to the dramatically increased numbers of companies and employees in such plans. 
This swell of interest could lead to the conclusion that the effects on working conditions 
may be just as dramatic. However, their marginal effects are enough here. For when 
combined with changes in technology, changes in industries and changes in demographics 
it suggests that the temporal conditions surrounding work will also change.
OTHER EVIDENCE FOR CHANGES IN THE LABOUR MARKET
"Unlike the position that exists in the physical sciences, in economics and 
other disciplines that deal with essentially complex phenomena, the aspects 
of the events to be accounted for about which we can get quantitative data 
are necessarily limited and may not include the important ones. ... And 
while in the physical sciences the investigator will be able to measure what 
is, on the basis of prima facie theory, he thinks important, in the social 
sciences often that is treated important which happens to be accessible to 
measurement." F.A. Hayek, Nobel Memorial Lecture - 1974
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The harder evidence displayed above about demographic changes, industrial changes, 
technological changes and organizational changes now gives way to some of the less 
quantitative evidence about changing attitudes and the changing environment. Some of 
this evidence will be based on the popular discussion about a new work ethic. Allied to 
this argument are the powerful environmental campaigns that have swept much of the 
Western world. An effort has been made to keep the discussion of these fecund topics 
brief, but this should not be inferred as a measure of their significance.
The Development Ethic
The new work ethic literature is summed up by the development ethic as opposed to the 
current work ethic. The basis for the development ethic is to develop oneself in totality. 
This includes the development of the physical, intellectual, emotional, spiritual and also 
includes the earning of a basic salary. No longer does more necessarily mean an increase 
in utility. Two cars may not be better than one. The most expensive suit may no longer 
bring the admiration of one’s peers.
Basic economic logic is being called into question. Does increased material affluence 
necessarily bring psychological well-being? This leads authors like Kareasek and 
Theorell (1990) to develop new models with labels like "New Value". They define this 
as a value that is "process oriented not product oriented" (p 192). It adds value to a 
person or an organization, as opposed to adding a physical input into the making of a 
final physical product. Occupations that already possess new value elements are the
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professional occupations, craft occupations and mid-level professionals22. They also call 
for an off-loading of pressures from some of the top managers etc. onto some of the 
occupations at a lower level. They feel that this might increase psychological well being 
for the top level managers, by decreasing their pressures as well as increasing the 
psychological well being of the lower level managers by increasing their responsibilities. 
In the long run, it is hypothesised, firms would be better off since the innate capabilities 
of human beings are more or less equally distributed across populations. The spreading 
of opportunity will more likely produce a more inventive output.
It is like-wise argued that managers who follow the development ethic will realize the 
importance of developing the whole person to the performance of the firm. This will 
foster an increased team effort spirit, which, it is hypothesised, produces employees that 
are more interested in bottom line results as opposed to mere appearances. What one 
contributes will be of more consequence than one’s position on the corporate ladder. 
This means a change in management style. "Because our bosses will begin to function 
more as coordinators and facilitators than as warlords, control will become less an issue" 
(Roth 1989). Thus, control, including control over working-time, becomes less of an 
objective in the firm’s employment policies.
The argument progresses toward one of its key elements - time. In the development 
ethic, freedom over working-time is highly esteemed, since control over time is needed
22 Kareasek and Theorell (1990) feel that temporary work is lowest in new value. But they could not 
measure it in their sample, since no temporary workers were studied. This thesis would call into question 
their conclusion about temporary work as a general classification. New value to us would be best placed 
on more precisely defined occupational categories. Perhaps even defined along geographical lines as well.
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to develop all aspects of ourselves. Some activities that help in this development can not 
be performed outside traditional working hours, like: seeing one’s baby take its first 
steps, or tending to a loved grandmother, or playing tennis in the mid-day sun. If there 
is an increased occurrence of the development ethic, the need for working-time freedom 
may follow.
The development ethic may first surface in those employees with life styles most satiated 
with the basic needs like: housing, clothing, food etc. These are likely to be the scarce 
knowledge based expert employees. Their compensation packages may then reflect this 
new development ethic and therefore contain compensation in the form of working-time 
control. This is directly to the point of the forthcoming sections of this thesis, in that the 
compensation package, when evaluated, must be a larger set of items than merely 
pecuniary levels. It is suggested there that control over one’s time is a basic ingredient 
that can produce significant increases in personal utility, and is an important element in 
segmenting protean compensation from other compensation.
Environmental Pressures
Pym (1981) while also calling for new development values, links these ideas with the 
present concern for the environment. For him the new worker is "above all ... the 
embodiment of resourcefulness". Recycling and sensitivity to one’s consumption are 
valued in the highest degree. This link between the environment and the development 
ethic seems appropriate for most of these new work plans. It might be said that the 
threat of the ecological destruction of the planet surfaces in the literature about work 
ethics in the form of a reevaluation of what is considered valuable to the employee.
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Should one choose to purchase another or better car, and thus create the adverse 
ecological effects this purchase might have on the planet, or should one choose an 
increased opportunity to develop both professionally and personally? A more detailed 
account of the environmental argument and its possible connections to the development 
ethic is given below.
One of the more accessible planetary environmental models is in Meadows, Meadows and 
Randers’ Beyond the Limits (1992). They set out a simplified model (simplified from 
their complex computer model) of how present patterns of living will effect the future of 
the planet. The model they use plots the state of the world as far as its resources and 
pollutants are concerned along side the material state of living for the human population. 
They then alter the various parameters through the computer and they conclude the choice 
is between either global collapse or a sustainable future. The results depend, of course, 
on the levels of the parameters.
A principal mechanism that the parameters pass through are the programmed delays in 
feedback systems. So that a too long delay causes the overshoot of production which 
turns into either (a) oscillating recovery of the system or (b) a total collapse, as the 
system, unable to react in time, is unable to regenerate and then recover (oscillation alone 
can be devastating)23.
23 In their book Meadows et al (1992) give an example of over-shoot due to delayed feedback 
mechanisms in the accumulation of CFC’s in the stratosphere. It was fourteen years after the possible link 
between CFC’s and the destruction of the ozone layer were reported that Du Pont, the worlds largest 
producer of CFCs stopped production of those compounds. However the production that took place within 
those fourteen years has not yet had its full effect on the ozone layer. Only time will tell if this particular 
overshoot has caused oscillation or collapse.
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Even with the shortest feedback system they conclude that with liberal estimates of 
pollution control, yield enhancing technologies, land protection technologies, and resource 
saving technologies their model still yields a collapse scenario. This results in a world 
wherein pollution is high, consumer goods per person are low, services per person are 
low, and food per person is low, as well as a decreased life expectancy.
What they conclude, most importantly for this thesis, is that no combination of 
technology can sustain a healthy planet. They claim that in order to avoid collapse in 
their model, one must input a structural change in the system. The change they program 
for is a change in the "cultural expectations and practices ... that associate social status 
with material accumulation, and that define goals of getting more rather than having 
enough" (p 192, this is programmed by restricting output per capita). They maintain that 
this does not mean a no growth stance, but a call for "qualitative development, not 
physical expansion" (p 210).
The results of the combinations of changes in technologies and a structural change in the 
system are: life expectancy is high, a generous amount of food per person is sustainable 
at a reasonable level, pollution ultimately falls, and notably services per person are quite 
high. Industrial output is sustained but decreases slightly and population is maintained 
by both increasing the standard of living and by a change in attitude. It is a far more 
attractive result than those predicted without structural change.
Again this structural change in attitude may most likely be accessible to those groups of 
workers that have the most advantages in the labour market. They will generally be the
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best paid and more secure in their work. Adopting these new attitudes may first be the 
expert employee.
The links between the environmental models and the new development work ethics then 
are complete. Both maintain that a change in attitudes toward what is perceived as a 
reward for work is needed. Development of the person is prized as opposed to an 
increase in material wealth. It is not the task of this chapter to defend these development 
ideas. This is not the point. The point to be taken is that these are serious discussions 
in a very accessible format, both in books and on television, and they may turn out to 
have a great impact in altering work attitudes, work patterns, and work compensation24.
CONCLUSION
For all of the dimensions of change discussed in this chapter, both the hard evidence and 
the soft evidence, a feedback system similar to the environmental feedback system may 
occur in the labour market. Namely, the problem of signalling delays in labour markets 
is critical in understanding the recent data given above. The data is broad and yet 
indicative of forces that may change the pattern of working-time. The exact amount or 
timing is unclear due to the signalling delays inherent in the labour market.
24 Guest (1992) discusses the possible effects of popular phenomenon can have on management styles. 
In his article he reports on the influences of Peters and Waterman’s (1982) book In Search o f Excellence, 
and believes that the book has had a "profound impact upon management thinking and upon behavioral 
sciences". He takes this stance in contrast to the academic discrediting of the style of the book.
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The question remains — who will react to these signals? Will firms provide for the 
development needs of the employee within the corporate structure, or even within the 
physical building (ie gymnasiums, adult education and child-care facilities), and attempt 
to maintain considerable control? Or, will the firm relinquish its time restricting strong 
hold so that the employee can pursue the diverse activities when doing so is most suitable 
and when it yields the highest levels of satisfaction? On the other hand, external markets 
may begin to first cater for the needs of a work force which preferes greater control over 
working-time. This could result in less time restricting institutions (hypothesised later 
in this thesis as temporary agencies), which also allow for the pursuit of the 
developmental activities. Finally, there may be a combination of both of these 
influences.
This chapter has set out not to prove the various linkages between the selected changes 
but just to provide a glimpse of the general trends toward increased preferences for 
control of working-time. In other words, we did not provide proofs to the hypothesised 
connections, to do so would be a task that would take volumes. However, we did intend 
to show the changes in employment which may increase the ability to control time at 
work. An alteration which may be suitable to the protean expert employee; an employee 
who is time-sensitive.
We believe, Labour Market Segmentation theory has not suitably addressed the working- 
time preferences of employees. Also, a change in the composition of work rewards 
toward working-time freedom may alter compensation to the employee in unique ways. 
These issues are addressed in Part 2 which follows.
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PART 2 - Theory
Chapter
3
Inter-occupational Labour Market Segmentation —
And The Supply Side
INTRODUCTION
The protean employee discussed in Chapter 2, is defined as an employee that seeks 
control over their working conditions. More precisely, control over time at work, both 
the amount of time and more importantly the pattern of time. This invokes a theory of 
new job forms, here the temporary agency which allows for some supply-side influences. 
This implies a different approach to temporary work than that proposed by Labour 
Market Segmentation (LMS) Theorists.
The first section of this chapter will frame the thesis in its appropriate position in LMS 
theory. This is possible because of the depiction of LMS theory that is used. The 
second section will begin to develop a model of intra-occupational labour market 
segmentation by utilizing some familiar segmentation techniques. Finally, the third 
section will propose the use of a supply-side, preference driven, neo-classical model of 
job forms. It is the point of this chapter to direct the reader down a progressive route 
towards a more appropriate evaluation of segmentation within an occupation and within 
a firm. It also allows for an accurate placement of this thesis in a labour market
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segmentation "slot". It is the task of the next chapter to propose a more rigorous theory 
which is hypothesised from the general model that is implemented here.
THE DYNAMICS OF LMS THEORY
Labour market segmentation theory (LMS) was initially based on the belief that 
segmented labour markets are distinguished by a "primary" market and a "secondary" 
market. The primary market exhibits all of those "good" traits of employment like: job 
security, high pay, high mobility, interesting work, etc. and the secondary market 
exhibits all of those "bad" employment traits like: job precariousness, low pay, unvaried 
and tedious work, etc. So segmentation was defined by the working conditions of a 
particular job form. Ultimately segmentation theorist believe in a compartmentalised 
labour market as opposed to a fluid labour market.
As LMS theory developed, the definitions of the different segments varied according to 
size, importance, and with the author’s opinions of the good or bad job characteristics. 
Although confusing, this is valuable because the theory is able to adapt to a variety of 
issues. Therefore, the significance of certain areas of working conditions may expand 
while others may contract. Because of this adaptability, it may periodically be necessary 
to reassert different aspects that may be segmenting the labour market while still using 
LMS theory. The evolution of the protean employee may therefore make it necessary 
to rethink past LMS theory.
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LMS theory has been described, most notably by Caine (1976), as a direct attack on 
neoclassical labour market theories. Neoclassical theories assume that market forces will 
efficiently distribute the work force and, more importantly, that market forces will do so 
in a way such that if there were forms of segmentation they would be abolished, through 
competition. LMS theory believes that this has unsatisfactorily described the labour 
markets in North America and Europe.
Because it is an attack on neoclassical labour market theory, most LMS studies have 
attempted to determine if segmentation exists at all. From this broader question, 
however, other studies have tackled questions pertaining to labour market segmentation 
specifically. These studies try to resolve issues such as what to include in the primary 
segment and the secondary segment; whether there is a high or a low level of mobility 
between the two segments; whether the segments are characterized by sex or race or are 
they more likely to be characterized by industry or occupation?; the extent to which 
institutional arrangements like unions been active in promoting or breaking down the wall 
between segments; and whether social institutions like discrimination play a part in 
segmentation.
These are all valid questions that the LMS literature has brought forward producing 
various and sometimes conflicting answers. We believe that some of the incongruencies 
may result from the desire to prove that there is one all encompassing form of labour 
market segmentation, or that labour market segmentation is necessarily absolute. There 
may be some benefit in combining opposing segmentation theories and approaching them 
so that they can coexist and can also coexist with some neoclassical ideas attached. This
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becomes important when discussing new labour market segments, like the temporary 
agency employee (a hypothesised form of the protean employee), that have been relegated 
to the vague classification of secondary level job form.
HISTORICAL DEPICTION OF LMS THEORY
Segmentation theory as it has developed might be broadly defined by the extent of the 
size of the labour market the segments cover. These levels of classification are described 
in Figure 3.1 below. The first level, Level 1, may represent some of the first theories 
of LMS like Piore’s (1970) model. Here the segments are defined through the people 
that were relegated to them. This was partly because the theory was being developed to 
explain the persistence of urban ghettos and poverty in America. It was argued that it 
was the characteristics of the secondary labour market workers that explained the inability 
to move into the primary market. This then emphasised not just individual traits but 
traits that were developed by secondary employees because they were the most rational 
course to follow when living in secondary market circumstances. But this rational course 
maintained their status in the secondary market. Cain (1976) states that "this model has 
the aspect of the ’vicious circle’ or the ’self-fulfilling’ prophecy in it". This is the 
broadest of terms in segmentation theories in that it can encompass whole classes, 
nations, and genders of people.
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Figure 3.1 
The Progressive Levels 
in which Labour Market Segmentation Discussions Take Place
Primary Secondary
Level 1 Divided by class, gender or nationality
Level 2 Divided by industry
Level 3 Divided by occupation
Level 4 Divided by mobility chains
Level 5 Firm internal division
Figure 3.1 shows the five levels of Labour Market Segmentation theories. There is a 
general progression towards smaller units of analysis as one moves from Level 1 to Level 
S. Much of LMS debate is trying to determine where the segmentation between primary 
and secondary segments occur.
53
From this broad segmentation theory we move down to the second level, Level 2 in 
Figure 3.1. At this level, discussion takes place on an industry scale where certain 
industries are seen as either being primary industries, which provide the "good" jobs and 
secondary industries which provide the "bad" jobs. This level of segmentation theory 
was used by Craig, Gamsey and Rubery (1984) in their study where "the excluded 
industrial sector corresponded to the primary sectors of the labour market segmentation 
models" (page 92). They conclude that "the role for a differentiated labour supply in 
structuring pay and employment has not been given sufficient attention". Oster (1979) 
found evidence from the US, using census coded industries, that "reflect" industry 
segmentation. Whereas Level 1 yields only two segments, this second level of definition 
can give rise to tests over many industries. The divisions can be numerous.
The third level is a division of the primary and secondary segments by occupation. There 
has been some recent evidence that this may be some of the best uses of LMS theory. 
Dickens and Lang (1985) by utilising their switching regression model have shown that 
"occupational based classification schemes do a better job of dividing workers between 
sectors than do industrial schemes" (Rosenberg, 1989, discussing Dickens and Lang). 
McNabb (1987) in his study using general household survey data and estimating earnings 
functions concludes that "the findings ... support a form of labour market segmentation 
based on occupation rather than one associated with industry specific characteristics" (p 
271). As convincing as this evidence is, we believe that no segmentation theory 
necessarily precludes any other. In other words, there may be some industries that use 
higher percentages of occupations that exhibit secondary segmentation characteristics.
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In the fourth level we move to the theory postulated by Doeringer and Piore (1971) in 
which they see the primary market as being distinguished by the type of "mobility chain" 
that an employee may be on. The different mobility chains will constitute the differences 
between the primary and secondary segments. The primary segment has mobility chains 
which are akin to career ladders, whereas the secondary market is described as having 
mobility chains that lead to no where. They are instable dead-end jobs. Stewart et al 
(1980) investigate this in the clerical labour market where "they point out the difference 
between a permanent clerical job and a clerical job that is a trainee slot for management" 
(Burchell and Rubery, 1990). The mobility chain theory can also be used to break the 
primary sector down into sub-segments by the employee’s relative position on the 
mobility chain. Still, though, the two tiers on the primary sector mobility chain should 
be recognized as being in the primary sector.
The fifth level of segmentation theory is the Atkinson (1985) model of the "flexible 
firm". Here the division of core and periphery segments are divided within the firm 
according to their relative flexibility attributes (discussed in greater detail in the next 
section below).
Where then does this study fall in this stylized representation? Its intention is to be 
unabashedly placed in the primary segment at levels 1 through 3 of segmentation 
analysis. The technique used here relies upon the assumption that accountancy (the 
occupation from which data was collected) is a primary occupation thereby occupationally 
exhibiting consistent forces through all of the participants. It also includes the Doeringer- 
Piore mobility chain theory distinguishing between tiers within a primary segment
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mobility chain. The analysis itself though is best described in terms of the core-periphery 
analysis of Atkinson because it will segment the accountnacy labour force into job forms. 
Overall our analysis should be considered a micro analysis of a primary segment 
occupation, when looking at levels 1 through 3 of the hierarchy of segmentation theory. 
Furthermore, application of the findings to levels beyond the specific occupation 
(accountancy) and the firm must be done so cautiously.
SEGMENTATION AND NEW JOB FORMS
Intra-occupational segmentation1 in its simplest form can be described as people 
performing similar jobs within one occupation but in various job forms. For example, 
waiting on tables can be performed under the employment status of a long standing full­
time permanent employee, a new full-time permanent employee, a permanent part-time 
employee, or as a one-time temporary employee. Each of these are considered here to 
be different "job forms". The emphasis of this study will be on comparing the long­
standing full-time permanent worker, the entry permanent worker and the temporary 
agency worker. These job forms and the resulting differences in working conditions 
within an occupation, or intra-occupational segmentation, are the main concern of this 
thesis.
These different job forms are notoriously described by the virtues they bestow upon the 
firm or by the detrimental side effects they inflict upon the employee in the secondary
1 The term "segmentation" is used here as opposed to "stratification" as segmentation appears to be 
the norm when discussing job form designation like "temporary workers". There has been some delineation 
between the two where stratification implies some sort of scale that is used to rank occupations in certain 
levels of social status (Stewart et al, 1980), and segmentation implies limited mobility between different 
labour market segments (Jacobs and Brieger, 1988).
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segment. Although there is some acknowledgment in the literature about the benefits that 
might accrue to the temporary worker from working under a temporary employment 
situation (these are usually comments made in passing), it amounts to very little. 
Furthermore, there has been almost no empirical investigation as to the characteristics of 
these benefits as registered by the current attitudes of temporary agency employees. 
There has also been very little inquiry as to how the temporary employee’s working 
conditions compare to working conditions of similar employees in the labour force, as 
described by the employee. We believe this omission is because most of the previous 
investigation has been driven from a demand-sided theory point of view. The approach 
outlined below suggests that demand (or firm) derived explanations of labour market 
segmentation filter out important information which is captured by the supply (or 
employee) derived explanations of labour markets.
Atkinson’s theory of the flexible firm - the "core-periphery"2 analysis is an economical 
synthesis of the various job forms in a simplified and readily accessible model of labour 
market segmentation. We suggest that, like Hakim (1990), although it is not a perfect 
description of a real life firm that exists, it is a very useful analytical tool to discuss job 
forms both internal to the firm and established from external institutions. It is useful, she 
contends and we agree, because it facilitates discussion between disciplines and across 
theories. Its effectiveness in this regard can be documented by the amount of literature 
both academic and practical that the description has generated.
2 "Core" and "Periphery" were originally used by Averitt (1968) and Bluestone (1970) when referring 
to different sectors of the economy.
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Atkinson’s study and studies that have followed have as their main goal tried to
"explore the extent to which more flexible working practices had been introduced, to 
ascertain under what circumstances particular kinds of change might be found, to consider 
how permanent they might be and to look at their implications for employers, workers 
and job seekers" (Atkinson 1986 page 5).
Because Atkinson’s model categorizes job forms within one particular firm, it takes a 
particular demand-sided point of view of job segmentation; it stresses organizational 
reasons for various job forms. This, it can be argued, is typical labour market 
segmentation theory in which firms (or outside influences) are the main forces which 
cause the segmentation in the labour market. It is the employees plight to go through life 
"trapped" in the periphery (or lower status job), because they have been segmented out 
of the core labour force via demand-sided influences.
It is asserted here that Atkinson’s model, as well as other demand-sided labour market 
segmentation models, may be acceptable when discussing the structure of the firm, and 
how different job forms are utilized within a firm, but they are less acceptable when 
trying to discuss the specific characteristics of job forms and how they will or will not 
provide for a specific group of employee’s preferences. This is because their approach 
looks at employment from an institutional point of view, thus filtering out varying 
employee preferences on job-form selection. A temporary job harvesting sugar cane on 
a Southern Florida plantation may exhibit the same characteristics as a temporary clerking 
job in a law firm in London when comparing attitudes of the firms (numerical flexibility). 
But the two jobs, although both temporary, will not necessarily exhibit the same 
characteristics when comparing attitudes of the employees. (In LMS theory the former 
is emphasised, in our approach it is the latter.)
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An underlying assumption is being made: that differences in job form characteristics 
within occupations rather than across occupations will result in a more accurate 
description of a job form. This means that the hypothesis derived from this approach is 
concerned with intra-occupational labour market segmentation. It is not concerned with 
inter-occupational labour market segmentation. This is important in that an intra- 
occupational comparison will aid in extracting the influences of the job form of the 
atypical employment, here temporary agency work, rather than the influences of the 
occupation. This approach is an attempt to develop an accurate format to analyze 
atypical employment, and different job forms, while leaving some of the distorting effects 
of the flexibility debate behind.
So, this theses is not about the flexible firm per se, but about the employees’ working 
conditions when employed in various job forms. It attempts to establish a system of 
intra-occupational job forms. This, it is hoped, will produce a more realistic description 
of the value of the different job forms and the different compensation packages 
confronted by different employees within an occupation. The structure of the Atkinson 
model is implemented in hopes that a familiar framework will facilitate a quick and clear 
way in expressing a supply-side derived model o f intra-occupational segmentation.
SUPPLY-SIDE (OR EMPLOYEE PREFERENCE) DRIVEN INTRA- 
OCCUPATIONAL JOB FORM CHOICE
In short, the supply-side model is that intra-occupational segmentation will not occur 
solely due to the firm, but will also be influenced by the preferences about working 
conditions of the employees that are in the specific job forms. This is a semi-neoclassical
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approach in that the preferences of the employees are considered to be attainable through 
the attributes of different job forms. Acknowledgment by the employer of these 
preferences then acts as compensation, via the employee’s utility function, and therefore 
effects job form working conditions and/or job form choice (this is taken up in greater 
detail in Chapter 4). Because the theory makes no reference to the broader segmentation 
which may occur when choosing an occupation, it allows for institutionalized labour 
market segmentation at either that level or at a larger social level. One might say that 
it even defends this idea by assuming that it is so3.
Still, job segments here are not characterized through their relative flexibility to the firm, 
but through job characteristics of the job form that may be valued by the employee. It 
is hypothesized here that each job form can be characterized by a set of working 
conditions as reported by the employee. This is important. It means that the job form’s 
compensation package’s relative value is determined by the attitude of the employee, not 
by subjective opinions of those who classify the job form. For example, if a job form 
lacks job security but, relative to other working conditions, obtaining this job 
characteristic is not important to the employee, its significance to the job form is 
diminished.
3 Burchell and Rubery (1990) have investigated supply-side segmentation in the labour market using 
the Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI) attitudes/work history data for Northampton. On 
the basis that "firms have been found to have distinct notions of the existence of segmentation in the labour 
supply, particular groups are favoured to occupy particular job slots..." (p 552-553). Although the basis 
of segmentation is through the supply-side characteristics, the actual segmentation of the labour force is 
through the demand-side. The firm divides the labour supply. They find five different clusters which are 
predominantly divided up by sex and mobility. Their study may be regarded as taking place in Level 1 of 
Figure 3.1. Whereas this study does not have such broad intentions with regards to labour market 
segmentation. Our thesis is developed at levels 4 and 5 (and 6 of Figure 3.3 which follows).
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This means that job form segment classification may be partially linked to, or formed by, 
the employee’s preference for a certain set of job form characteristics (for the protean 
employee of Chapter 2 - preference for control over working-time), not solely by the 
demand-sided influences of institutions. Furthermore, the job form characteristics may 
also be fused to the employee’s chosen occupation. One occupation may have relatively 
poor job security across all types of job forms, whereas another may have good job 
security. In summary, some job form working conditions may be linked to the 
preferences of the employee and some working conditions may be universal across all job 
forms within an occupation.
Recall that this is not a theory of the firm or a theory of occupations, but a theory of job 
forms. It is not the objective of this thesis to propose any new theories of organizations 
but to emphasise the supply-side of job form working conditions. The LMS theory is 
"flipped" to emphasise the employee’s point of view. Understanding this is fundamental 
to understanding the analysis.
Subjective job form descriptions do have their role in this thesis, but that role should not 
be considered identical to the one segmentation theorists apply. Here the subjective job 
form labels establish a starting point of analysis. After that the employee’s opinion is 
given more attention to understanding the job form. This is because of the perspective 
that this model is attempting to achieve. It wants to formalize the notions of an 
employee, supply-side derived theory. This then entails a rethinking of terminology for 
proper analysis. Indeed, this is the point to be stressed throughout this thesis, that an 
overindulgence in discussions about the organization of the firm and other institutions
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may overlook some of the elements of job forms important to employees. This may lead 
to incorrectly proclaiming pure institutionalised segmentation. In our case the relegation 
of temporary agency employees, with protean preferences, to a vaguely defined secondary 
labour market segment.
Thus, we believe that employees are compensated in a way that is partly determined by 
their position on the mobility chain and partly determined from the employee’s current 
personal preferences. On top of this, the occupation itself may exhibit its own set of 
characteristics (inter-occupational segmentation) which effect all job forms.
In summary, the range of choices of occupations may be a result of labour market 
segmentation (associated with Level 3 in Figure 3.1), institutional mobility chains (career 
paths associated with Level 4 in Figure 3.1) may also lead to labour market 
segmentation. However, employee preferences can lead to job form choice which is 
reflected in different job forms with different sets of working conditions (which here are 
proposed to form a part of the compensation package), so that segmentation may play 
a part in ones occupation and preferences in ones job form. As Paul Ryan (1981) states
"... segmentation is clearly a matter of degree. ... the economist is well 
advised to study the relative strengths of competitive and segmentationist 
forces as they vary across time and place" (page 18).
We add to this that strengths may vary when comparing occupational choice with job 
form choice. So that segmentation forces are predominant in occupational choice and 
employee preferences are predominant in job form choice.
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THE RELEVANCE TO PROTEAN EMPLOYEES
This model then allows for a changing form of compensation to include those 
contemporary employee preferences that might better describe different labour market 
segments. This means that a protean employee (described in Chapter 2 above) may 
influence the compensation package toward greater control over their working conditions 
(control over working-time). If this is not available to them in one job form (either due 
to their lack of seniority or other reasons), other market-mediated institutions may arise 
that provide for the employee’s preference for control over their working-time (the 
temporary agency) and thus form a distinctive labour market segment.
Some immediate results can be drawn from the model as it is described so far. Some 
characteristics of working conditions should be influenced by the occupation selected and 
should therefore be relatively stable across all job forms within an occupation. Other 
working conditions will be influenced by one’s position is at on the firm’s mobility chain. 
More to the point for this study: some job form working conditions should
correspond closely to the preferences of those workers employed in them. In other 
words, the working conditions an employee faces (or the compensation package the 
employee receives) within a job form should be influenced by the employee’s own 
preferences. Finally, of course, some working conditions should be influenced to some 
degree by a combination of those listed above.
If we describe this approach, in Ryan (1981) terms, we are allowing pre-market 
segmentation (segmentation of capabilities which restrict occupational choice). We, 
however, enter the debate regarding temporary agency employment in the in-market
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segmentation analysis. For if, as Ryan states,
"The dispute between the segmentationist and orthodox approaches hinges 
... upon their divergent assessments of the importance of in-market 
segmentation" page 6
then it is important to assess to what degree differences in working conditions between 
temporary agency employees and permanent employees are formed by either in-market 
segmentation, causing differing working conditions and compensation packages, or a 
result of employee preferences which are reflected in different compensation packages.
We believe that an over emphasis of demand-sided studies, wrongly emphasise the in­
market segmentation of temporary agency employees. Thus neglecting the important 
aspect of temporary work, namely its working-time pattern novelties.
This employee preference theory implies a linking of those characteristics of a job form 
that are valued by the employee and those characteristics that the job form actually 
provides. If these match, there will be some evidence that the employee has, at this time 
in the work history, selected the job form which most accurately suits their needs. It is, 
then, the employees’ opinions’ of their current working conditions under their present 
form of employment that is of the most paramount consideration for this model. Through 
this type of data it will become established whether supply-side forces influenced labour 
market segmentation.
CONCLUSION
Involving a discussion of personal preferences with LMS theory in some ways brings 
LMS theory back to its beginning. Recall that some of the first segmentation theories
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were used to explore the persistence of US urban ghettos in the 1960s. It was then 
hypothesised that because people were being trapped in the secondary labour market they 
would take on traits that made them less desirable to primary segment employers. These 
traits were not considered inherent in their nationality, class or gender but due to their 
labour market segmented position. "Low wages and the virtual absence of benefits 
combine with undesirable work conditions to discourage stable job attachment by the 
labour force" (Harrison, 1974). Furthermore, these traits develop because they are the 
best attributes to hold while being in the secondary labour market. Thus the "viscous 
circle" hypothesis. The personal preference theory, however, does not link personal 
preference to the position in a secondary labour market segment. The theory is based on 
the preferences of individuals.
The difference lies in our definition of the terminology used. "Traits" in early 
segmentation theory mean precisely those characteristics of workers which are reactions 
to their secondary segment situation (see Harrison, 1974; and Cain, 1976). These work 
habits then make them undesirable for primary segment work. The "personal 
preferences" that we use here are those characteristics of jobs that are desired by the 
employee. They are not endogenous trait variables but preferences exogenous to the 
labour segment. If so-called secondary labour markets provide for the preferences of 
those working in them at the cost of other "good" characteristics, then instead of 
segmenting the market into primary and secondary segments the market may be providing 
alternative forms of work arrangements that are neither "primary" nor "secondary" but 
just atypical.
65
The question remains as to whether what we observe are actually preferences or traits. 
But the point remains that some segmentation may occur due to the employee’s 
preferences. There will be no easy proof as to what are traits resulting from labour 
market segmentation and what are preferences that do not. It is, however, the duty, of 
the observer to pointedly express what in the study is being assumed to be a trait and 
what is being assumed to be a preference and, if possible, to identify these empirically. 
The confrontation between labour market segmentation theory and neoclassical preference 
segmentation may result from unclear communication because of the reluctance of 
scientists to either accept the possibilities of endogeneity in labour productivity (neo­
classical theorists) or to accept the possibilities of labour preferences beyond hourly 
compensation and/or a ''benefits package" (LMS theorists).
The strategy thus far has been to suggest the evolving importance of varying working- 
time preferences (Chapter 2 above), and then to clarify how LMS theory may be used 
as a tool to discuss supply-side (employee preference) influences in LMS. The next 
chapter combines these by formalizing the preferences of individuals for different 
working-time arrangements.
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Chapter
4
Job Forms in a Time-Sensitive Model — 
Modelling The Time-Sensitive Protean Worker
"It is because I want to make economics more human that 
I want to make it more time conscious..." - Sir JR Hicks 
(1976), Some Questions o f Time in Economics
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will detail the employee preference or supply-side forces which are 
hypothesised to characterize groups in the intra-occupational labour market. This is 
based on the general idea in labour market segmentation theory that was put forth in the 
previous chapter. This emphasis does not mean that occupational forces or mobility 
chain forces are insignificant to this study. However, because the ideas of occupational 
and mobility chain influences are well known, they will be dealt with in a more succinct 
fashion during the analysis of the results. It is because the employee preference forces 
critical to this study have not previously been formalized that they are done so here.
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In this study it is hypothesised that intra-occupational segmentation takes place at the firm 
level by mobility chain forces producing "tiers" which segment the internal labour force. 
Furthermore, that the compensation package between these tiers will consist of non- 
pecuniary elements that will be different according to the preferences of the different 
groups of individuals in the different tiers. It is also hypothesised that differences in 
compensation packages between what are called large firm job forms (core) and other job 
forms (periphery or outer ring) are also due to employee preferences. Again, the 
respective compensation packages will reflect this. The unique form of non-pecuniary 
compensation that divides working conditions within the internal market and working 
conditions between the internal market and the external labour market will be the concern 
of this chapter.
It is this supply-side desire for a more flexible working-time arrangement that divides the 
labour supplies between internal and external job forms by offering a different 
composition of the compensation package. This supply-side desire is also reflected in the 
different compositions of compensation packages in the internal job market. It is the 
working-time aspects of employment that divide part of the groups’ working conditions.
The rationality for choosing a so-called secondary segment job-form over a primary 
segment job-form on the basis of what is often thought of as a minor fringe benefit 
(control over working-time) needs some defence. It is shown below that control over 
working-time can be a powerful form of compensation fo r those workers who value 
control over working-time. Defence of this statement requires a careful time-sensitive 
analysis. This type of discussion for this type of job form is altogether appropriate, if
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not essential, in that the time elements of temporary work are truly what give it its 
distinctive properties (other properties, it is shown, might be assigned to occupational, 
industrial or other institutional reasons).
A brief sketch of what is to come may prove useful. First, the foundations of the 
analysis of time and labour markets is developed. This is followed by a description of 
a time-sensitive labour market model. This model is then applied to a time-sensitive 
supply of labour services. The time-sensitive analysis will be applied to the internal 
labour market, showing the appeal of including working-time freedom in the 
compensation package of those employees who value working-time freedom. The time- 
sensitive analysis will then be applied to the external labour market, showing how 
preferences for working-time freedom may create atypical market mediated institutions 
(the temporary agency). Our ultimate aim is to highlight a significant hitherto 
unformalized supply-side reason for the differences of working conditions between 
temporary job forms and permanent job forms and to show the importance working-time 
freedoms may play in an organization to both keep protean (expert) employees and/or 
increase their effort.
FOUNDATIONS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF TIME
As Winston (1982) in his very insightful analysis The Timing o f Economic Activities 
asserts, because of the way economics treats the timing of events "temporal information 
is lost automatically, filtered out by the way economics treats time." In studying the
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segmentation of employees between temporary agency employment and full time 
employment it is paramount that this temporal information is not lost. Employment in 
time virtually distinguishes temporary work. An accurate and thorough understanding 
of this market and its segmentation would be difficult if the analysis proceeded without 
a time-sensitive discussion. By introducing a time-sensitive model into the consideration 
of employment arrangements one will be able to more fully understand the time elements 
of labour markets. It focuses not only on the division of temporary employment and full 
time permanent institutionalized employment but also on the effects in the internal labour 
market.
Before proceeding with the time-sensitive model it will be quite useful to briefly describe 
the time elements and assumptions in earlier economic analyses critical to their 
formulation.1 This step will give a foundation to the time-sensitive analysis which 
follows, as well as clarify the penetrating insights that a time-sensitive model uniquely 
affords the investigation of core-periphery segmentation and differing job form 
characteristics.
Time In Marshalian Analysis
Time has consistently caused problems for economists when they have attempted to 
accurately describe markets and market dynamics. They struggle hard to incorporate 
time into their analysis, recognizing that a change in time could have profound 
consequences on many of their conclusions. Indeed, as Alfred Marshall (1946) states in
1 Currie and Steed man’s book, Wrestling with Time (1990), gives an extensive analysis of time and 
the struggle economists have undergone to understand its influences cm markets and general equilibriums.
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the preface to the first edition of his classic book Principles o f Economics, "the element 
of time ... is the centre of the chief difficulty of almost every economic problem" (p vii). 
It is with Principles o f Economics that our discussion of time elements in labour markets 
will begin.
Marshall’s analysis in Principles is largely one in which he invokes the coeteris paribus 
device; "we fix our minds on some central point; we suppose it for the [unit of] time to 
be reduced to a stationary state; and then we study in relation to it the forces that affect 
the things by which it is surrounded, and any tendency there may be to equilibrium of 
these forces" (p 369). This technique, widely used in social sciences, renders time static.
Marshall’s famous descriptions in Book V, Chapter 3, "Equilibrium of Normal Demand 
and Supply", invokes with great care this device of coeteris paribus. In this chapter he 
sets up a framework for analysis in which a specific "unit of time" (p 342) is chosen 
prior to analysis. The unit of time may be of any duration, a day, a week, a month, 
depending upon the market studied. During this unit of time, outside forces may not 
effect supply and demand. "The general circumstances of the market remain unchanged" 
(P 342).
In applying Marshall’s analytic technique to labour markets, the wage and quantity of 
labour services is determined by the intersection of the supply and demand schedules in 
the traditional manner. The resulting wage and quantity supplied of labour services then 
is said to be the stable equilibrium conditions for that market for the chosen unit time, 
be it a day, a week, a month, a year or longer. One of the consequences then of this
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analysis is that once the unit of time has been selected the effects of circumstances within 
this unit of time are no longer visible.2 In other words, if the wage was determined for 
a week-long period, the changes of labour supply which occur within that week are held 
in check; for example, the consequences of religious ceremonies on Saturday or Sunday 
precluding work on those days. This has no effect on the equilibrium conditions. The 
fact that work is not performed on those particular days is hidden behind the veil of the 
unit time. The final equilibrium is merely in labour services per week.3
Marshall’s analysis is, of course, static. It strips time of its continual influence over 
goods and prices. In it "the general circumstance of the market remain unchanged 
throughout this period [unit time]; ... there is, for instance, no change in fashion, in 
taste, no new substitute which might affect the demand, no new invention to disturb the 
supply" (Marshall p 342).
This "all things being equal" device so well exploited by Marshall is continually used in 
economics and other social sciences. For, indeed, it is quite useful in that it narrows the 
issue under examination and therefore allows the topic to be handled more exactly. But
3 Marshall makes explicit this neglecting of forces within his unit time in his discourse on the fishing 
industry. Where when looking at the supply of fish, the effects of daily weather changes may be held 
constant while he discusses influences of a more long term nature, like the scarcity of meat during the year 
or two following a cattle plague (p 369).
3 Although this suggests that much of Marshall's work is time-insensitive, it cannot be argued that 
Marshall was ignorant or less than aware of the influences of time and the effects of holding things static. 
As Currie and Steedman (1990) observe "he seized [time’s] importance in vivid fashion and kept it at the 
heart of his analysis." As early as page 15, Marshall points out that "the pleasures which two persons 
derive from smoking cannot be directly compared; nor can even those which the same person derives from 
it at different times." And in appendix H he even approaches a dynamic analysis when he observes that 
perhaps we should not look at just a quantity - price curve but "a surface of which the three dimensions 
represent, amount, price and time respectively" (pp. 809 -10).
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this type of treatment could have a grave cost in that its description of real life becomes 
less and less accurate. Invocation of it, in terms of holding the unit time constant, in an 
analysis of labour markets being segmented between temporary work and permanent work 
could make the analysis so inaccurate as to leave it essentially ineffective. It deprives 
the analysis of the very element that may distinguish labour market segments - time- 
sensitivity.
Describing choice between two discrete modes of working time, temporary and 
permanent, using partial equilibrium analysis is problematic because that form of 
analysis will not easily allow discussions of the exact time patterns of preferences and the 
exact time patterns of work provided by those job forms. It is helpful to have this 
information accessible when discussing temporary employment.
Time in "Allocation of Labour Theory"
More recently, in an attempt to capture some of the consequences of time, economists, 
most famously Becker (1965), have approached time as a commodity (see also Chez and 
Becker, 1975). They treat it as something that could be divided up like a cherry pie or 
a train load of gravel. The analysis they undertake begins with this basic underlying 
assumption and then considers the agents decisions to allocate their time. This allocation 
is usually between work and leisure and in Becker’s case between work and home 
production. Although they have approached time as an element to be confronted, the 
analysis still lacks a time specificity necessary to analyze the time-sensitivity of the 
protean work style (in our case the temporary agency employee).
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The allocation analysis is usually described on an individual basis. One agent acts to 
maximize a hedonistic utility function. The agent is considered to make choices between 
work and leisure maximising a utility function:
U (Leisure or consumption (Income), Labour) 
subject to the time constraint:
T total = T work 4- T leisure 
and also faces the budget constraint:
I income =  H hours worked * W wage rate
The agent then works the appropriate number of hours so that his preferences are 
maximised, taking into consideration that working-time produces income which allows 
consumption during non-working time, thus increasing utility. This theory has told us 
much about the responses of wage rises, national benefits programme and substitution and 
income effects. This thesis is not the place to dwell on these useful analyses. But here 
we are most concerned with the allocation theorists’ treatment of time and what can be 
learned from it.
The labour/leisure and labour/home production models both assume that onoe the decision 
as to how much time one allocates to work has been made, then one merely puts this 
number of allocated hours into the day. Is this a time-sensitive model? Winston (1982) 
has suggested that these models do not allocate time at all, but merely allocate labour 
services measured in time units - labour services per hour. In other words, this gives us 
a useful description of labour services but hides the effects of time to the allocation of 
labour services. Furthermore, becker’s model allows time to only be seen as labour.
74
Yet for a discussion of Protean employee preferences, labour and other non-labour 
activities must be seperable in time.
The importance of this is critical to our analysis. It is proposed here that the allocation 
of labour services and consumption in time is the decisive factor in segmenting labour 
supplies. It is the difference in the patterns of time that make some labour market 
segments unique. For example, it might be the difference in the preference fo r  control 
over working-time that distinguishes the temporary agency worker. Thus, an analysis that 
eliminates the effects of working in time will not go very far in describing the possible 
supply-side processes which could generate the segmented labour market or differences 
in compensation packages between tiers.
The two systems of analyses used above to describe labour markets, are not clear or 
precise enough to discuss the temporary agency market but they do yield some useful 
ideas about time. Marshall’s analysis clarifies precisely the unit time. The allocation 
model describes well the agent’s decision mechanism. To some extent the time-sensitive 
model below will utilize these two concepts.
A TIME-SENSITIVE LABOUR MARKET MODEL
Winston (1982), takes a step away from these time-insensitive models4. He has 
developed a highly time-sensitive model that he has used to describe rhythmical
4 Deserpa (1971) also develops a theory of time, distinguishing between activities that are a necessity 
and activities which can be chosen. He utilizes a non-linear programming model.
75
fluctuations within time and their effects on markets. Much of the time-sensitive theory 
briefly described below is based on his model. Its application to the theory of employee 
preference driven labour market segmentation and the hypotheses about control over 
working-time are new.
The basic premise of the model is that activities performed by an individual are 
dependent upon the time they are performed (Here it is important to note that time is used 
in the sense of calender time). A simple example of Winstonian time-sensitive 
consumption is that of sleep. Sleep is best performed when it is dark, ie when it is night 
time. So that the production (consumption) of sleep is dependent on the time of day that 
the consumer sleeps. Sleep during the day may not be as useful or pleasant as sleep 
during the night. This is introduced by making the utility function time-sensitive or a 
flow of utility. There is a constant flow over time of potential utility from sleeping. 
Sleep during the day will give less utility and sleep during the night will give higher 
utility. This flow of utility within time can be shown for every activity, so that the 
consumer will choose between activities over time. Thus, one lays out on the beach 
during the day (when doing so has a high utility flow) and sleeps during the night (when 
doing so has a high utility)5. More formally:
Accumulated household utility is:
5 Bosworth and Dawkins (1980), looks at how the variations in utility over the day may effect wage 
premiums at unsocial hours. Hicks was also sensitive to the fact that commodities may be differentiated 
not only according to their attributes but also to their date (Currie and Steadman, 1990, page 109). In this 
thesis, though, the physical attributes are endogenous to the date.
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U = j Cl u1( z 1(x:i{t )  ; t ) ) f i t  + f tb u2 ( z2(x2 ( t )  ; t)  ) f i t  [1]
Where flows of utility from activity 1, ulf is a function of the intensity of the activity Zj 
(which is function of timing) and the amount of goods used Xj. The same holds for 
activity 2.
This utility is maximized subject to the constraint6,
Where the price, p, is exogenous and goods, X;, are time-sensitive. They are constrained 
by the resources, w, flow of wages and Yp wealth.
From maximization and the resulting first order equations, Winston produces the optimal 
switching moment, t \  between two activities (in our example sleep and awake). In each 
activity time will have the same value7,
6 This time constraint differs from Beckers in that it allows for the timing of activities to be generated 
from the model, not just the amounts of time devoted to different activities.
7 This differs from Becker in that t* is a moment in time, not a level of time allocated.
[2]
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Of course, other choices made by consumers are more pertinent to our discussion. One 
can imagine a continuum of choices being made by agents over a large set of 
possibilities. One of these possible choices is the decision to go to work or not. In 
Winston’s (1982) model it is assumed that the utility derived from work is zero. The 
only positive utility derived from work is from the income produced which can then be 
transformed into goods used while not at work (in leisure or home production)8. The 
agent’s decision to go to work, then, is time dependent because he compares going to 
work with other non-work activities over time, see eg Groneau (1986). Since the 
perceived non-work utility derived from non-work activities is assumed to be time 
dependent, then the choice of when to go to work (t*) is time dependent. Ultimately, 
work will occur only at those moments, over the unit time of analysis, that other 
activities have low utility flows.
Figure 4.1 goes a long way in describing the Winston model. It is an abbreviation that 
we think clarifies the concepts in his model well. There are two flows of utility: utility 
from leisure, U, (home(time,Income)), and utility from work, Uw (work(wage)). These 
utilities flow over the time unit T where the changing environment over T, day to night 
for example, "calls for an optimal temporal allocation of goods" (Winston p 167). Since
8 This is akin to the Becker (1965) home production model.
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the wage over time is constant, then the utility derived from work is the straight line Uw. 
Utility from leisure, being time specific, undulates and is represented by the curve U,. 
If we assume T = one day, and leisure activities for this agent are better performed in 
the evening, as is shown, then this agent will work from hour tj to hour t2 and perform 
non-work activities in the evening (tj and t2 are the optimal switching times). Work is 
performed only when it derives (indirectly) a utility flow that is greater than that of the 
other non-work activities.
79
Figure 4.1
A Winstonian Time-Sensitive Model Diagram
Flows
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u t i l i t y
w
morning t
Time
Figure 4.1 shows that during some hours of the 24 hour day there are times when the indirect utility 
derived from work (Uw) is greater than the utility derived from non-work activities (U,). There are also 
times when the utility derived from non-work activities is greater than the indirect utility from work. This 
diagram reflects the preferences of a hypothesised individual who will work during the day and perform 
non-work activities during the morning or night.
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The subtle difference of this model, more formally described in Appendix B, is its 
superior time-sensitivity. It treats time more appropriately for our discussion in that it 
does not treat it as a commodity but allows analysis over time. It also does not hold time 
completely static with equilibriums for one specific unit time only, but allows analysis 
within a unit of time. It enables us to study the consequences of the time-sensitivity of 
an individual on the allocation of labour services. This is essential in analyzing 
temporary employee preference driven segmentation. The model has the ability to expose 
the time-sensitivity of preferences in time, and therefore the time-sensitivity of different 
job forms in labour markets9.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF A TIME-SENSITIVE LABOUR SUPPLY -  
EMPLOYEE PREFERENCE DRIVEN JOB FORM CHOICE
Within this framework one can compare the different employment solutions of two 
different groups of potential employees, those who do not value control over their 
working-time (time-insensitive) and those who do value control over their working-time 
(time-sensitive). When these two groups are faced with two different job forms their 
preferences will tend to form a segmented labour market.
The first group is distinguished by time-insensitive preferences. The second group is 
distinguished by time-sensitive preferences (protean employees). (The differences in 
preferences may occur for various reasons but it is not assumed or addressed here what
9 Winston emphasises the cyclical nature of time in his book. We emphasise the heterogeneous nature 
of time. Hassard (1989a), believes that studies utilizing either approach are scarce (p 13).
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those reasons might be.) These two different types of workers when maximizing their 
utility functions compare the utility derived from non-work activities with the indirect 
utility derived from income generated by work. This is done in the manner described in 
the section above. It is first assumed that this occurs in a market place where the job 
form has a rigid set of time constraints that must be adhered to. Later this will be 
relaxed.
In general, because the first group of workers have preferences which are not time- 
sensitive, when they work has little bearing on their final utility. If the job form implies 
rigid work schedules, the effect on their final utility will be minimal. However, for a 
group of workers whose preferences are time-sensitive, the constraint of rigid work 
schedules will effect their final utility drastically10. This difference between the two 
groups is shown in Figure 4.2 below.
10 These are two hypothesised groups and one can imagine a semi-sensitive employee who might work 
within the time rules of an institution but demand overtime rates for social hours.
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Figure 4.2
Time-Sensitive Employee in a Time Constraining Job Form
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Figure 4.2 shows that under a time constraining job form the demand for labour is absolute and set by the firm. 
In this case the firm allows time off or does not need workers at week three. During week six. though, the 
time-sensitive employee (UJ has a great demand for time off since the utility of non-work activities is shown 
to be much greater than the indirect utility from work. However, they must work. The time-insensitive worker 
(Uj) exhibits an increase in utility at week three since it does not matter when the non-work activity is done for 
this type of worker.
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The unit time of analysis T is assumed here to be two months, shown as eight weeks 
along the X axis. A representative of the first group of workers with time-insensitive 
preferences is shown by the flow of non-work utility as described by curve A 
representative of the second group of workers with time-sensitive preferences is shown 
by the flow of non-work utility as described by curve U,. The indirect utility from work 
is given by Uw and is assumed to be identical for both individuals. The demand for 
labour is given by the dichotomous function D, where the demand for labour is either 
"on" or "off1. This is used to simplify the analysis and the diagram.
The time-sensitive worker exhibits an increase in utility from non-work activities in week 
six, otherwise at any other time the worker prefers to work, since the indirect utility 
derived from the wages earned is above the utility from non-work activities during all 
weeks except week six. There is no possibility of substitution. The employee’s 
preferences for non-work activities (therefore work as well) are time-sensitive.
Formally this preference for control over working-time is felt through the zi(xi(t);t)) term 
(speed of output) of Equation 1. This term denotes the efficiency of production, and 
Winston suggests that this is time-sensitive since the production environment (Winston 
uses E(t) to denote this) changes throughout the day (therefore the "speed of output" will 
change). (Winston relies heavily on cyclical variations like day to night altering the 
production environment to change the relative efficiency of production). So that we can 
rewrite Zj as:
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z±(t) = fi(xi(t),li) Ei(t) = zi(xi(t) ,li; t) , [4]
Where ^  is a function partially explained by the production environment E(t).
We, however, in our application are redefining the zi(xi(t);t)) term by redefining what 
effects the production environment, E(t). Again, Winston’s production environment 
changes constantly via exogenous environmental rhythms, like the daily train schedule, 
or the yearly weather conditions etc (Winston p 159). We accept this influence over the 
efficiency of production but find it too conservative. Therefore, we include in our 
production environment E(t), personal preference aspects that individually deteimine the 
efficiency of production or the utility of work - elements like one’s father visiting, or an 
offer to play tennis, or a preference to sleep late. To us, individuals who find tie timing 
of their activities central to their utility (labelled time-sensitive) will have unique 
production environments, as represented in Figure 4.2 by the U, curve. And a restrictive 
scheduling will decrease their production efficiency (speed of production in non-work 
activities) and therefore decrease total levels of utility.
However, the production environment, E(t), of the time-insensitive worker is not a 
function of their own preferences, since the timing of activities just does not natter to 
them. Their utility curve, Uj, shows a drastic increase in the utility derived from non- 
work activities during week three. This occurs just at the moment when the labour 
demand schedule D, is such that they are not needed (or not allowed to work). This is 
not by chance. It is because the worker’s utility from non-work activities is time- 
insensitive that the utility from non-work activities will rise at exactly this point within 
the unit time. It does not matter when the non-work activity is performed. It is merely
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performed when there is no work, as determined by the job form. So this increase is not 
showing the pattern of preferences of the employee, as much as it is showing the timing 
of non-work activities. The utility derived from non-work activities is independent of 
when it occurs. The time-insensitive preferences of this worker allow utility 
maximization while employed under this time constraining job form.
Clearly, because the time-sensitive worker must work during the week in which the flow 
of utility from non-work activity is greater than the flow of indirect utility from work, 
week six, there is a loss of utility (The difference in utility derived from non-work 
activity and the indirect utility derived from work). Furthermore, because the time- 
sensitive worker will not be able to work during the time when the utility flow from non- 
work activity is low, there is another loss of utility. It is the combination of the 
employee’s time-sensitive preferences and the restrictions of this job form (rigid work 
schedules) that cause the decrease in overall utility11.
In another job form though, wherein the worker has control over working-time, the 
circumstance will change considerably for the time-sensitive worker. With control over 
working-time, the time-sensitive worker will be able to maximize the flow of utility from 
both work and non-work activity. This is shown in Figure 4.3.
11 One might say that non-protean employees may too be "time-sensitive" since if they are accustomed 
to rigid schedules, they become attached to certain patterns for time off. We however define time-sensitive 
employees as those requiring working-time scheduling freedom.
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Figure 4.3
A Time-Sensitive Employee in an Accommodating Job Form
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Figure 4.3 shows that under an accommodating job form the employee turns the demand for 
labour on and off. It is the employee who has control over working-time. If the employee 
is time-sensitive, as is shown here (UJ, then there will be a gain in utility from an 
accommodating job form.
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In Figure 4.3 the job form allows the worker to work when they prefer. Here it is clear 
that the time-sensitive worker will choose not to work during week six, since it is during 
week six that the non-work utility flow is greater than the indirect utility flow from 
work12. The decision to work is unconstrained. The employee turns the labour demand 
schedule on or off. This of course maximizes utility13. At the precise moment in time 
(t*) that the time-sensitive worker requires "time-off’ this job form allows it. The utility 
that is lost in the time constraining job form shown in Figure 4.2 is recaptured by virtue 
of the control over working-time that is allowed in this job form. Faced with the two 
different job forms, the time-sensitive worker, in m aximizing utility, would tend 
toward the job form that allows control over working-time, since control produces 
a level of utility greater than the job form that is time constraining. This is employee 
preference driven job from selection14.
Adam Smith’s (1976) "equalizing differences hypothesis", or theory of net advantages, 
states that the rewards of different jobs should tend towards equality. Rewards in the 
sense of all of the advantages of a job. In our discussion it appears that for some 
individuals, those that prefer control over working-time, the calculations of net
12 This is akin to Groneau’s (1986) discussion of the "shadow price of time".
13 Owen (1979) suggests that flexi-time will not increase leisure time. We suggest that it might change 
the quality of leisure time. Owen's analysis suffers because time is treated as a commodity; the number 
o f leisure hours takes precedence. We believe the timing of leisure hours is most relevant
14 Allen's (1981) empirical investigation of work attendance suggests that the flexibility of the work 
schedule directly relates to attendance. See also Schappi (1988). He also states that "there was no 
empirical support that certain classes of individuals are absence prone regardless of scheduling flexibility 
provided by their employers or the opportunity costs of taking a day off". This gives some evidence that 
preferences over working-time are true exogenous preferences not traits (see Chapter 3). Hepple (1990) 
suggests that full-time permanent employees need to be paid more than others to decrease their incentive 
to be absent.
88
advantages of temporary work should include control over working time (at the expense 
of income), thus their selection of this job-form 15.
For the time-insensitive worker, though, the choice may appear easier. Either job form 
will maximize utility. However, since there is no gain from choosing the job form that 
allows control over working-time, other characteristics of the two job forms may be 
considered (These were implicitly held constant in the preceding analysis but are now 
relaxed here). These may include, promotional possibilities, job security, working peers 
and others. If the time constraining job form exhibits any more positive attributes it will 
be selected (Of course this may be the case as well for the time-sensitive worker, since 
only if the gain from control over working-time outweighs the benefits that the other job 
form has to offer will the time-sensitive worker choose the job form which offers 
control).
These arguments can also apply to the internal job market. In an evolutionary way, job 
tier compensation might ultimately reflect those preferences of tiers either for control 
over working-time or not. Rather than segmentation this results in different 
compensation packages that may appear as demand-side stratification but may have their 
roots in the time preferences of the employee. Again the increase in utility occurs only 
if the employee has time-sensitive preferences.
13 Although this would be nice to test, problems arise which are noted in our results Chapter 11 in
footnote 2.
IN CONCLUSION - TWO HYPOTHESES
The Winstonian model, then, formalizes the influences of maximizing behaviour in a 
labour market within time. The consequences of this are shown to be a possible selection 
of one job form over another by one type of worker who exhibits time-preferences 
differently to another, or different compensation packages between different tiers within 
a firm. The basic hypothesis derived is that the time-sensitive preferences of some 
employees may drive them into the job form which allows greatest control over working- 
time. Different preferences will be the driving force behind different compensation 
packages in the external labour market and in the internal labour market. This creates 
an example of employee preference (or supply-side) driven intra-occupational job form 
choice. In this study we propose two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1:
In the internal labour market some job forms will include working-time 
flexibility in their compensation package and others will not - according 
to the sensitivity to time of the employee.
Hypothesis 2:
In the external labour market temporary agency employment will exhibit 
working time flexibility which is partially driven by the supply-side 
preferences for control over working-time (supply-side driven intra- 
occupational job choice).
These hypotheses, generated from the time-sensitive model, are based on the supply-side
job choice theory shown in Chapter 3 above, as well as the proposed evolutionary
changes on work which may boost the time-sensitivity of employees shown in Chapter
2 above. We will look at these two hypotheses in greater detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter
The Two Hypotheses In Closer Detail
The two hypotheses developed in the previous chapters are now examined further. It is 
suggested that preferences for control over working-time may effect the internal labour 
market in varying ways, namely in the composition of the different compensation 
packages, but also including the effort of employees. It is also suggested that preferences 
for control over working-time may effect the external labour market mainly through 
search costs. The search costs will increase because of the preferences for control by the 
employee (supply-side forces), as well as the timing inconsistencies of the firm’s demand. 
Ultimately, this may lead to the market mediated institution - the temporary agency and 
its resulting labour market segment, the temporary agency employee.
CONTROL OVER WORKING-TIME AS PART OF THE COMPENSATION 
PACKAGE IN THE INTERNAL LABOUR MARKET (THE LARGE FIRM)
The preference for control over working-time may play a very important role in the 
various compensation packages (or set of working conditions) that prevail across various
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job forms (tiers) within a firm. If it turns out that groups of individuals within a firm 
have preferences for control over working-time that differ, their resulting working 
conditions may be attributable to these different preferences. In other words, if control 
is relatively unimportant to a group of individuals, then the lack (or benefit) of control 
will have little consequence over their final utility and therefore be of little consequence 
in the compensation package. However, if control over working-time is highly valued, 
then including control over working-time in the compensation package will not only mean 
that pecuniary compensation will not have to be as great, but also that work effort may 
be greater. A simple example using the time-sensitive analysis will illustrate.
Again the labour supply is distinguished by two different groups of individuals. The first 
have time-insensitive preferences and the second have more inconsistent time-sensitive 
preferences for activities (the protean employee). It is assumed here that the firm has a 
set standard pattern of demand for labour services over time. What are the consequences 
of this? In the internal labour market the wage has been contracted in a prior 
arrangement for an extended period of time. This contracted wage then holds for the 
analysis over the entire length of the unit time. For those with time-insensitive 
preferences the consequences are nil, since their expected patterns in non-work activity 
utility will be consistent with the firm’s demand schedule. However, for a group where 
non-work activities have time varying non-work utility flows, discrepancies may occur.
If at a given moment within the unit time the non-work activity yields utility greater than 
the indirect utility gained by working, the employee is obliged by the long term contract 
to work. This is because of the rigid long term contract and the standardized patterns of
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work established by the firm. The consequences are that an employee is being paid, for 
the length of time that his non-work utility is greater than the indirect utility from work, 
below what is necessary for the employee to work. This may yield inconsistent 
performance. It may also yield a decrease in effort. Clark, (1992) has shown "that the
i
perceived relative value of the reward will effect the level of effort"1. It is proposed 
here that the perceived relative value of the reward is time-sensitive. In other words, 
when non-work activities are valued, the relative perceived value of the wage decreases. 
Thus, shirking or a decrease in work effort may occur.
This example can be shown in a Winstonian diagram (Figure 5.1). Here the unit time 
T =  six months. The wage is static for six months and is assumed to give the utility 
flow as described by Uw. To person 2 this wage is just sufficient to induce that person 
to work each week out of the six months. This is shown by the flat utility flow curve 
of non-work activities U2. These are the time-insensitive preferences. For person 1 the 
wage is more than sufficient during some weeks and less than sufficient during other 
weeks. This is shown by the undulating utility flow curve of non-work activities Uj. 
Since person 1 had originally contracted for the six month period, there is nothing they 
can do to alter the work schedule. They are obliged to work the entire six months. 
Although, overall the person may average out to being paid sufficiently over the six 
month period, there may be moments of insufficient pay (tr t2 and tj-tj).2
1 See also Staten (1982) for more on incentives to shirk.
2 Of course the selection of the unit time in this analysis becomes very important. The selection here 
may be described as the ability to choose which weeks out of the year are worked. If one picked a smaller 
unit time, say one day, the flexibility of working hours during die day would then be analyzed. The 
discussion would take place considering questions like: if someone did not like to work on Wednesday 
mornings, or preferred longer lunch breaks. Still the consequences are the same. There may be a decrease 
in effort or a decrease in production. These time elements may be “both physically determined and socially
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Figure 5.1
Time-Sensitive Worker in a Time Constraining Firm-Internal Job Form
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Figure 5.1 shows that a time-sensitive worker’s non-work utility fluctuates over time (U,). There are some 
moments, from t, - tj and t3 - t4, that the non-work utility is greater than the indirect utility derived from work 
(Uw). However, in the firm the worker must still go to work because of the time constrained work 
environment. This results in an overall loss of utility. The time-insensitive worker (Uj) does not suffer the 
same consequences, since as long as the employment structure wants them to work they are willing. It is only 
when the employment structure allows time off that the utility from non-work activities will rise for this time- 
insensitive worker. (This is not shown in the diagram).
constructed" (Hassard, 1989, p 80).
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If the firm included in the compensation package some control over working-time this 
would act like a real increase in compensation to the employee and the level of work 
effort may increase. But the internal market, it appears, has allowed little working-time 
flexibility. However, firms could be implementing compensation packages that give more 
subtle flexibility to employees — to employees who value their working-time flexibility. 
Offering it to these employees not as a fringe benefit, but because it is the least costly 
method of improving performance3.
This means that the driving force of creating flexible work patterns may not solely be 
competition for labour services. The competition argument suggests a battle for labour 
services being waged by offering different compensation packages — those which include 
flexibility and those which do not (the implication is that those who offer flexibility will 
be more attractive). Hill (1984) suggests that with specialization and production process 
indivisibility, working hour flexibility is disallowed even if the pressures of competition 
for labour forces increases. Here we take a different stance and suggest that (a) working- 
time flexibility is only attractive to those who value it and (b) that working-time 
flexibility may not be detrimental to the production of knowledge based products, but that 
flexibility may actually enhance employee performance.
Most importantly, we depart by suggesting that working-time flexibility may occur in 
various time units, and that including flexibility of hours of the day, or days of the week, 
or weeks of the year may yield significantly different results. This is why we prefer the 
phrase working-time control. It allows for a greater range of time units than does the
3 Orpen (1981) concludes that flexi-time has "no adverse effects on production" (page 115).
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general term "flexibility1'. Again, a model constructed to explore work as an activity that 
takes place within time may be more suitable in exploring the consequences of working- 
time control at work, rather than a model that commodifies time. And a model that starts 
from the perspective of the employee as opposed to the firm may raise issues that have 
been previously neglected.
Some differences in compensation packages may be currently observable within a firm. 
If there is a group of individuals who prefer working-time control, then they are more 
likely to exhibit working-time control in their compensation package. The significance 
of this control to the individual’s utility has been shown above. If, as has been proposed 
earlier, the protean employee emerges as being more and more prevalent it may be to 
both the firm’s advantage and the employee’s to work out increasingly diverse sets of 
compensation packages.
CONTROL OVER WORKING-TIME AS PART OF THE COMPENSATION 
PACKAGE IN THE EXTERNAL LABOUR MARKET (THE TEMPORARY 
AGENCY)
How the time structure of work effects the external labour market suggested here is a 
little more complicated. Whereas in the internal market an equilibrium over working­
time control can directly result between employer and employee, in the external labour 
market the problem of information costs develops. It has often been said that this is why 
the temporary agency will appear, because of the search costs that both sides of the 
temporary employment contract must incur in order to locate the complimentary 
arrangement (see Mangum, Mayell and Nelson (1985) for example). However, it has not 
been shown how instrumental the demand by the firm for flexibility and the supply-side
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issues of working-time control may together increase the search costs which facilitate a 
market mediated labour market — the temporary agency. Again, this is an important 
point of this thesis — to reassert the significant influences that supply-side preferences for 
working-time control may have in labour market arrangements, segments, organizations 
and in compensation packages. Here their effects are felt through search costs.
The Role of Search Costs
In general the analysis of external labour markets (the temporary agency) is stylized for 
clearer presentation. It will proceed in the following manner: assuming an instantaneous 
increase in the demand for labour services for a predetermined length, we will compare 
the difference in search costs incurred by the firm when searching in three different 
groups of labour service supply. The first group will generally be distinguished by an 
abundant labour supply with consistent, similar, time-insensitive preferences; the second 
group by a less abundant labour supply with consistent, similar, time-insensitive 
preferences; and the third group by a labour supply with inconsistent, dissimilar, time- 
sensitive preferences who desire greater control over their working-time (the consequent 
increases in utility being shown in Chapter 4).
Assume our profit maximising firm experiences a sudden need for labour (this could be 
due to an immediate increase in demand for their product, an ill employee, an employee 
on holiday, or a special project). Assume, for the time being, that the firm must employ, 
a new employee for, we’ll say a week. In a labour market where the labour supply is 
distinguished by a large group of employees who are willing to work for any length of 
time (assume too that they all have similar, time-insensitive preferences; in other words,
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all of the available worker’s preferences are identical functions of time), the wage 
necessary to induce any one of them to work is identical at all times and they all are 
available. The firm need only make one phone call. That will be its search cost, since 
it is assured of obtaining the same type of work for the same wage no matter who it 
contacts no matter when it needs them. The person comes to the job and fills in for the 
necessary week. This may be the case of a large group of unemployed workers who 
prefer work of any type at any time (Indeed they may be maximizing their income and 
disregarding entirely alternative non-work activities).
If, however, there is scarce labour supply with varying time-sensitive preferences 
associated with varying opportunity costs of non-work activities over time and thus 
varying availability at the offered wage, the search costs for the firm will rise 
considerably. One can imagine multiple phone calls to various employees before finding 
an available worker. It is obvious that the probability of finding an available employee 
is dependent upon the relative availability of employees. In other words, the scarcity of 
the labour services. It is concluded that the more scarce the supply of workers, the 
higher will be the search costs.
Again, assume the firm has an increase in demand for labour services. However, the 
labour supply available is one person willing to work at all times. In this case one phone 
call is all that is necessary in order to fill the position. Although the labour supply may 
be small, it is easily attainable. Therefore, the search costs are low. (Note the wage may 
not necessarily be low.)
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Now, compare this situation with a time-sensitive labour supply (A labour supply that 
values control over working-time). The time-sensitive labour supply includes two 
workers. One is available for half of the unit time, and the other for the other half. The 
firm does not know at any particular time which worker is available or willing to work. 
The probability of locating the appropriate person is 1/2. In the previous example the 
probability was one. The supply of labour services in this case has not become any more 
scarce; there are the same amount of labour services available, but the search costs to the 
firm have increased.4
Search Costs in a Winstonian Diagram
These examples are more concretely developed in a Winstonian diagram as in the four 
cases in Figure 5.2: a, b, c, and d. In d the firms flow of demand for labour services 
is shown over the unit time T = 1 month. In a the utility flows for the abundant group 
of consistent time-insensitive workers are shown. In b the utility flow for the single 
person and in c the utility flows for the two time-sensitive workers. In a all workers 
derive less utility over time from activities other than work and are willing to work each 
week in the month. In b the single worker is willing to work each week within the 
month. In c two workers are shown with two different sets of time-sensitive preferences 
over time. Worker 1 is willing to work in weeks 1 and 2, and worker 2 is willing to 
work in weeks 3 and 4.
4It has been shown more formally by Lippman and McCall (1976) that search costs increase when the 
probability of receiving a job offer decreases. This can be applied to the descriptions above. The 
probability of finding an available worker for the firm decreases from case one - an abundant supply of 
labour; to case two - one worker willing to work at any time; to case three - two workers willing to work 
only at specific times. See also Mortensen (1986) for a general discussion on search costs.
99
Figure 5.2
Comparison of Different Time-Sensitive Workers
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In Figure 5.2 above, a shows many time-insensitive workers. For ail of them the indirect 
utility derived from work Uw is greater than the utility derived from non-work activities U. 
During weeks three and four the employer should have no problem finding workers. In b 
there is only one worker but since that worker is time-insensitive the employer need only ask 
that one to work during weeks three and four. In c there are two time-sensitive workers and 
during weeks three and four the search cost to the firm to find an appropriate worker will 
increase since both of these workers may have to be contacted in order to find one willing to 
work, d  shows the increase in demand for labour services during weeks three and four.
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It is clear that if our firm, which is shown to have an increase in demand for labour 
services in weeks 3 and 4, were to face the labour supply of numerous time-insensitive 
workers a, the search costs would be low compared to the two cases b or c. The more 
subtle difference in search costs is revealed when comparing b and c. In week four if 
the firm faced the labour supply exemplified in b, one phone call would be sufficient. 
(Although the wage may be higher than in case a.) But by facing the time-sensitive, not 
any more scarce, labour supply in d  the search costs will increase. It first must find the 
one worker where utility flow for non-work activities are low for week four. The firm 
will then be able to fill the vacancy with person 2, whose utility flow is shown by U2.
If the firm contacted person 1, whose utility flow is shown by U l, they would receive 
a negative response at the wage offered w, since the utility from non-work activities 
during that week of the month (Uj), is greater than the indirect utility derived from the 
income from work.5
This causes a further complication for the firm. It can either attempt more searching, 
hoping to find person 1, or it can increase the wage offered until it reached the 
"reservation wage" of person 2. This is the classic search cost theorist’s stopping rule 
problem. (See eg Lippman and McCall, 1976; Mortensen, 1986; and Akerlof, 1984) 
One can generalize from this example over a large number of workers with various 
reasons for different time shaped utility curves. The search costs to the firm, compared
5 The fluctuations in availability of temporary workers may also be due to their being at another job. 
It can be argued though that this type of search cost is not necessarily any greater for temporary labour 
hiring or permanent labour hiring. It just determines the relative amount of labour supply available in the 
market.
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to other more stable labour supplies, could be higher.
When comparing the labour supply b and c with a, the scarcity o f labour is low, the 
probability of locating a worker may be lower, and therefore the search costs are more 
likely to be high. When comparing c with b, the time-sensitivity of the labour supply, 
its need for control over working-time, is the basis for the differences in the probabilities 
of locating a worker. In c the probability is lower than in b, therefore the search costs 
are higher.
The above analysis suggests then that the search costs fo r  the firm  will increase with an 
increase in the scarcity o f the labour supply and with an increase in the labour supplyfs 
time-sensitivity, their value o f control over working-time. Because the analysis was 
time-sensitive an element of search costs previously hidden by traditional analytical 
approaches, namely the supply-side effects of a time-sensitive labour supply, was 
uncovered.
The Employee’s Search Costs
Assume now that the firm has a reoccurring seasonal need for an increase in labour 
services. This is shown in Figure 5.3 as a seasonal increase in demand every March. 
If we assume our agents are rational and learn from the past then we would expect this 
pattern to become known. A worker who prefers to work in March will know exactly 
where to go and accordingly the search costs will be low. This is often seen in 
agricultural labour markets, where the same group of pickers will show up at a farm
102
figure 5.3
Repetitive Increase in Demand for Labour Services
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Figure 5.3 shows that March of each year is accompanied by an increase in demand for labour 
services. This repetitive pattern implies that workers will know where to go to find work, 
the search costs for them will be low.
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when the fruit has become ripe. If we generalize this pattern of short term demand over 
many firms throughout the year we may have a systematic demand for temporary labour 
services. The demand could cover the entire year. Again, seasonal fruit pickers will 
often follow the harvests. For example moving from apple picking one time in the year 
to hop picking at another time in the year.6
If the firm has inconsistent increases in demand, the worker will not know when each 
firm demands temporary employees. The employee will then have trouble finding the 
appropriate place to work. On a given month, since there is no previous pattern, there 
will be no reason for the worker to search for a job at one location over another. It 
would become necessary for the worker to at all times search out all firms to find the 
firm which has need for labourers. The search costs for the worker will thereby have 
increased considerably.
If we add to this scenario two different types of groups of employees, the differences in 
search costs due to time-sensitivity will again become apparent. For a group of 
employees with very little time variation in their preferences, the job situation finally 
acquired can last a long time since the indirect utility derived from the wages earned will 
be sufficiently high for an extended period. The search costs therefore will be distributed 
over a longer period. A group of workers with a desire for more control over their 
working-time (time-sensitive workers) will, by changing jobs with more frequency, incur
6 Informal discussions with apple farmers in Kent and Sussex have hinted that this is the case. They 
report that frequently the same apple pickers will show up at approximately the exact time that the apples 
are ripe. After picking apples they will then move on to pick hops from neighbouring farms, where at that 
exact time hops are ready to be picked.
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a relatively larger search cost. It is partly because their time-sensitive preferences will 
cause the wages earned to be insufficiently high for a sustained period that their job 
duration will be less. Thus the search costs for the time-sensitive worker will be 
distributed over a much shorter period.
Of course the duration of employment may be more directly linked to simply the duration 
of work available. But the consequences to the worker are the same. With a decrease 
in job duration, the search costs will be spread over a shorter period. The search costs 
per job will rise.
The above analysis suggests then that the search costs fo r the potential worker will 
increase with an increase in a time inconsistent demand fo r labour services and with an 
increase in the labour supply's preference or need fo r  control over their working-time. 
Again, because the analysis was based on a time-sensitive labour market, a significant 
time element of search costs in temporary work previously hidden by traditional 
analytical approaches was uncovered. It is implicit in temporary work that the time 
erratic behaviour of the market implies significant search cost problems.
The Temporary Agency Hypothesis as Two Propositions
The search costs described above play a critical role in the development of a market 
mediated temporary labour market. For it is the ability of the temporary agency to 
decrease the timing inconsistencies of supply and demand of temporary work that 
distinguishes it. It is its ability to provide a service that eliminates most, if not all, of 
the search costs described above that will make its service valuable.
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The agency is able to eliminate these search costs by providing all the information about 
all the employees and all the firms in the time-sensitive labour market. It attracts the 
temporary employee by providing information about jobs from all firms (thereby the 
agency obtains information on the individual’s particular availability and reservation 
wage). It attracts the firm by providing information about all potential workers (thereby 
the agency obtains information about available jobs and offered wages). Because single 
firms and individual workers have only limited information, they cannot alone provide 
the necessary information that the temporary agency is able to do.
The only information a single firm can provide about jobs to potential workers is its own. 
Since its demand for services is time erratic, this is insufficient. The worker must search 
at many different firms before they find an appropriate match. This increases the 
potential workers search costs. The only information an individual worker can provide 
about potential employees for the firm is their own. Since their supply of services is time 
erratic this is insufficient. The firm must search for many different workers before it 
finds a match. This increases the search cost for the firm. It is not possible for the 
single firm or the individual temporary employee to provide the information a temporary 
agency can provide. It is the timing inconsistency of labour supply and labour demand 
that makes this mediator necessary. It is the time-sensitivity of the temporary employee 
that is critical in forming this labour market segment. It is their preference for control 
over working-time that drives the labour market segment.
Because the temporary labour market is distinguished by time inconsistencies (or 
preferences for control over working-time) and scarce labour, the search costs for both
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the firm and the individual will be higher than in other markets. This high search cost 
will induce alternative organizations to appear that can provide information at a lower 
cost. So that, whereas before, the search costs may have been prohibitively high for 
either the firm or the individual to trade, because of the temporary agency the trade will 
occur7.
This theory of temporary agencies results in the following two necessary conditions stated 
as propositions, (which when combined are identical to Hypothesis 2 about external 
labour markets given above).
Proposition 1:
Temporary agency employees when compared to permanent employees of 
a large firm will perceive their job form as offering greater control over 
their working-time. (Suggesting that the temporary agency market 
mediated market provides for the time-sensitive preferences)
Proposition 2:
Temporary agency employees when compared to permanent employees of 
a large firm will show a greater preference for control over their 
working-time. (Suggestion of the time-sensitive preferences)
CONCLUSION
We have now developed a time structure from which we concluded that control over 
working-time will make a significant impact on the utility of only those employees that 
value that control. This means that, in the internal labour market, control may have its
7 In Appendix C we give a brief example of how temporary agency firms may capitalize on the 
differences between the search costs of the firm and of the temporary employee. Their profits may 
ultimately derive less from their own search costs than from the difference between these two search costs.
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greatest effect on those employees within the firm who are most time-sensitive, and that 
control over working-time may actually improve performance. In other words, that we 
would expect to see a positive relation between those people who value control over 
working-time and the amount of control over working-time in their compensation 
package. And that this relation might be construed as labour market stratification. 
Stratification of compensation packages between those job forms that have control and 
those job forms that do not. However, a stratification that may be partially supply-side 
driven.
We also concluded that, because of the time-sensitivities of some individuals, an external 
labour market arrangement or organization which will provide for the time-sensitivity of 
employees, will develop. It will develop because of the search costs associated with 
various time inconsistencies in demand and in supply. Ultimately a group of workers 
will emerge that work via a temporary agency. This group, often relegated to the 
periphery or secondary labour market segment is in a job form that has attributes often 
considered to be secondary labour market segment attributes (like job insecurity and 
insignificant benefits package), but the job form has other attributes (more highly valued 
by this group) like control over working-time. This control is our catalyst to the 
derivation of a supply-side driven labour market segment. The next few chapters, 
comprising Part 3, will test the hypotheses and propositions developed in Parts 1 and 2.
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PART 3 - Evidence
Chapter
6
Methodology -- 
Testing Our Hypotheses Using Several Forms of Evidence
THREE DIFFERENT DATA SETS
Evidence supporting our hypotheses is given by three different types of data. Initially, 
a secondary analysis of data compiled from previous investigators results is used to test 
the validity of the Atkinsonian demand-sided influences on job forms. These studies 
investigate whether organizations are developing a new structure of human resource 
utilization, a structure which produces an increased amount of flexibility. This tests the 
pertinence of using a supply-side approach rather then a demand-sided approach. We 
then analyze our own study of the London Temporary Accountancy market through a set 
of in-depth interviews with leading managers from temporary agencies. These include 
a structured interview of the opinions of the managers designed in the first instance to test 
some of our conjectures on job forms as well as an overall assessment of the accountancy 
market in general at the time of our study. Finally, we test our hypotheses through our 
extensive questionnaire data from a large London accountancy firm and a London 
temporary accountancy agency. This concentrates on the employee’s opinions of their 
working conditions which are critical to our hypotheses.
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Rather than relying on one type of data, our three tiered strategy provides the basis for 
cross-referencing and consistency checking. Further, it provides insights into 
professional organizations that may not be appropriately analyzed with techniques based 
on manufacuring industries. Our approach facilitates an examination of many of the 
supply-side issues which may surround the new protean employee that a single type of 
measurement may intrinsically exclude1.
METHODOLOGIES
Secondary Analysis of Data
In making a secondary assessment of evidence it is incumbent of the researcher to be as 
inclusive as possible in order to preserve the validity of the conclusions. Because the 
study of the temporary job form is relatively recent, we were able to include almost all 
of the US and UK studies which directly investigate the phenomena of temporary work 
as reported in the UK and US academic literature. This should increase the reliability 
of our conclusions based on previous data.
Our analysis is based upon 27 articles from the years 1963 to 1992. These largely 
include data sets which are predominantly geared toward responses by managers about 
their firm’s use of temporary employment. The scope of research ranges from 
government data sets like the UK Labour Force Survey and the US Bureau of Labor
1 Essentially we investigate the validity of our hypothesis on three different levels. Levels which 
correspond to those levels given in Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3. The first set of evidence looks at temporary 
employment in general. The second looks at a specific occupation and the third at the employees of two 
firms.
I l l
Statistics to case studies of specific temporary employees. Their approach is marked by 
the constant attempt to lump together all temporary employees. We feel this may be an 
initial misspecification of the temporary agency job form.
In general, analysis of secondary data sources can be fruitful in three ways. Firstly, it 
allows for an historical perspective on the development of organizations. Secondly, it can 
give sound evidence of the general trends about the hypotheses we are investigating and 
can be used to test previous theories. Finally, it can, through comparison, highlight the 
differences in our own approach. Indeed, these studies formed the basis for our original 
interests, for, after inspecting their results, we felt these studies could be made 
increasingly clear if supplemented by a study that embraces responses about working 
conditions from both temporary employees and permanent employees within an 
occupation.
In-Depth Interviews
In-depth interviews, by virtue of their ability to allow for more open responses, can ferret 
out concepts and opinions about organizations that may be hidden by a study restricted 
to quantitative data. Aware that open interviews can prompt responses influenced by the 
investigators attitude and personal attributes, thus violating construct validity, the 
interviews were, in the first instance, performed by telephone using a pre-written 
questionnaire (see Appendix D). It was only after these questions were answered that a 
more open discussion was initiated which sometimes concluded by arranging a more open 
face to face interview.
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Managers from 20 London temporary accountancy agencies were contacted; 17 of the 20 
were willing to be interviewed. This translates into an 85 per cent response rate. The 
twenty firms were selected randomly from a list of temporary accountancy agencies 
compiled from the 1991 Central London Yellow Pages Directory. The exclusion of other 
less specialized temporary agencies is justified in that, after an initial pilot survey of a 
random selection of all temporary agencies, it became clear that temporary accountants 
were working primarily from specialized firms rather than a general office help firm. 
(The temporary agency industry appears to specialize in professions, for example: legal 
secretary firms, health employment, secretarial.) Thus, our interview portion of the 
study can be said to give a good overall indication of managers' opinions in central 
London.
The interview itself was introduced as a London School of Economics research project 
about different forms of work. The respondents were informed that their responses 
would remain untraceable and be used for academic purposes. This improves confidence 
in the truthfulness of the responses given. An attempt was made to speak with the 
owner/manager so that responses were as much as possible obtained from employees with 
relatively equivalent job descriptions.
Employee Opinion Questionnaire
Since the theory of temporary work and the hypotheses of job forms developed in Part 
2, are based on the perception and relative value of working conditions by employees, 
a self-reporting questionnaire (a design which inherently measures perception and 
opinion) was considered the most appropriate tool. Although the accuracy of this type
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of research tool in obtaining actual "real" levels may be questioned, for our study this 
becomes less troubling since it is precisely the opinions and perceptions of employees that 
are critical to our theories. This ensures its construct validity. To a large extent a 
confidential and self administered questionnaire is one of the more accurate tools in 
obtaining this information and, if appropriately designed, one of the most objective 
unbiased tools, thus establishing its reliability.
This portion of the evidence yields some of the more important and original results of our 
study because there has been little investigation comparing working conditions between 
individuals in the same industry, performing the same job, but with different job forms, 
ie temporary versus permanent. Bearing this in mind, it is this design which allows us 
to be more confident in our comparisons of working conditions than other designs of the 
past. Because the questionnaire was administered in the same time frame, within the 
same region and in the same occupation, many of the influences which can skew results 
about job forms were held constant. This is an important aspect of our design for we 
feel, when trying to describe and compare working conditions or when trying to produce 
normative statements about working conditions, it is paramount that the effects of the 
time frame, industry, occupation etc., are. as much as possible, held constant.
The final design of the questionnaire followed an initial pilot study of 10 temporary 
accountants. Their responses were considered and follow-up telephone interviews were 
performed, thus alterations and adjustments were made to the questionnaire. Several 
large firm employees were also administered the questionnaire, and the process repeated. 
Furthermore, several managers were sent a questionnaire to make detailed design
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corrections in order to increase the readability and reduce confusion in its format. The 
resulting questionnaire is given in Appendix D.
The questionnaire was organized with care for its internal validity, taking into account 
possible spurious relationships (see eg, Yin, 1989). We included a range of questions 
about many different aspects of working conditions, and personal histories allowing us 
to test numerous relationships, not just control over working-time.
The two firms surveyed, a large London accountancy firm and a London temporary 
accountancy firm, were sent identical questionnaires in the Autumn of 1991. The large 
London accountancy firm was divided up into 6 divisions; 3 of these divisions were 
randomly chosen as perspective respondents. This amounted to 265 questionnaires 
distributed to the employees. The questionnaires were delivered by firm internal mail 
under our supervision with a cover letter with London School of Economics letter head 
stating that responses would be used for academic purposes and that all responses were 
confidential, that no individual would be traceable back to a particular questionnaire. 
The participants were also given a return envelope so that questionnaires were returned 
directly to us at the LSE. The firm itself never handled the completed questionnaires. 
From this we received 175 responses, a response rate for the large firm of 66 per cent.
A similar system was used for the temporary accountancy agency. All (75) of the 
accountants were sent a questionnaire through the post to their house. Also included was 
a cover letter which explained the project without referring to it specifically as a project
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about temporary employment, rather about working conditions. Again, completed 
questionnaires were returned by post to the LSE. Confidentiality of the responses was 
expressed. Of the 75 mailed we received 50 responses. This is a 67 per cent response 
rate.
THE EXTERNAL VALIDITY OF OUR STUDY
Robert Yin (1989) contends that a study of this type produces external validity (producing
results which can be used in other situations), not by statistical generalization but by
analytical generalization.
"In analytical generalization, the investigator is striving to generalize a 
particular set of results to some broader theory. For example, the theory 
of neighbourhood change that led to case study in the first place is the 
same theory that will help to identify the other cases to which the results 
are generalizable. If a study had focused on "gentrification" (see Auger,
1979), the procedure for selecting a neighbourhood for study also will 
have identified those types of neighbourhoods within which gentrification 
was occurring. In principle, theories about changes in all of these 
neighbourhoods would be the target to which the results could be later 
generalized. " (Yin, p 44)
This analytical generalization means that for this case study the focus may be one specific 
temporary accountancy agency and one specific large accountancy firm, however, the 
results may then be generalized to a much broader theory of different job forms within 
an occupation.
Still, we believe it is incumbent upon a case study to provide some proof of its statistical 
generalization or more importantly its use for a wider audience. This can be approached 
in various ways. A traditional method is to carefully select a case that is representative 
of an important larger group. This technique is akin to the statistical method of sampling
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from a larger population.
We have described in Chapter 2 the emergence of the importance of the knowledge based 
employee. This is suggested by the growing numbers of business service and 
professional employees in both Great Britain and the United States. Accountancy as an 
occupation fulfils almost all of the requirements of being in this group of knowledge 
based service business industries. It requires much formal education, services all 
businesses, and is itself inherently a knowledge based product This, we believe, goes 
a long way in satisfying the requirements of external validity.
Because we propose a general trend in employee preferences and a relatively new 
approach to labour market segmentation, no one set of evidence will be altogether 
convincing. We find it necessary to analyze the circumstances that surround 
organizations using three different sets of data. This will give more power to the 
conclusions that we draw about our hypotheses and about the hypotheses of demand- 
driven segmentation. In the following chapters this evidence is displayed and assessed.
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Chapter
Testing Demand-Sided Models by 
Secondary Analysis of Evidence
INTRODUCTION
We have constructed a model of intra-occupational labour market segmentation, while 
promoting two assertions: (i) that segmentation proper may partially occur between two 
groups of people within an occupation, those who work as temporary workers and those 
who work permanently within a firm (core - periphery) and (ii) that segmentation 
(stratification) may partially occur internally within the structure of the firm as expressed 
by the different compensation packages between tiers. The former is hypothesised to 
partially occur from employee preference influences, specifically the desire for control 
over working-time. The latter occurs due to mobility chain forces as well as employee 
preferences. Both are results of the preferences of protean employees.
The purpose of presenting segmentation in this way is two fold: (i) to emphasise the 
importance of the time patterns and preferences that surround work, and (ii) to establish 
the relevance of the supply-side (employee side) influences on labour market 
segmentation and stratification. The significance of time and temporary work was treated
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in previous chapters. This chapter investigates the appropriateness of the latter 
proposition by examining past temporary work literature.
While doing so, we will show how present studies have been predominantly testing a 
demand-sided segmentation argument. It is asserted here that they go far in disproving 
the total relevance of this argument. The general rejection of the demand-sided theory 
gives strong confirmation for the need of a study of supply-sided (employee preference) 
driven labour market segmentation theory.
The chapter begins with a brief review of the demand-side theory. Section 1 looks at UK 
literature that uses the firm as its starting point. Section 2 looks at UK literature that 
emphasises national data, and section 3 looks at US literature that emphasises national 
data on temporary agency workers. The analysis also gives some indication of the 
relative numbers of temporary workers in both the UK and the US. Several tables follow 
Section 2 summarizing the data on temporary work in the UK and one table follows 
section 3 which summarizes US data. We will also see to what extent the discussions 
have made use of the universal definition "temporary work" and where there might be 
room for more intimate studies of smaller segments of the larger group called "temporary 
workers".
THE DEMAND-SIDED ARGUMENT FOR LABOUR MARKET SEGMENTATION
In general, the demand-sided argument most often used to study temporary work is that, 
with more and more frequency, firms are becoming leaner. They establish this by
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coveting a smaller number of core workers. The theory goes on to say that they can do 
this only because they are allowed to increase their numerical flexibility (see Atkinson 
discussion in Chapter 3 above) within the firm. This will result in an increased use of 
peripheral workers, in this case temporary workers, by the firm at the expense of 
permanent job forms. Thus a demand-sided (or firm) driven segmentation of the labour 
market will occur.
Much of the literature below is used to test the hypothesis that firms are changing 
universally towards this new organizational structure1. A change like this, it is 
hypothesised, should result in greater numbers of temporary workers as a proportion of 
the general work force. The theory also suggests that there might be greater numbers of 
temporary workers working in this job form involuntarily. These are labelled 
"involuntary" temporary workers versus "voluntary" temporary workers. Both of these 
are either overtly or intrinsically tested in the literature on temporary work.
If we can show that the demand-sided argument for segmenting employees into temporary 
employment is partially, if not wholly, refuted by previous work, then this supports our 
contention for an analysis based on supply-side forces. Again, this is the point of this 
analysis.
1 Lane (1989) proposes that the practice extends through Britain, West Germany and France. She uses 
an historical and cross-national approach in her study.
120
TESTING DEMAND-SIDED ARGUMENTS 
EVIDENCE FROM UK
Firm Based Data
One way of investigating the demand-sided model is to use the firms themselves as a data 
base. This is done by approaching the firm and asking if its policies towards temporary 
work and other peripheral forms of work have changed. This then is usually followed 
by an analysis of how this will effect the working conditions of the labour force, both 
permanent and temporary. This is a direct approach in that the evidence is directly 
obtained from the opinion of managers to their own organizational structure. The results 
of some of the more important studies are given below.
The Labour Research Department’s (LRD) (1987) pamphlet summarises the findings of 
its own survey of this type. It was carried out between April and June 1987 and covered 
370 firms from various regions in the UK. They report that 42.4 per cent of the firms 
were increasing the use of temporary workers in the previous two years. They give 
different types of evidence to the increasing flexible structure of the firm by reporting 
that 15 per cent of the firms surveyed report that they are using temporary workers to 
replace permanent workers. In general it gives some indication that the use of temporary 
workers has or will change.
One result particularly pertinent to this study shows that all of the respondents from the 
banking finance and insurance industry report that they are using some temporary 
workers to replace permanent staff (two firms). The document goes on to note that
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agency temporary employees are treated differently in that they are regarded as the 
responsibility of the agency.
Meager (1986), using Institute of Manpower Studies (IMS) data of 175 employers (out 
of 296. "It covered a broad cross-section of sectors and size groups..."), from the 
opinions of employers, draws the conclusion that "among the IMS sample, the use of 
temporary workers has been growing since 1980." This is based on the fact that 39 per 
cent of the employers report increase use of temporaries relative to total employment, 44 
per cent report no change and 17 per cent reduced their use.
Meager notes that some "differences were observable between occupations in the form 
of temporary work adopted (here he is distinguishing between direct employment and 
agency employees). In particular, moving down the occupational hierarchy both in the 
manual area (from skilled to semi and unskilled, catering and cleaning jobs) and in the 
non-manual area (from managerial and professional to clerical and secretarial jobs) the 
proportion of directly employed temporaries tends to increase."
He concludes that "three-quarters of employers in most industrial sectors make use of 
temporary workers" and that "newer rationales for the use of temporary workers 
(associated with "flexible manning" policies) are increasingly important, but traditional 
rationales (holiday, sickness and absence cover, seasonal workload fluctuations etc) are 
still dominant." He qualifies this statement by noting that "The new rationales had 
emerged particularly in the manufacturing sector". The basis for this conclusion appears 
to be the 30 per cent of the respondents who reported that they use temporary workers
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"to avoid recruitment of permanent employees at a time of uncertainty about future 
employment levels"2.
Each of these traditional rational reasons are intrinsically interlaced with the timing of 
work. It is either the need of the permanent employee to have time off, or the 
seasonality of the workload that alters the temporary work force. Still, however, he 
predicts a rise of temporary employment in the future and an increase in the use of new 
rationales as the reason for using temporary work. Again, in general, this supports the 
demand-sided flexible firm hypothesis.
Potter (1987) also uses the IMS data to defend his belief that temporary work is 
increasing. He is particularly concerned with the consequences this will have on both 
unions and those workers who will be employed as temporary employees. He infers 
similar conclusions as Meager3.
Piotet (1988) reports that the EFILWC foundation’s4 data "indicate that there is a real 
interest in flexibility and a move away from salary-related issues as the sole object of 
collective bargaining, particularly in countries with relatively high income levels". But
* Notice how this could actually be a traditional reason if one reads the question closely. They are 
not replacing permanent jobs, but utilizing temporary personnel when they believe that demand may be 
short lived. If demand becomes longer term there is no indication that they would not hire these people 
full time.
3 The debatable issue of the IMS survey and the LRD survey is their reliance on the projections of the 
managers surveyed. There is some question as to whether this is a statistically accurate sample of all 
businesses. They do though take a step towards a more accurate study of temporary work in their attempt 
to emphasise the various industrial sectors studied and the differences between them. These articles are 
the strongest arguments for the demand-sided phenomena of labour market segmentation.
4 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
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the reliance placed on this statement can only be slim as the data were not given in the 
report.
Casey (1988) looks into the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) of 2000 
establishments from both 1980 and 1984. He finds no indication that those firms that use 
temporary workers are more likely to use part-time help, home workers and freelance 
workers. In fact, in some instances there was even found some negative correlation, 
(temporary workers were substitutes for part-time workers in some instances). He 
concludes that the "global notion of the "flexible firm" is scarcely supported" (p 47). 
Casey also found no hard data that there was an increase between 1980 and 1984 of the 
use of fixed-term contract users. This is an indication of a stable amount of this form 
of peripheral employment. This suggests there is no growth in the numbers of firms 
switching their employment practices.
Hakim (1990) in using the Employers’ Labour Use Strategy Survey suggests that very 
few firms are actually pursuing the flexible firm set-up in order to increase flexibility. 
This survey is unique in that it asks the employer directly what type of manpower 
strategy or plan is being carried out. There is even a direct question on their use of a 
core periphery strategy. The set up of the study is very good in that all questions were 
asked cautiously and in as unleading a manner as possible. She breaks up the study 
group into those employers that are "opportunists" and those that are "core/periphery 
strategists". Of the respondents, only 11 per cent were "core/periphery strategists". 
Because of this she believes that most firms are using peripheral strategies for traditional 
reasons.
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Hakim (1990) believes that most of the rapid increase in peripheral employment is 
"brought about by the continuation and intensification of traditional and opportunistic 
approaches, as an extension of, or substitution for, the core work force". She warns that 
"Institutionalised temporary worker use that was instituted because of the recession could 
turn into a more patterned thing in the long run". But, unlike Hakim, we assert that (i) 
the traditional firms’ use of permanent workers developed because of the competitive 
advantages that this brought to the firm and (ii) that the use of a peripheral workforce 
by traditional firms in recessionary times can coexist with a reestablishment of permanent 
work after recovery. The interesting point is that there is no evidence for a core- 
periphery strategy by firms. This then reasserts the importance of a supply-side (or 
employee preference) driven model of labour market segmentation between periphery and 
core workers. There may be more to be learned about periphery workers if periphery 
work is approached from the supply side. McGregor (1992) also using the ELUS 
concludes similarly that "the main reason cited by employers for recruiting part-timers 
and temporary workers was traditional ones" (p 225).
Rubery (1988) while giving a general review of data and key articles on precarious forms
of work in the UK concludes with some enlightening propositions about precarious work
and institutions. She states that
"the diversity of factors which influence the level and pattern of non­
standard and precarious employment forms must cast doubt on simplistic 
notions concerning the presence of universal trends towards flexible 
employment see eg Atkinson (1985) Hakim (1987b). There are major 
differences even between advanced EEC countries, in their industrial 
systems, in their systems of labour market regulation, and in their systems 
of social reproduction and income maintenance. These differences 
influence the incidence and significance of non-standard and precarious 
work Rubeiy (1988a). Thus, evidence of similarities in levels and trends 
between countries may be the outcome of different combinations of
125
circumstances which have by chance resulted in similar net overall 
changes. Moreover, current demand for precarious work may not reflect 
long term trends in the organization of markets and technology, but short 
term responses to uncertainty or variability in product markets or over- 
supply in labour markets” (p 70 -71).
She goes on to comment that
"the problems with universal explanations of the development of 
precarious or flexible work become even more apparent when particular 
countries or particular employment forms are studied. In the UK there is 
unambiguous evidence of growth only for self-employment and part-time 
work... the evidence for a general growth of other precarious work forms 
such as temporary, contract or homework is much less strong" (p 70 -71).
This supports our contention of the importance of clearly placing and stating which labour 
market one is studying for explanations may vary between occupations. Overall, the 
difference in opinion between Rubery and Meager and Potter, may be brought on by the 
fact that Meager and Potter use statistics which ask for future tendencies of firms, 
whereas Rubery is using current data and past growth rates.
Most potently Rubery concludes that
"the focus of research into the restructuring of the labour market should 
therefore not be exclusively or mainly on different contractual 
arrangements but also include the potentially much more significant 
transformations in employment conditions for those within the regular, but 
increasingly unprotected labour force" (p 71).
Rubery’s argument is of course to the point of our thesis -  that not just the change of the 
job form should be looked at when discussing the precariousness of work but the entire 
situation surrounding that job form. This suggests the need to include influences which
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effect an occupational market place across all job forms. In other words, not just a study 
exclusively about temporary workers but one in which permanent workers within the 
same industry are included as well. This then will give a good idea of how compensation 
occurs via working conditions across job forms. Most importantly, it should approach 
labour restructuring not as the exclusive domain of demand-sided effects but also supply- 
side (employee preference) forces as well.
General Data
The general notion of the flexible firm, beyond generating expected outcomes when 
surveying the attitudes of firms, also fosters some expectations about the total numbers 
of temporary workers in the UK and the number of "involuntary" temporary workers. 
If the flexible firm is a growing phenomena one would expect both numbers to increase. 
The following literature explores both of these numbers using national data. Again, what 
we stress here is that the demand-sided theory emphasis is once again prevalent, and to 
a large extent discredited. This opens up large avenues for further studies into employee 
preference driven labour market segmentation.
Casey (1988) has produced the most extensive study of Labour Force Survey (LFS) data 
as well as Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) data on temporary workers in 
his Temporary Employment - Practice and Policy in Britain. His first contribution is the 
extensive listing of categories of temporary employment. He uses eleven altogether and
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notes that "many of these categories in fact overlap each other5" (p 4). These categories, 
though non-industry specific, do break temporary work industry into the various forms 
the contractual arrangements take. It may turn out that these are good indicators of 
industry specific characteristics, if certain industries use certain types of contracts.
Utilizing the categories that he first establishes, the book follows with descriptions of 
some of these categories. Most notably for this study, he states that "people who work 
through and are paid by agencies numbered only some 50,000 in 1984 and made up only 
just over three per cent of the temporary labour force. ... and that nearly half are 
working in the banking, finance and business service sectors" (p 16). Interestingly 
though, Casey later notes that "The FRES (Federation of Recruitment and Employment 
Services) estimates that their members might have about 60,000 temporaries on the 
payroll at any one time in 1985 (a figure broadly consistent with LFS data), but that some 
half a million persons might have worked for an agency for some period in the course 
of that year" (p 82). This problem of counting temporary workers is inherent in any data 
set on temporary workers. Because the temporary workers and temporary work are time- 
sensitive, the actual numbers of temporary workers for any one year will always be hard 
to estimate.
Most noteworthy is Casey’s claim that others who do claim that temporary working in 
recent years has grown are given "no support whatsoever" by his own findings from the -
3 The eleven categories are: (i) Consultants or freelancers, (ii) Labour only sub-contractors, (iii) casual 
workers (different than King's (1988) definition), (iv) seasonal workers, (v) fixed term contract workers,
(vi) workers with a contract dischargeable by performance, (vii) workers on a training contract, (viii)
temporary workers on indefinite contracts, (ix) agency workers, (x) employees of work contractors, (xi) 
participants in special programs for the unemployed.
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LFS survey. From 1983 to 1986 temporary workers excluding those in government 
programmes grew but just 5 per cent. Citing the fact that this was a period of economic 
growth, it makes this all the more "noteworthy". In fact he goes on to explain that when 
this is expressed as a proportion to the total labour force, there has been no growth at all.
In an article (1988) published prior to his book, Casey brings up the issue of 
"involuntary*1 temporary work versus "voluntary" temporary work. The results cited are 
determined by the response to a question in which the participants select whether they 
took a temporary job because they could not find a permanent job or other reasons6. He 
finds that 36 per cent of those employed as temporary workers were doing so because 
they could not find a permanent job. This gives us the 36 percent of involuntary 
workers7.
Casey also examines the numbers regionally and suggests that involuntary temporary 
work is positively related to the numbers of unemployed. Those regions with high 
unemployment appear to have more "involuntary" temporary workers. Combining this 
with the conclusion that the numbers of temporary workers are stable, there appears to 
be a stable number of temporary jobs relative to permanent jobs. The consequence of 
unemployment means more permanent workers are competing with temporary workers 
for temporary jobs. As the number of permanent workers who obtain temporary jobs
6 The choices are: could not find a permanent job, did not want a permanent job, because the job has 
training and other reasons.
7 These are the numbers that we report in Table 7.2, though we believe they are a bit inflated in that 
temporary work has long been recognized as an avenue to secure some money while looking for a job or 
jo b  shopping. Furthermore, temporary work is often noted as an avenue to a permanent job. Arguably 
this will not account for all of the ’involuntary" temporary workers but it could explain some of them.
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increases, then the number of "involuntary" temporary workers increases. This does not 
mean that more temporary jobs are being created which are dissatisfying to the work 
force, but that preferences of individuals and the job form are not being matched up 
appropriately.
But, other than this, what does this tell us about temporary work? It tells more about the 
state of the economy as related to unemployment than it does about the working 
conditions of temporary work, or the reasons that temporary work exists. It is from the 
demand-sided theory and the broad definition of temporary work that this debate grows.
King (1988), using findings from the 1986 Labour Force Survey, reports that in 1986,
28.3 per cent of the temporary worker respondents reported that the reason was because 
they could not find a permanent job, 35.3 per cent did not want a permanent job, and 
32.9 per cent had other reasons (1 per cent mentioned contract with training). King 
states that "Both among men and women, the proportion taking temporary work as a 
substitute for permanent job has tended to fall very gradually between 1984 and 1987." 
This study, rather than emphasising the number of dissatisfied permanent workers, who 
are stuck in temporary jobs, is developed to propose a reason for the other 68 per cent 
who either did not want a permanent job or had other reasons. This gives some 
indication of the relative importance of the "employee preference" segmentation of the 
labour force into the temporary work job form.
Marshall (1989), using a different set of data, produces conflicting results on the numbers 
of "involuntary" temporary workers. These numbers differ greatly from the LFS
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numbers. Still, they are useful in that they show how difficult it may be to determine an 
"involuntary" temporary worker. She reports that in 1983, 52.6 per cent of temporary 
workers in the UK were involuntary, in 1984 - 60.2 per cent, in 1985 - 56 per cent and 
in 1986 - 57.2 per cent. Her sources were supplied from "unpublished Eurostat tables."
Burchell (1989), in a more specific study, looks into the "effects of precarious work on 
the psychological health of the individual" (p 225). However, before doing this he 
selects for his study those jobs that are particularly precarious and labels that group 
"temporary work." But, he clearly states that he excludes "many jobs which, although 
short term in nature, would be considered as good jobs in terms of other criteria such as 
pay, conditions, status and availability of work; for instance much specialized 
consultancy work is, by its very nature, almost always taken on a temporary basis may 
not be precarious" (p 226).
This is an interesting point in that it is because of the prevalent emphasis on the demand­
sided segmentation that studies like this will emphasise or be skewed towards the 
proposed effects of institutionally influenced labour market segmentation. To Burchell’s 
credit, though, he is trying to redefine what "temporary" is. To him, it appears that it 
need be employment that is necessarily precarious. However, the point to be gained from 
this is not whose definitions or typologies are the most accurate, but that there is a 
general emphasis on testing either the consequences of the flexible firm or the side effects 
of the flexible firm.
From his study Burchell concludes that the "primary psychological problem with
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temporary work is probably the insecurity that it brings ... insecurity and the failure to 
plan for the future are among the principle causes of the worsening in psychological 
health that accompanies ... temporary work" (p 245). But remember that these results 
depend upon his selection of temporary work to be studied - the previously described 
"precarious temporary work". This is possibly a form of selection bias.
Furthermore, the reactions of permanent employees in similar occupations were not 
shown. This suggests the possibility of occupational influences being registered as job 
form influences. But, in this study he is making a step to a more accurate (accurate to 
her) description of temporary work, in that he determines that the insecurity that she talks 
about can be more precisely placed onto those types of workers that are included in his 
study. He is giving some indication of the importance of a specialized study.
He also gives data on "involuntary" temporary work using a different data base. From 
four surveys ( the Prices and Income Board, 1968, The Federation of Personnel Services, 
1975, and the Alfred Marks Bureau, 1982, all cited in Syrett [1983]; and the Labour 
Force Survey, 1984), he reports a "consistent pattern over time". He claims that the 
proportion of involuntary temporary workers was increasing from 13 per cent (1968), 
through 25 per cent (1975), 33 per cent (1982) to 36 per cent (1984). He does go on to 
say that
"while these figures are not directly comparable because of differently 
drawn samples, different phrasing of the question and different response 
options, the conclusion that might be reached is that temporary work used 
to be taken on "voluntarily" in times of almost full employment, in times 
of high unemployment employees have increasingly been forced to take on 
temporary jobs due to lack of alternative" (p 238).
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Again, the effect may stem not from full time jobs being transformed into temporary jobs 
but from permanent workers muscling in on easy entry temporary work.
Dale and Bamford (1988) in summarizing some more specialized articles show how the 
use of temporary contracts may enable an employer to increase control over the 
workforce as well as to achieve numerical flexibility. They state that "evidence from 
qualitative research highlights the lack of labour market power which makes some groups 
particularly vulnerable to casualisation. For example, Fevre (1986) demonstrates the way 
in which redundancy and unemployment lead to an acceptance of casual work among ex­
steel workers in South Wales that would not have occurred in more prosperous times".
Coyle (1986, p 223), in a study of privatisation in the NHS, argues that "the most 
vulnerable sections of the workforce are at the foremost of a general dismantling of the 
regulation and control of employment". This is interesting in that it is a new argument 
about temporary work. It introduces the idea that temporary work is a controlling tool. 
Still, much more needs to be done to prove or disprove this.
Collinson (1987, p 385), in a study of women warehouse packers in the mail order 
industry as giving some good evidence to this influence of temporary work. The change 
in recruitment practices was seen to result directly from a recession. These of course 
defend Hakim’s position - the stickiness of established job forms. However these ideas 
are thwarted by the relative consistency in the proportion of temporary employees 
employed. Dale and Bamford (1988) conclude appropriately that
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"while surveys such as the LFS are invaluable in giving a national 
dimension to employment practices which are evident from qualitative 
research, it is essential that definitions are clarified, and the limitations of 
sampling frame and method understood if results are to be meaningful.
This is of particular importance when using a concept such as "temporary 
work" which has no formal definition and where variations in definition 
may make quite marked differences to the results of the analysis".
In summing up the UK data it should be pointed out, however, that some of the first 
academic works on temporary work seem to have been more precisely about temporary 
work rather than the flexible firm. Towers (1978), in writing on temporary work, gives 
us one of the first glimpses into temporary work in the UK. In the article he notes "that 
temporary work is strongly associated with industries and services of a cyclical or 
seasonal nature such as agriculture, hotels and catering, manufacturing and distribution, 
as well as those in which labour shortages seem to be a durable feature such as office 
work in central London and nursing generally". Immediately the emphasis is on the 
time-sensitivity of temporary work8.
At this point studying temporary work in an academic setting was quite rare. Still, 
Tower’s description of the 1975 Employment Service Agency survey of 7853 participants 
gives a fair indication of the number of temporary workers in the UK at that time. 
Tower’s survey followed a pilot study that was reported by Newton and Parker (1975), 
which gives us some indication of the numbers of temporary workers in 1974. Because 
of the novelty of these studies at the time, little was done except to describe the numbers 
of the temporary workers. He goes on to hypothesise that "in the case of temporary
s Each of the industries listed are distinctive, save the unifying theme of the seasonality of their 
demand. The labour shortage industries, though, give no clue as to why they would use temporary work. 
One answer might be the desire for control over working-time by the employees themselves.
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workers, it is likely that the composition of the [compensation] package is different in 
that the worker may seek and be offered ... benefits which are more likely to influence 
other members of the working population” (p 101).
Where does this leave us? The point to be gained is that the emphases of many studies 
on temporary work are based upon the idea of a changing structure in the organisation 
of work imposed by the demand-sided influences of the firm. Much of the evidence 
given by past literature appears to refute this idea. This makes room for our thesis which 
attempts to reassert the importance of the supply side (employee preference for control 
over working-time) in temporary work and the segmentation that it represents in the 
labour market, as well as the impact it may have on organizations9.
9 Bosworth (1987) tends to agree. He states that "flexible employment strategies seems to be an over 
simplification and many of the changes we observe can actually well be regarded as reflecting the strategy 
of individuals wanting to achieve their own flexibility" (p 36). See also Pollart (1988) for a general 
argument against the core-periphery analysis.
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TABLE 7.1 - The Total Number of Temporary Workers as Proportion of Total Employment -
SOURCE
Casey (1990)
1983-86 LFS
Meulders et al (1987) 
1986 LFS
Marshall (1989) 
OECD Figures
Towers (1978) 
Employment Service 
Agency Survey
Newton (1975)
Pilot Study 
Employment Service 
Agency Survey
Parker (1976)
Social Survey div.
YEAR
1974 1975 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986
5.5 5.6 5.6 5.6
6 .2**
3* 5.5 5.7
6.7
8
7.3
* This figure is calculated by Marshall from Hakim (1987).
** This figure includes those people employed temporary on government schemes.
TABLE 7.2 - Involuntary Temporary Workers as a Proportion of All Temporary Workers - UK
SOURCE YEAR
1968 1974 1975 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Casey (1990) 36
1984 LFS
Burchell (1989) 13 25 33 36
Various*
Marshall (1989) 53 60 56 57
LFS Eurostat 
Unpublished Tables
King (1988) 28
1986 LFS
Towers (1978) 8-30**
Employment Service 
Agency Survey
Newton (1975) 12-30**
Pilot Study of 
Employment Service 
Agency Survey
* Data from Price and Income Board 1968, Federation of Personnel Services 1975, Alfred Marks Bureau 1982, LFS 1984.
** These numbers are derived from a list of optional responses and vary depending on what is included as indicating "involuntarv" temoorarv em n lo v m r.n t
LOOKING AT DEMAND VERSUS SUPPLY-SIDE ISSUES 
EVIDENCE FROM THE UNITED STATES
Rather than looking at temporary work as a general phenomenon like in the UK, the US 
has, in some sense, defined temporary work as only those people who are working for 
temporary help agencies. And, therefore, most of the literature about temporary work 
is developed along these lines. This of course narrows the scope of the US studies, but 
makes more exact what they are talking about. Much of the debate that grows in the UK 
literature from the broad definition of temporary work that is assumed there does not 
come up in the US literature. Still, the driving concern of these articles tends to be the 
relative numerical significance or insignificance of temporary agency work.
Moore (1965,) was the first to raise the issue of temporary work to the academic 
audience in the US. In his study of the temporary help industry he gives a clear over 
view of how the industry started, from post-World War II to about 1963. In it he 
produces a most relevant anecdote of the beginning of the temporary help service 
industry:
"Robert B. Miller, president of Employers Overload, began in 1947 by 
running a blind ad in a New York newspaper. The ad asked people who 
wanted to work at their own convenience to phone Miller. The phone 
went wild. ’Calls were backed up all the way to New Jersey,’ Miller then 
recalled."
Here even at the birth of the temporary help industry we see a bold faced indication of 
the extreme importance that freedom over working-time has in the temporary work labour 
force; it wass engrained in temporary help from the beginning.
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Abraham (1990) discusses the growth of temporary help in the US. She notes that within 
the business sector, the growth of temporary help services was the highest of all business 
services between ’82 to ’86 with an annual growth of 19.9%. In 1986 she says the BLS 
estimated that 787,000 individuals were working as agency temps. This is in numbers 
employed. She puts these figures in interesting perspective by noting that in 1986 "there 
were 283,200 employees in the steel industry (SIC 331), 684,400 employees engaged in 
manufacturing computers and semi-conductors (SIC 3578 plus SIC 5674), and 833,000 
employees in the automobile industry (SIC 371)10.
The figures above highlight the importance of temporary agency employment. However, 
it would be even more instructive to know what profession the temporary agency 
employee was working in. These numbers reflect specialized professions (agencies
10 Belous (1989) in writing about die US "contingent" workforce (contingent meaning temporary, part- 
time, business services and self-employed) notes that the temporary workforce in the US grew from just 
.4 million workers to 1.1 million workers from 1980 to 1988. This is a 175 per cent change, which is very 
dramatic compared to the total US labour force growth rate of just 14 per cent He contends that "in recent 
years, US labour markets have shifted away from die rigid labour market world and toward a more flexible 
labour market environment. He claims that in 1980 90 per cent of the US work force were core workers 
and that 10 percent were contingent workers. This changed drastically in 7 years, wherein by 1987 75 per 
cent of the work force was made up of core workers and 25 per cent were contingent. This of course is 
strong evidence as to a switch in the US toward a more flexible employment dynamics. However, it is 
impossible to infer from this data whether the change is because of employer’s different approaches or a 
change in preferences by the work force (specifically expert, professional, protean workers) to a different 
employment arrangement.
Carey and Hazelbaker (1986) note that between November 1982 and November 1984 the temporary help 
industry added about 280,000 workers to its payroll, and that "it was the fastest growing industry among 
those with employment greater than 50,000". Simonetti, Nykodym and Sell (1988) note that this is a 
growth rate of about 24.4%. They also note that in 1988 2.5 million people were employed in the 
temporary help industry. These discrepancies, as noted in some of the UK literature, are due to the 
adjustments made in that people may be employed at a temporary help Arm for only one or two weeks or 
even one day. This implies that a large number of those people working for a temporary help Arm in any 
one year would not be counted using survey data. Only those people who are consistent workers in 
temporary help agencies. But this is the raison d'etre for the industry. This means that some of the more 
freely drawn estimates of the numbers of temporary help industry employees may be more accurate than 
the actual numbers procured by survey techniques. In the future it will be necessary to capture these 
missing temporary employees when estimating the temporary help industry’s labour force.
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usually specialize) in the business or knowledge dense professions. In that case, we 
argue that this does not necessarily mean that firms are converting to temporary help, 
rather it could mean that these industries and professions provide control over working- 
time which is suitable for time-sensitive employees11. Perhaps it is the supply-side 
preference of individuals who demand the flexibility of working-time that temporary work 
offers.
Some evidence for a supply-side force can be inferred from Abraham’s (1990) report on 
Bureau of National Affairs Survey. In describing the cost of using a temporary agency 
worker, it was generally reported as being more expensive by 42 per cent of the Bureau 
of National Affairs survey. They responded to the question "Is your hourly cost for 
agency temporaries generally higher or lower than the hourly pay and benefits costs for 
regular employees in comparable positions?" This supports Burchell (1988) from the UK 
who, in noting Syrett (1985), suggests that it is even more expensive for firms to hire 
temporary workers per hour than it is to use a full time staff. Perhaps the time-sensitive 
temporary worker is the only available knowledge based expert employee.
Magnum, Mayall and Nelson (1985), using national data from their own mail survey and
11 Belous (1989b) by using Manpower Inc data, the largest temporary help company in the US, 
establishes that a dramatic change in the composition of temporary help occurred between 1978 and 1988. 
In 1978 three-fourths of the placements by Manpower Inc. were in blue-collar jobs and in 1988 70 percent 
of the placements were in white collar office jobs (secretarial, clerical). This information coupled with the 
higher than average increases in temporary agency employment points to white collar work being inherently 
temporary. Rather than converting to temporary, knowledge based industries may develop initially as 
temporary employment situations.
One thinks of the legal profession and medical profession as having always worked temporary for various 
clients. Perhaps because a larger proportion of the labour force now work in professions sim ila r  to these 
older professions they too will (or do) work under a contracted employment situation suitable to their 
preferences.
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interviews, show that the use of temporary employees was negatively associated with the 
stability of product demand as measured by employment (n = 882 firms). This implies 
that it is the product rather than the organization of a firm that determines the use of 
temporary employees. If knowledge dense industries are inherently demand sporadic, 
then temporary employees will be hired. This argument is not Atkinsonian in nature but 
is still demand-side driven. And, although supporters of an Atkinsonian type model, 
Magnum et al propose that the temporary help service agency is an active external labour 
market devise which allows employees to be attached to some sort of coherent work, 
rather than be totally peripheralized from the firm. This gives a "modicum of security 
and upward mobility to workers in the secondary labour market" (p 611). This is 
particularly interesting to our discussion, for the temporary agency, rather than producing 
insecurity (as Atkinson asserts), provides increasing amounts of security. The idea is that 
no single firm can provide a stable demand for labour, however an industry or occupation 
in general can. This supports our contention that job security may be occupationally 
based or industry based, not job form based.
One of the more interesting studies to come out of the US is Gannon’s (1984) research 
into the preferences of temporary workers. He looks at time, variety, and flexibility in 
the nursing industry. Of the entire sample of about 1,000 nurses employed as temporary 
nurses, over 60 per cent chose "freedom to schedule my work in a flexible manner" as 
the most important reason for working as a temporary nurse. This gives some evidence 
to the driving force of employee preference for control over working-time to segment the
141
labour force discussed above12.
He concludes by noting that "the research indicates that flexibility in scheduling is the 
most important source of motivation ... and that the higher the skill level, the greater the 
probability of citing flexibility in scheduling as the most important reason for becoming 
a temporary employee." This supports our contention that studies of temporary work 
which neglect supply-side influences about control over working-time may be missing a 
significant element which describes this job form, an element that is based on intra- 
occupational employee preference job form choice, driven by time-sensitivity.
Williams (1989) reports on a unique survey of what temporary employees earn. This is 
based on a survey by the Bureau of Labour Statistics conducted in 1987 which covered 
more than 600,000 workers (it did exclude those establishments employing fewer than 50 
workers) and revealed wide variations. The data itself shows that pay was partly 
determined by the location of the job and by the occupation. This is more evidence as 
to the importance of distinguishing which occupation is being selected to study as well 
as location, a methodological consideration that the interview and questionnaire portion 
of our study (Chapters 9 -1 1 ) employs.
The data given on the numbers of temporary agency employees in the articles discussed 
above is given in Table 7.3 below.
12 Note that he did not compare these responses with nurses that do not work temporary. Permanent 
nurses may have the same working-time flexibility. Our study is sensitive to the need to study various 
groups of workers at different points in their career and in different job forms.
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TABLE 7.3 - The Total Number of Temporary Workers Working in Temporary Agency - US
(Numbers are in thousands)
SOURCE YEAR
1956 1972 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Abraham (1990) 807
US Dept, of 
Labor data
US Dept, of 180 320
Commerce data
Carey (1986) 340 400 420 450 390 500 650 695
[US Bureau of 
Labour Statistics]
Gannon (1987)
National Commission 
for Manpower Policy
Mack Moore Survey 20 
1956
Simmonetti (1988) 2 . 5
US BLS est. mil.*
Statistical Abstract
US BLS (1990) 736
US Dept of Labour 1
(1988) mil.*
2 - 3 
mil.*
CONCLUSION
The UK data tests more directly than the US data the hypothesis put forth by Atkinson 
and other demand-sided arguments. In the UK literature, we observe evidence against 
the theory of a restructuring by organizations to use temporary workers. This supports 
the importance of a discussion for supply-side forces. The US data shows an increase 
in temporary agency employment, and yet little evidence for a demand-sided or 
organizational driven change (the increase could be purely supply-side). Whether the 
change is due to organizational changes, occupational emphasis changes or employee 
preference changes is unclear.
Although many issues may surround temporary employment and all may have influences, 
we feel that past data yields a compelling intuitive basis to look at the supply-side 
employee preference aspect of temporary employment. Because there has been little 
work comparing working conditions between temporary employment and permanent 
employment conditions within an occupation we feel such an investigation will contribute 
much to understanding temporary employment.
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Chapter
Evidence by Interviews
"It was a sight to behold Tim Linkenwater slowly bring out a massive 
ledger and day-book, and, after turning them over and over and 
affectionately dusting their backs and sides, open the leaves here and 
there, and cast his eye half mournfully, half proudly, upon the fair and 
unblotted entries". (Charles Dickens - Nicholas Nickleby)
THE LONDON ACCOUNTANCY MARKET
By investigating the London accountancy market through manager’s opinions we can test 
some of the hypotheses that were put forth in the theoretical sections of this thesis. 
Firstly, by coupling our interviews with professional accountancy journal articles we can 
test the validity of the Atkinsonian idea that job security is linked to job forms rather than 
occupations or industries. We investigate the rational for studying a specific form of 
specialized temporary work rather than temporary work in general. We also investigate 
the amount of control over working-time employees possess as expressed by managers.
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This provides a test for our temporary agency employee preference hypothesis 
(Proposition 1) and our control over working-time hypothesis (Proposition 2).
The sample included 17 managers from 20 companies approached. The name of the 
companies which responded to our interview are given in Table 8.1 below. They range 
from the smallest to the larger temporary firms that have several branches.
Table 8.1
London Temporary Accountancy Agencies Interviewed
Love & Tate 
Kelley
Allan Marks David Statton 
Accountancy Connections 
Abacus
Accountancy Personnel (1) 
Accountancy Personnel (2) 
Accountancy Personnel (3) 
Selected Accounts Personnel
Reed
The Accounting Staff Centre 
Accounting Plus 
Accounting Recruiting Inc. 
Accountancy Aims 
Accountancy on Call 
Bond Accountancy 
Accountancy Task Force
INTERVIEW RESULTS ON JOB SECURITY
The accountancy profession in the last ten years has grown almost 33 per cent. The 
number of students in the profession has grown more than that (Harvey, 1991). 
However, the summer of 1991, the time frame in which data was collected for this study, 
was by all accounts, a period of recession for most industries in London and the 
accountancy market was no exception. As reported in several trade journals, as well as 
newspapers, the London accountancy market was, for the first time in over a decade, 
contracting. Staff across the board were being made redundant:
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”... 225 redundancies at KPMG, Peat Marwick McLintock, UKs second 
largest firm. ... 120 staff cut from London office, 60 from the London 
region and the remainder from the Northeast. ... Redundancy terms at 3 - 
4 months salary" (The Accountant, May 1991).
"Price Waterhouse announced in early November that 150 consultants "at 
most grades" would be let go" (The Accountant, Nov 1991)
Accountancy "... as leading figures point out - is no longer a job for life.
Nor is it the preserve for the dull and grey; while such people have a role 
they are unlikely to make it to the top" (The Independent, 28 July 1992)
The more qualitative accounts about the large accountancy firms given above are reflected 
in the numbers given in Table 8.2 below.
Table 8.2
Numbers of Accountants Made Redundant Summer 1991
Company Numbers Made Redundant
KPMG Peat Marwick 225 Professional
Coopers & Lybrand 
Deloitte
220 Professional and Support
Price Waterhouse 180 Professional
Ernst & Young 150
Touch Ross 150
BDO Thornton 35 Professional / 35 Support
Source: The Accountant, July 1991
Clearly, the London accountancy market was contracting. These redundancies came after 
a large build up of staff throughout the 1980s. There were 29,911 United Kingdom 
accountants who were formally attached to an accountancy association in 1950; 88,636
in 1970; 133,712 in 1980; and 177,911 in 1990. These numbers imply a 33 per cent 
increase in the 1980s.
It appears that the pattern of growth for the temporary agency accountancy market is 
similar. Using responses from our more open interview, almost all of the 17 managers 
of temporary agencies surveyed believe that there was a rapid growth in the number of 
temporary accountancy agencies in the 1980s. One of the temporary agency managers 
stated,
"It was so easy to start up a company [in mid 1980s]. You simply find 
a store front, advertise in the paper for some accountants and you were on 
your way."1
Indeed, most of these agencies sprang up in the accountancy boom period of the 1980s. 
It may have signalled the ability of knowledge based products (perhaps driven by 
technology) to be commodified.
However, during the period of this study, things had changed drastically for the 
accountancy market and for the temporary accountancy market as well.
"Less demand for temporary professional staff and static salary levels 
among accountants in the UK are just some signs of the recession on the 
profession according to a report by Robert Walter Association. The 
London recruitment consultant. ... Hie report which covered the London 
and Birmingham regions showed that the demand for temporary 
professional staff is likely to dip sharply this year, along with requests for 
qualified temporary staff." (The Accountant, May 1991)
1 Quotes from temporary managers are from different mangers in each case.
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This is also reflected by the responses to our structured interviews. Of the respondents, 
75 per cent reported that "there had been fewer jobs available for their staff over the past 
18 months". Several even noted that the drop had been severe. Two of the respondents 
felt that there had been not "too much drop", and one other reported that there was 
actually a slight increase. They explained this by the use of temporary accountants when 
companies are going out of business "to clear up and clean up their accounts".
Table 8.3 justifies this response to some degree. It shows that insolvency work for some 
of the larger accountancy firms had increased as well.
Table 8.3
Percentage Increases in Insolvency Work By the Big Six Firms 1990 - 1991
Company Percent Increase
C & L Deloitte 56
KPMG Peat Marwick 100 
Price Waterhouse 100
Ernst & Young 30
Touche Ross 54
AA 64
Source: The Accounumt, June 1991
None of those temporary agency managers contacted felt that business had shrunk to 
zero, but had perhaps dropped by 25 per cent. Still, it was noted that some of the 
branches of the large temporary accountancy Reed Personnel had been shut down.
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Another large firm, Accountancy Personnel, appeared to be performing comparatively 
better.
It appears that the journal and newspaper reports, when connected to the interviews of 
temporary agency managers, imply redundancy for the accountancy labour market in 
general. Whereas the Atkinsonian demand driven model of a firm would expect a 
shedding of accountants from the outer rings of the firm (the peripheral job forms), a 
more accurate description might be that the recessionary influences take a slice out of the 
Atkinsonian accountancy labour market pie. A group of peripheral as well as core 
employees will be made redundant. This, of course, also includes the temporary 
employees.
However, organizational differences could result in different effects of a general decline
in demand for an occupation. Large firm employees, or perspective large firm
employees, may register with the temporary agency as they are made redundant. This
could cause an increase in the supply of temporary accountants alongside a decrease in
demand (as shown by our survey), which in turn may cause more intensified competition
for long term temporary firm employees to find jobs. As one of the temporary agency
managers interviewed reports,
"We are now getting more applicants who were previously employed by 
large firms."
A SPECIALIZED FIELD
The interviews also suggest that the temporary accountancy market, as opposed to the 
temporary labour market in general, is a very specialized field. Most temporary agencies
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supplying temporary accountants as their main function (rather than secretaries and the 
host of other temporary office jobs); 88 per cent of those interviewed felt that the market 
in general is supplied by agencies that specialize in accountancy.
This supports our original assumption that we would be studying a form of temporary 
employment that is not, and should not be, linked to other forms of temporary work. It 
is a specialized field that may (and this is one of our main contentions) be exerting 
occupational forces that are different from other temporary jobs. This emphasises the 
necessity of studying temporary jobs not just as a general phenomena (as many demand­
sided theorists do) but as an occupational phenomena; not all temporary employment can 
be lumped together. This, then, supports investigation of supply-side issues which may 
be of importance in describing and analyzing job forms.
It also links temporary accountancy employees to the knowledge based industry in a 
specialized information technology field. This is the assumed area where protean 
preferences, or preferences for control over working-time, would surface.
There was also evidence that some of the professional accountancy placement agencies 
(agencies which are placing highly sought after individuals in permanent positions) will, 
on occasion, place an accountant in a temporary position if that accountant wanted to 
work for only a short period (a form of preference for control over working-time). Still, 
they do this as a sideline only, as stated by a placement firm manager,
"It’s not really what we do on a day to day basis. Maybe once a month."
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INTERVIEW RESULTS ON CONTROL OVER WORKING-TIME
From our interviews, we have evidence that temporary agencies provide control over 
working-time. They do this, according to one manager, by allowing employees to "either 
accept a job or not". Although not a structured question in the telephone survey, 100 per 
cent of the managers felt that their firm provides control over working-time. They link 
this to the fact that temporary employment is continually being decided upon by the 
employee, therefore they control when that occurs. To many of the managers it was an 
aspect of their profession which defined it. This means we cannot reject our Hypothesis 
2 (that temporary work will provide greater control over working-time than other job 
forms).
In asking the managers directly why they think people sign up with their agencies, several 
respondents mentioned that quite a few were from Commonwealth countries and planned 
to stay in England for perhaps several years only, and prefer the flexibility temporary 
work offers. More generally, a temporary agency manager summed up our findings:
"They walk in and want to work temporary due to the fact that they know
they will be available for only a short time."
Of course this is crucial to our hypothesis about temporary agency employees valuing 
control over working-time. And our interviews did support this (this will be treated in 
greater detail in the next chapters). Of the respondents, 50 per cent mentioned, without 
being specifically asked, that some type of control over working-time as a factor for their 
employees in being temporary employees. None of the respondents gave a negative 
response about control over working-time when pursued specifically about this topic.
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Still, 25 percent mentioned that temporary work might be an avenue to permanent 
employment for the temporary employee. These results do not allow us to reject our 
Propositions 1 and 2 (that temporary employment will offer control over working-time 
and that temporary employees will value control over working-time greater than other 
employees), but does not directly confirm them, since temporary agency managers are 
the respondents.
OTHER RESULTS
Our survey also captured the current circumstances of the accountants who came in to 
register for placement. About half of the respondents stated that the number of people 
"walking in the door" to register has increased. Some cautioned, however, that this 
could be due to accountants registering at more than one temporary agency service.
The interviews revealed a place where the permanent accountant and the temporary 
accountant appear to cross, namely the use of temporary agencies by the larger 
accountancy firms. It was volunteered that the larger firms will contract for short periods 
when projects or increases in demand appear. This was mentioned by four of the 
temporary agency respondents. They said that "not infrequently" some of their staff was 
used by the larger firms. One manager mentioned that "they are frequently used" in this 
way. This implies an occupational cohesiveness between temporary employees and 
permanent employees.
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CONCLUSION
In general, these results provide a background for our other source of data - the 
Employee Opinion Questionnaire. When reading the results of the questionnaire, one 
must keep in mind the state of the accountancy market at the time the responses were 
given. Positive responses about job security must be viewed as extremely positive 
considering the market place at the time. Positive opinions about control over working- 
time, in a period of recession, give strong support for the importance of such non- 
pecuniary elements of the compensation package, which may provide support for the idea 
that the Atkinsonian idea of a core group of workers, may actually be non-existent. In 
other words, that most of the job forms are to some degree peripheral (in a job security 
sense); job security may be an occupational distinguishing phenomena not necessarily a 
job form phenomena. Perhaps only a very few are "core" employees. And perhaps 
attributes that distinguish "core" employees are of a highly personal nature, not of a job 
form nature. The interviews and reports given above do suggest some support for this. 
Job security appears to be an occupational hazard as much as a job form problem.
Furthermore, there is evidence that temporary accountancy can be linked to large firm 
accountancy and therefore be studied as an intra-occupational phenomena. And finally 
we have evidence which supports our contention that control over working-time is an 
important aspect of temporary work.
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Chapter
The Empirical Constructs 
Derived from Our Questionnaire
DEFINING EMPIRICAL CONSTRUCTS
Before we analyze the results of our survey, we must describe the empirical constructs 
for the conceptual variables (control over working-time, job security, etc.). We do this 
as we build a set of indices which use several questions designed to extract the concepts 
desired. It is preferable to use a construct rather than a single question as an empirical 
tool, since combining a variety of questions concerned with the same concept increases 
the range of scores reported. This increases the reliability of low, medium and high 
scores. Along this same vein, one question alone may not capture all of the respondent’s 
opinion of a concept. Thus, by using an empirical construct, a more inclusive proxy, one 
which has the virtue of averaging out extraneous influences, is established.
It is traditionally necessary to meet two criteria when using an empirical construct: those 
of internal consistency and external consistency. To measure internal consistency (when
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appropriate) we rely upon Pearson’s correlation coefficients and their significance. 
External consistency, defined as whether the name given to a construct is justifiable, can 
be satisfied if the individual items in the construct can be shown to relate to the 
theoretical definition. This is argued for in the process of developing the empirical 
indices and can be tested by direct observation.
CONTROL OVER WORKING-TIME INDEX
In Chapter 4 we proposed that the level of control over working-time may be critical in 
describing job forms of the Atkinsonian type (for example, core versus temporary). In 
other words, as control over working-time increases, the ability to accurately predict 
participation in a specific job form should increase as well. Since we argued that no one 
single time unit is important in defining working-time (for example, time units like hours 
of the day, or days of the week), it follows that a construct of several time units would 
be superior. (Whether reported levels of control over working-time are actual or not is 
not pertinent to our discussion, since perceived levels of control are the critical concept 
in a preference or opinion driven labour market segmentation).
Since there has been very little empirical work concerned with control over working-time 
as an important aspect of working conditions, precedent for constructing a proxy for 
control over working-time is limited. Our attempt was to be as inclusive as possible in 
the range of time units described. Although it may not be the case that a job form will
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provide control across all time units, we felt it safest to construct our proxy, in the first 
instance, in this manner1.
Four questions in the questionnaire were designed to reflect employee perceptions of 
control over working-time. These are listed in Table 9.1. responses were reported on 
a five point Likert scale where: 1 =  "strongly agree", 2 = "agree", 3 = "neither agree 
nor disagree", 4 =  "disagree", and 5 =  "strongly disagree". For our statistical analysis,
the numbers were reversed so as to associate high numbers with higher levels of
agreement. For example, after recoding, "strongly agree" = 5. This helps to clarify 
some of the analysis that follows.
Table 9.1 
Control Over Working-Time Items
Question
I have control over the times of the day that I work.
I have control over the total number of hours I work during 
an average week.
I have control over which days of the week that I work.
I have control over which weeks out of the year I work.
Label
Timecont!
Timecont2
Timecont3
Timecont4
1 la  so far as control over working-time may be considered to be a desirable attribute of work, 
respondents may tend to exaggerate upwards their responses. However, because the questionnaire was 
entirely confidential and since the responses would not possibly effect their working conditions, we believe 
the responses will tend to be truthful.
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The correlation matrix of these five items shows that each item is correlated with the
/
other items. Person’s coefficient of correlation for each pair is significant at above the 
99 per cent level. This matrix is reproduced as Table 9.2.
Table 9.2
Control Over Working-Time Items: Correlation Matrix
Item 1 2  3 4
Timeconti 1.00**
Timecon^ .6747** 1.00**
Timecont3 .5271** .5185** 1.00**
Timecont* .3272** .4482** .4118** 1.00**
** significant at > 99 per cent.
A principal components analysis of the five items demonstrated that a single common 
factor (Timecontj) explained 61.7 per cent of the variation between the items. Table 9.3 
reports the loading coefficients onto this factor.
Table 9.3
Control Over Working-Time Items: Factor Loadings
Items Loading Coefficients
Timecontj 0.82305
Timecont2 0.85742
Timecont3 0.78414
Timecont4 0.66466
Regression method factor scores were obtained, and used to construct a scale using all 
four items. The scale, TIME CONTROL, varies with a standard deviation of one about
158
a mean of zero. Excluding cases which contained a missing value of one or more of the 
component items, 225 cases had a TIME CONTROL value computed.
OTHER CONTROL INDEX
A study on control over working-time which excludes other working conditions will not 
be as useful in determining the relative importance of working-time control to a job form. 
Therefore, we have included other variables used to indicate control over other aspects
of work. These other aspects of control at work may also play an important role in
distinguishing between job forms, but it is the point of this thesis to test the hypothesised 
relative importance of control over working-time for different job forms, more 
specifically the temporary employee from a large firm employee. We hypothesised that 
it is this control over working-time that distinguishes the temporary work job form. Still, 
creating an index about control over other aspects of work needs to follow the same steps 
that were used to create the TIME CONTROL index. Table 9.4 reports the items used.
Table 9.4 
Other Control Items
Question
I have control over the location that I work from.
I have control over the types of tasks that I perform.
I have control over the amount of work I must complete.
I have control over the setting of deadlines.
I can choose who I work with.
Label
Othcontj
Othcont2
Othcont3
Othconti
Othcont5
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Again, a correlation matrix was calculated between the items and is reported below with 
Pearson correlation coefficients in Table 9.5.
Table 9.5
Other Control Items: Correlation Matrix
Item 1 2 3 4 5
Othcontj 1.00**
Othcontj .4325** 1.00**
Othcont3 .2670** .5170** 1.00**
Othcont4 .1555* .3770** .5095** 1.00**
Othcontj .3724** .5511** .3183** .3262** 1.00**
** significant at > 99 per cent.
* significant at > 95 per cent.
A principal components analysis of the five items demonstrated that a single common 
factor explained 51 per cent of the variation between the items. Table 9.6 reports the 
loading coefficients onto this factor.
Table 9.6
Other Control Items: Factor Loadings 
Items Loading Coefficients
Othconti 0.59867
Othcont2 0.82984
Othcont3 0.73876
Othcont4 0.65459
Othcontj 0.72597
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As in the TIME CONTROL index, factor scores were obtained, and used to construct a 
scale using all of the items. This scale is labelled OTHER CONTROL and varies with 
a standard deviation of one about a mean of zero. Excluding cases which contained a 
missing value of one or more of the items, 224 cases had an OTHER CONTROL value 
computed.
Since both of these newly constructed scales use control as a description of working 
conditions, it is instructive to look at the correlation between the two indices to determine 
the accuracy of making the a priori division between the two. The items within these 
two indices were closely correlated, with a mean correlation coefficient of the OTHER 
CONTROL index of 0.394 and for the TIME CONTROL index a mean of 0.484. This 
compares to a mean correlation coefficient between items in both groups of 0.295. This 
supports the theoretical idea of constructing the two separate indices.
JOB SECURITY INDEX
Because the levels of job security are important job form determinants for the 
Atkinsonian demand driven theory, wherein the job form rather than the specific industry 
is hypothesised to influence levels of job security, we must assess the ability of that 
portion of their model in predicting job form participation. This will be useful in 
determining the validity of our own model. Therefore, an index using the items listed 
in Table 9.7 was used in our analysis.
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Table 9.7 
Job Security Items
Label Question
Security! My amount of job security is an important advantage of my
job.
Security2 In the next two years I will expect to be made redundant
Security3 An increase in my job security would improve my situation.
In contrast to the two previous indices, a Pearson’s correlation coefficient is less useful 
in determining the validity of this index. This is the case because we do not assume that 
the level of job security, as reported by Security! and Security2 will necessarily be 
correlated with the opinion as to whether an increase in job security above this level is 
valued, as reported by Security3.
This index exemplifies how we part from the traditional demand-sided theories which 
neglect employee preferences, since in this index, as well as levels of job security, we 
have included an item which addresses the opinion of the respondent to that level of job 
security. So that if job security is low (as registered by Security! and Security^, but 
satisfactory (as reported by Security3) this increases the level of job security in the 
index.2
2 Items were recoded appropriately so that high numbers for each item equate to high levels or positive 
opinions about levels of job security.
We calculate the index by giving equal weight to all three items. This gives twice as 
much weight to the level of job security, as compared to the importance of job security, 
since twice as many items are used. This is done so as to create an index which 
emphasises the traditional measurement of levels of job security while allowing for some 
reported opinions about the level of job security. The final index, JOB SECURITY, 
varies with a standard deviation of one about a mean of zero.
INCOME INDEX
Just as in the index JOB SECURITY, our index for income relies not merely upon levels 
of reported income but on opinions about those levels of income. Therefore, income is 
approached from the supply-side employee preferences rather than the demand-side of the 
firm. This is achieved by using items related to income which were designed to extract 
opinion about the income the respondent receives. These items are given in Table 9.8 
below.
Table 9.8 
Income Items
Label Question
Income, The amount of income I receive for my work is an important
advantage of my job.
Incomez My income including all assets gives me more than enough
money to feed and house my family comfortably.
These two items had a Pearson Correlation Coefficient of .28 which was significant at 
greater than 99 per cent. Regression method factor scores were obtained, and used to
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construct a scale using both items. This scale, INCOME, varies about a mean of zero
with a standard deviation of one.
MOBILITY INDEX
We use mobility here in the sense that an employee is able to move along a type of 
promotional ladder or between tiers in an occupation. This is the sense that Doeringer 
and Piore (1971) use in their analysis of primary and secondary labour markets. Our 
index for measuring the availability of mobility is not complex. Others have gone into 
great detail how one can measure mobility. We use a more blunt instrument consisting 
of the two items in Table 9.9 below.
Table 9.9 
Mobility Items
Label Question
Mobility! My chances for promotion are an important advantage of my
job.
Mobility2 An increase in my responsibilities would improve my
situation.
Mobility! is used as a direct measure of the level of mobility between tiers. Again, it is 
relying on the opinions of the employees, because these are what is necessary for an 
accurate assessment of supply driven forces. Mobility2 is used as an assessment of the 
preferences of an individual to the level of mobility available. The index is a 
combination of these two items similar to those used in the JOB SECURITY index. It 
takes into account both levels and preferences. In our construct we again weighted the 
level more than the preference to emphasise the traditional model. Regression method
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factor scores were obtained, and used to construct a scale using both items. This scale,
MOBILITY, varies about a mean of zero with a standard deviation of one.
CONCLUSION
We have established a set of empirical constructs we label indices. These are conceptual 
variables that are inherent in the Hypotheses 1 and 2 as well as Propositions 1 and 2. 
Internal consistency, when appropriate, was checked through the Pearson’s Correlation 
Coefficient. External consistency was predominantly assured in the initial design of the 
questionnaire, where the questions used were formulated to measure the concepts of our 
theory. Another means of internal consistency is to demonstrate the predictive power of 
the indices. If they are useful tools in testing hypotheses and empirical results validate 
their importance, then we should not reject their use.
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Chapter
10
Results
Testing The Relationship Between 
Temporary Work and Control Over Working-Time
In Chapters 4 and 5 we argued that job forms (temporary versus permanent or core 
versus periphery) could be described by employee preferences and a more inclusive list 
of working conditions. We argued that control over working-time may be a very 
important element of working conditions since it has the potential to describe different 
job forms which provide different levels of control over working-time within specific 
labour markets. We also argued that the over-emphasis of demand-sided influences on 
job forms in theory and empirical research, necessarily neglects other important elements 
of job forms as preferred by the employee, namely control over working-time. This 
implies that conventional analysis of labour market segmentation may bring about 
erroneous conclusions about contemporary job forms (temporary agency employment), 
since they intrinsically neglect employee preferences and therefore the impact of control 
over working-time.
Conventional descriptions of job forms use pay, mobility among job tiers, and job 
security as the primary criteria in distinguishing between job forms. We have proposed 
an alternative hypothesis wherein we relegate these factors to an industry level which
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over-shadows all job forms. For us, differences in intra-occupational job form divisions 
may be explained by other working condition variables and by employee preferences. 
As stated in Propositions 1 and 2 of Chapter 5:
Proposition 1:
Temporary agency employees when compared to permanent employees of a large firm 
will perceive their job form as offering greater control over their working-time.
Proposition 2:
Temporary agency employees when compared to permanent employees of a large firm 
will show a greater preference for control over their working-time.
Our hypotheses can be formulated as below:
Temporary agency participation =
f(control over working-time, preferences for control over working-time)
RESULTS OF TESTING THE PROPOSITIONS
We test this hypothesis as well as the more conventional demand-sided hypothesis using 
logistic regression, wherein we can test the predicting capacity of independent variables 
for participation in a group. Our independent variables are those indices set out in
Chapter 9 as well as other binary preference variables to be described below. Our binary
dependent variable is defined as participation in the temporary agency (1) and non­
participation (or participation in the large accountancy firm), (0).
The binary dependent variable TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION and 
the independent variables were tested for significant predicting power in a forced single
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entry logistic regression. Table 10.1 summarises the results of these regressions.
Table 10.1
Constructing a Model: Testing the Predictive Power of Indices
Dependent Variable: TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION
F o r c e d  S in g l e  E n t r y
Significant
Variables Coefficient
B
Wald
Statistic
sig R exp(B)
TIME
CONTROL 0.8004 21.4017 0.0000 0.2856 2.2265
MOBILITY -1.6255 43.2944 0.0000 -0.4162 0.1968
Other
Variables
OTHER CONTROL 0.2384 2.2653 0.1323 0.0334 1.2692
JOB SECURITY -0.0274 0.0288 0.8652 0.0000 0.9729
INCOME 0.0137 0.0070 0.9332 0.0000 1.0138
n =  222
Table 10.1 shows that we can reject the null hypothesis that TIME CONTROL and 
TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION are not dependent. More 
specifically, the odds of predicting participation increase as control over working-time 
increases (exp (B) >  1 and B >0 ). This result supports our Proposition 1 above, that 
the temporary job form will be perceived as exhibiting greater degrees of control over 
working-time. This is a necessary condition for a theory that preferences for control over
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working-time can influence job form choice, since the job form must accommodate for 
that preference. It appears here that temporary employment offers to the employee 
greater control over working-time.
There is also evidence that temporary work will exhibit less opportunity for advancement. 
As MOBILITY increases, the odds of predicting participation decrease (exp(B) <  1 and 
B <0). This result supports more conventional analysis of temporary work, wherein they 
suggest that one of the unappealing aspects of temporary work, an aspect which places 
it in a traditional secondary labour market segment (See Doeringer and Piore, 1971), is 
the inability to be promoted or to increase one’s responsibilities.
However, Table 10.1 also gives evidence against the conventional demand-sided theories 
of temporary work. It suggests that JOB SECURITY is not a significant predictor for 
participation in temporary employment (significance of the Wald statistic is = 0.8652). 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that JOB SECURITY and TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION are independent. This is important as job security 
is one of the key elements in distinguishing a segmented secondary level job form.1 
Recall, the Atkinsonian model defines temporary employment by the demand-sided issues 
of the firm with regard to the firm’s demand for numerical flexibility. This does give 
support for our hypothesis that job security may be an industry level phenomena.
Our index INCOME represents opinions about levels of income, and Table 10.1 suggests
1 This result does not occur because our index takes into account the value of job security. After 
running a logistic regression on an index constructed from Security, and Security, this new JOB 
SECURITY index also was insignificant in predicting temporary employment participation.
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that opinions about income are not good predictors of TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT 
PARTICIPATION. In other words, we cannot reject the hypothesis that INCOME and 
TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION are independent. This is evidence 
against the conventional theories which link organizations like temporary firms to 
secondary labour markets because of their income. It appears that opinions about income 
in both the temporary firm and the large firm are not different.
A more direct analysis was made on incomes between the two job forms. Direct self- 
reported levels of income were analyzed between the two groups using crosstabulation 
and the Chi-Square statistic. Table 10.2 reports our findings.
Table 10.2 
Job Form by Levels of Income
Cr o s s t a b s
£ per annum 
(thousands)
< 9 9-18 18-36 36-60
Total
Temporary 14 38 46 2 100 Per cent
Firm (7) (19) (23) (1) (50) (numter)
Large 11 45 35 10 100
Firm (19) (78) (60) (17) (174)
X2 = 5.04413 significant at 0.1686 with 3 degrees of freedom 
n = 224
It is apparent from Table 10.2 that reported levels of pay are not significantly different 
between job forms. This result, coupled with our previous results, gives strong evidence 
that, as far as pay is concerned (another major distinguishing factor between a primary 
labour market segment and a secondary labour market segment for demaid driven
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models), temporary agency employment in the accountancy occupation can not be 
relegated to the periphery. This suggests that pay, like job security, may be an 
occupationally determined working condition, rather than a job form determined working 
condition.
The results of these first tests show that there is support that divisions in working 
conditions between temporary agency employment and large firm employment can be 
described by MOBILITY and TIME CONTROL. This supports our Hypothesis 2. 
Because JOB SECURITY and INCOME are not good predictors of TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION this is evidence against segmentation in the demand­
sided sense2.
PREFERENCES
We now directly measure the respondents preferences over their working conditions. We 
asked the respondents to tell us which two aspects of work they value (or would value) 
the most. These were selected from nine items regarding work. The two items selected 
as the most valued were not ranked, therefore carry the same weight. The responses 
were used as binary independent variables (Yes or No), in a logistic regression to test 
whether differences in reported preferences were significant predictors of TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION. The items and the results are listed in Table 10.3.
2 Although testing for net advantages using reported wages is tempting, several problems hinder doing 
this. The first problem lies in that differences in wages are not statistically different (see table 10.2). The 
second problem is that differences in compensation packages are not solely of working-time control. 
Temporary agency employment also is reported as offering less chance for mobility. Therefore, less 
mobility is a disadvantage. This means that the trade off, producing equal advantages, might be greater 
control over working-time for less mobility.
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Table 10.3
Constructing a Model: Testing the Predictive Power of Preferences
Dependent Variable: TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION 
F o r c e d  S in g l e  E n t r y
Statistically
Significant
Variables Coefficient
B
Wald
Statistic
sig R
I  VALUE 
CONTROL OVER
WHICH WEEKS OF 
THE YEAR I WORK 1.0559 9.8736 0.0017 0.1817
CHOOSING WHO I 
WORK WITH -1.0076 5.8295 0.0158 -0.1268
Statistically 
NOT Significant 
Variables
I  VALUE CONTROL 
OVER...
WHICH HOURS OF THE 
DAY I WORK -0.5251 1.8102 0.1785 0.0000
WHICH DAYS OF THE 
WEEK I WORK -.01427 0.0458 0.8305 0.0000
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
HOURS I WORK IN A WEEK 0.5931 2.2727 0.1317 0.0336
THE LOCATION THAT I 
WORK FROM -0.4550 0.4890 0.4844 0.0000
THE TYPES OF TASKS 
THAT I PERFORM 0.1611 0.2494 0.6175 0.0000
THE AMOUNT OF WORK 
I MUST COMPLETE 0.8958 1.8059 0.1790 0.0000
THE SETTING OF
DEADLINES 0.1771 0.1425 0.7058 0.0000
n=223
exp(B)
2.8745
0.3651
0.5915
0.8670
1.8097
0.6345
1.1748
2.4492
1.1938
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Table 10.3 supports our Proposition 2. It shows that a reported preference for 
CONTROL OVER WHICH WEEKS OF THE YEAR THAT ARE WORKED will 
increase the odds of predicting TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION 
(coefficient B >  0 and exp (B) > 1). Temporary employees are exhibiting a preference 
for control over working-time greater than the large firm employees. This is a necessary 
condition for supply-side job form choice via control over working-time. Interestingly, 
there is not a greater preference for control over working-time in all of the time units. 
This highlights the importance of carefully distinguishing the time unit in the variable.
We also analyzed differences in preferences for control over working-time using a binary 
independent variable which records the number of respondents who choose two items 
related to time as preferred. We labelled these respondents TIME-SENSITIVE (Other 
respondents were considered TIME-INSENSITIVE). Using a crosstabulation analysis 
Table 10.4 reports our results when comparing the temporary employees with the large 
firm employees.
Table 10.4 
Job Form by Time-Sensitivity
Cr o sst a b s
Time- Time-
Insensitive Sensitive
Total
Temporary 72 28 100 Per Cent
Firm (36) (14) 50
Large 89 11 100 per cent
Firm (155) (20) 175
X2 = 7.08353 significant at 0.0078 (after Yeates correction) with one degree of freedom, 
n = 225
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Table 10.4 shows that temporary firm employees are more time-sensitive than employees 
in the large firm. This, too, supports our Proposition 2.
Control over CHOOSING WHO I WORK WITH is also a significantly useful predictor 
of TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION. However, here temporary 
employees value this less than large firm employees (coefficient B < 0 and exp (B) < 
1).
It may be the case that preferences are being reported for only those items that are 
present in a job form. The possibilities for an instrument (the questionnaire) being biased 
in this way can be tested. For example, although there is no significant difference in 
preference for CONTROL OVER THE TYPES OF TASKS PERFORMED between the 
temporary employee and the large firm employee, this element is still highly valued by 
the temporary employees; 56 per cent of the temporary employees reported a preference 
for this. However, only 12 per cent reported that they have CONTROL OVER THE 
TYPES OF TASKS PERFORMED3. So that for this item, although it is not present, 
preferences are still being reported.
We also measured respondents preferences over other working condition items. We 
asked the respondents to report their preference for the two items that, if increased, 
would improve their situation. These were selected from 12 items. The relevant 
responses are reported in Table 10.5.
3 Similar numbers were reported by the large firm employees; 52 per cent preferred CONTROL 
OVER TASKS PERFORMED and 20 per cent had CONTROL OVER TASKS PERFORMED.
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Table 10.5
Constructing a Model: Testing the Predictive Power of Preferences 2 
Dependent Variable: TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION 
F o r c e d  S in g l e  E n t r y
Variables
Statistically
Insignificant Coefficient Wald sig R exp(B)
B Statistic
THE MOST IMPORTANT 
IT E M ...
AN INCREASE IN PAY 0.2519 0.6150 0.4329 0.0000 1.2864
AN INCREASE IN JOB
SECURITY 0.0316 0.6071 0.9331 0.0000 1.0321
A CHANGE OF MY
JOB LOCATION -0.7828 1.9516 0.1624 0.0000 0.4571
AN INCREASE IN MY
RESPONSIBILITIES 0.4830 2.1012 0.1472 0.0206 1.6209
AN INCREASE IN THE 0.1704 0.2500 0.6171 0.0000 1.1858
CONTROL OVER THE 
TYPES OF TASKS
A CHANGE IN THE PEOPLE -1.1303 2.2133 0.1368 -0.2099 0.3229
I WORK WITH
n=222
The most relevant results from Table 10.5 point against the conventional hypotheses of 
the demand-driven Atkinsonian type model. We can reject the hypothesis that 
preferences for INCREASES IN JOB SECURITY are dependent of TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION (significance < 90). Again, our analysis of labour 
market segments does not neglect differences in employee preferences across job forms. 
We look not only at the level of JOB SECURITY in an industry but also at the value
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placed on that level by employees in different job forms. For even if JOB SECURITY 
is lower in one job form compared to another (in our case we can not accept this 
hypothesis), it is essential to evaluate the employee’s preference, or lack of preference, 
for JOB SECURITY. If it is not preferred, the lack of JOB SECURITY becomes 
irrelevant to that employee. This is critical in testing the relevance of the levels of all 
items of working conditions, and the importance of what other benefits a job form might 
provide, like control over working-time.
Table 10.5 also supports our contention that income may be an occupationally or 
individually determined aspect of work not a job form aspect. This argues against the 
conventional demand- sided models, since we can reject the null hypothesis that a 
preference for an INCREASE IN PAY is not independent of TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION.
THE MODEL
Our model can now be expressed as:
+ + - 
Te = f (Tc, Cp, M)
Where:
Te =  Temporary employment participation 
Tc =  Control over working-time 
Cp =  Preference for control over working-time 
M =  Level of Mobility
These outcomes support the thesis that elements of working conditions other than those 
conventionally used to describe labour markets may be more appropriate for some of the
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contemporary labour market segments and organizations (temporary agency employment). 
We point to the aspects of change that are improving the availability and preference for 
control over working conditions (the influences creating this changes were discussed in 
Chapter 2). Here we assert that this evolution of preferences may be manifesting itself 
in contemporary organizational phenomena like the temporary agency.
The above has suggested that only some of the conventional elements used to distinguish 
between a "primary’' labour market segment (the large accountancy firm) and a 
"secondary" labour market segment (the temporary agency) are relevant, specifically, the 
lack of available occupational MOBILITY. Most importantly, it has suggested that TIME 
CONTROL can be used to describe temporary agency employment and that preferences 
for CONTROL OVER WORKING-TIME are also important predictors of temporary 
employment participation. This is the basis of our hypothesised model.
TESTING THE MODEL
Using the constructed model we now test how well the model performs. Because our 
hypothesis concerns both elements provided to the employee via a particular job form and 
the preferences of employees, it will be instructive to look for interaction terms which 
might more easily and more accurately express the concepts we have put forth. Since 
this thesis is looking at a relatively untested phenomena, control over working-time, part 
of its aim is to construct an informative model of control over working-time in different 
job forms. This is why our model is improved here.
In Table 10.6 the results of our hypothesised model are given using step wise logistic
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regression. This is done so as to evaluate the levels of improvement the variables give 
to the initial model and the goodness of fit of the model. The Likelihood Ratio test was 
used for criterion in determining if variables should be removed. This is computationally 
more intensive but generally considered a better method in step wise selection.
Table 10.6 
Testing the Supply-Side Model
Dependent Variable: TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION
F o r w a r d  S t e p w ise
Steps Coefficient Wald
B Statistic
1 TIME 0.7785 19.6656
CONTROL
2 PREFERENCE FOR 0.9644 7.3206 
CONTROL OVER 
WEEKS OF THE YEAR 
WORKED
Variables rejected 
None
Model Statistics
r  D.F.
-2 Log likelihood 206.566 221
Goodness of Fit 239.775 221
n=222
These results confirm the previous tests of Propositions 1 and 2. There is a significant 
predicting power of the model for each term in the model for TEMPORARY 
EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION. But, how well does the model fit the data? There 
are various ways to asses the goodness of fit of the model. Table 10.6 reproduces the 
pertinent statistics. The probability of the observed results given the parameter estimates
Chi-Square Sig
Improvement (x2)
24.073 0.0000
7.225 0.0072
Sig.
0.7486
0.1839
Sig R 
(Wald)
0.0000 0.2725 
0.0069 0.1496
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is given by the likelihood. We use -2 Log Likelihood to test the null hypothesis that our 
model fits perfectly. Since the significance level (0.7486) is large we do not reject the 
hypothesis that the model fits. The Goodness of Fit statistic leads to a similar 
conclusion. Again the significance level is large (0.1839). Even though it is not as large 
as the Log Likelihood test, we still can not reject the hypothesis that the model fits.
In evaluating each independent variable, we can see that the level of TIME CONTROL, 
with an improvement of the Chi-Square of the model equal to 24.073, is greater than the 
improvement of the model for the PREFERENCE term. However, in both cases we can 
reject the hypothesis that the coefficients for either variable are equal to zero. The total 
model Chi-Square improvement is equal to the two added together, 31.298, and its 
significance level is also greater than 99 per cent.
Using a more direct analysis, the model correctly predicted 26 per cent of those 
respondents who participate in temporary employment. Furthermore, of the temporary 
employees there were 20 per cent of the cases which had a predicted probability greater 
than 50 per cent.
A MORE DETAILED MODEL
Having established the validity of the model, we now investigate ways that might improve 
its performance. Our first step is to test our hypothesis that control' over working-time 
and preferences for control over working-time will distinguish job forms by using an 
interactive term — a term that takes both of these points into account. We do this by 
using a newly constructed interaction term that is a binary (or a dummy) independent
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variable. This term includes the specific unit of TIME CONTROL (ie weeks of the year) 
and combines it with preferences for that specific TIME CONTROL. So that cases 
wherein the respondent gives a positive response about possessing TIME CONTROL4 
and a positive response about preference for that specific time-control, the dummy 
variable is coded "1”, otherwise the respondent was coded "0”.
This essentially breaks our index variable TIME CONTROL into its component parts. 
These component parts, however, will be associated with their preference counterparts. 
After running several regressions we found two such interactive terms significant. The 
first was an interactive term that included the level of control over the weeks of the year 
worked and the preference for control over the weeks of the year worked. We label this 
WEEKS. The second interactive term included the level of control over the total number 
of hours worked within a week and the preference for control over the total number of 
hours worked in a week. We label this independent variable HOURS. The relevant 
statistics are shown in Table 10.7 below.
4 If the respondent either "agreed" or "strongly agreed" to having control in a specific time unit they 
were coded as having control in that time unit. Preference variables were the same as used before.
Table 10.7
Testing a More Specific Supply-Side Model
Dependent Variable: TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT PARTICIPATION 
F o r w a r d  S t e p w ise
Steps Coefficient
B
Wald
Statistic
Sig
(Wald)
R Chi-Square
Improvement
Sig
(X2)
1 WEEKS 1.9928 22.8891 0.0000 0.2960 26.214 0.0000
2 HOURS 2.0557 11.1597 0.0008 0.1960 11.562 0.0007
Variables rejected 
None
Model Statistics
X2 D.F. Sig.
-2 Log likelihood 
Goodness of Fit
200.593
224.024
222
222
0.8458
0.4493
n = 223
From these new results it is apparent that preferences for CONTROL OVER THE 
TOTAL NUMBER OF HOURS IN A WEEK when combined with having that control 
becomes a statistically significant predictor of TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT 
PARTICIPATION, and that preferences for CONTROL OVER WHICH WEEKS OF 
THE YEAR ARE WORKED when combined with CONTROL OVER WHICH WEEKS 
WORKED becomes a significant predictor as well. Since these variables combine levels 
of time control and preferences the results confirm both Proposition 1 and Proposition 
2.
This more precisely specified model also performs better when compared to our first 
model. For example, the total Chi-Square improvement of this model is equal to 37.775, 
compared to the 31.293 reported for the previous model. Figure 10.1 below compares
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the results from the more direct approaches to assessing a model’s appropriateness. In
both the number of cases correctly predicted and in the number of cases with predicted
probabilities > 50 per cent the more specific model preforms better.
Figure 10.1 
Comparison of Model 1 with Specific Model
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These results then can be used to rewrite our initial model so that it is of the new form:
+ +
Tc = f(W, H)
Where:
Tc = Temporary employment participation
W = preference for control over weeks * having control over which weeks 
H = preference for control over number of hours * having control over number of hours
It is this final model that incorporates both preferences and availability of control over 
working-time that gives strong positive evidence for our supply-side control over 
working-time hypotheses. It suggests a job form choice that has been influenced through
182
the opinions about control over working-time.
In the next chapter we look for other distinguishing factors, like education and gender, 
and what bearing they have on our hypotheses and the results of the model, as well as 
looking at the large internal firm in seclusion for the other job forms differences.
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Chapter
11
Data Analysis by Gender, Education and 
Firm Internal Divisions
Using our refined model, we now test the relevance of larger institutionalised levels of 
segmentation. We test the model for predicting participation in a temporary agency 
against other demand-sided models discussed previously. In their labour market 
segmentation formulation, they suggest that institutions like the large corporate 
accountancy firm will segment the market place because of their selecting only a specific 
"type” of person. Particularly common divisions to make are those of gender and 
education.
If it can be shown that there is a significant difference in gender and education between 
the large accountancy firm and the temporary accountancy agency then this supports the 
demand driven model of segmentation. Segmentation in the sense of the larger 
institutions as described by Level 1 of Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3.
Finally, we look at how the firm internal division may also be described by control over 
working-time and preferences for control over working-time. We can analyze the
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significance of our supply-side driven model in terms of the firm’s internal tiered 
structures.
THE MODEL BY GENDER
The results of an initial assessment of the two firms according to gender are given in 
Table 11.1 below. A crosstabulation analysis was performed using the Chi-Square 
statistic to test the significance of the differences.
Table 11.1 
Job Form by Gender
Cr o s s t a b s
Male Female
Total
Temporary 42 58 100 Per Cent
Firm (21) (29) 50
Large 63.4 36.6 100 per cent
Finn (111) (64) 175
X2 = 6.50693 signifcant at 0.0107 (after Yeates correction) with 1 degree of freedom 
n =225
Table 11.1 confirms a common assumption about temporary work: that temporary work 
is predominantly performed by women. The argument continues that it is a demand 
driven segmentation by institutions which do not allow women to participate, or that it 
is a society driven pressure for women to be marginalized. At first glance, this notion 
cannot be rejected by the table above. There is a significant difference in gender between 
the large firm and the temporary accountancy firm; 37 per cent of the employees in the
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large firm are female as are 58 percent in the temporary agency1.
In light of this, it is instructive to assess whether the women in the temporary agency 
report a preference for control over working-time, as our supply-side model of temporary 
agencies developed in the last section predicts. If they show no signs of preference for 
control over working-time, then there is strong evidence for an institutional demand 
driven segmentation. However, if there is a significant difference in preference for then 
one can not reject the idea that there are supply-side influences which have divided the 
work force. In other words, the preferences for control over working-time by women 
may play a role in segmenting the market. Results of this assessment are given in Table 
11.2 .
1 There is no significant difference in the numbers of married women between the large firm and the 
temporary firm. In general, differences for control over working-time were nor reported by married 
respondents.
Table 11.2 
Testing Model by Gender
Population Dependent Independent X2 Sig
Variable Variables of model
1. All cases Participation WEEKS, HOURS 37.775 .0000
in Temp Employment
2. Female Temps and 
all Large Firm 
Employees
3. Female Temps and 
Female Large 
Firm Employees
4. Temporary
Employees
5. Large Firm 
Employees
Female Participation 
in Temp Employment
Female Participation 
in Temp Employment
Female
Female
WEEKS, HOURS
WEEKS, HOURS
WEEKS, HOURS 
WEEKS, HOURS
33.968 .0000
27.797 .0000
2.565 .2773
1.632 .4421
Table 11.2 reports the Chi-Square statistic for a Logistic Regression procedure testing the 
model on various populations within our study. It shows the high Chi-Square statistic of 
the specific model (Line 1 in the table). It also shows high Chi-Square statistics when 
the model is used to predict FEMALE TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT 
PARTICIPATION both in populations which include all large firm employees and only 
female large firm employees (Lines 2 and 3 in the table). Since the model fits well (as 
measured by the Chi-Square statistic) for predicting female participation in temporary 
employment, we can not reject the hypothesis that participation in temporary employment 
by women is dependent on their preferences for control over working-time.
Furthermore, since the model is not a good predictor of gender (as measured by the low
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insignificant Chi-Square statistics of Lines 4 and 5 in the table) we can not reject the null 
hypothesis that gender and preferences for control over working-time are not dependent. 
This analysis supports our contention that control over working-time is a major 
contributor in temporary employment participation, and that although there are more 
women in temporary employment, they may be participating because of their preferences 
for control over working-time and the availability of control over working-time provided 
by the temporary agency organizational form. In general, these results support a supply- 
side driven job choice theory.
This gender divide can be argued as result of women needing control over their working- 
tune due to imposed societal pressures on their time. Our data does not support this as 
the model is not a good predictor of gender in either the temporary agency or the large 
firm.
The gender divide may also be explained as a result of pre-market institutionalized 
segmentation (via discrimination, lack of opportunities etc.). We believe there may be 
a degree of this. This, more importantly, calls into consideration the problems of 
cognitive dissonance (see Festinger, 1954 and Berowitz et al 1987). Women may be 
"justifying” their institutionalized job form by reporting preferences for it. Their "self- 
evaluation [may be] based on comparisons with others" pg 138 Festinger). If presumably 
they would feel bad by reporting a non-desirable difference, their replies will be skewed 
to report preferences to justify their lower status job-form. However, this argument 
assumes that temporary agency employment is "bad”; that temporary agency employment 
needs justification by the participants. We do not make this assumption and therefore
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cognitive dissonance, in the form of inacurate replies, becomes less of an issue for this 
thesis.
THE MODEL BY EDUCATION
Another often argued form of demand driven segmentation is the level of education 
obtained. It is argued that levels of education form barriers to entry between 
occupations. Since we are not comparing differences between occupations, we cannot 
test this hypothesis. It is important to understand that we do not argue against demand 
driven segmentation of this form between occupations. It seems obvious that this is the 
case when looking at the qualifications needed in order to participate in various 
professional occupations, including accountancy. The causes which determine educational 
attainment and thus segmentation are not at issue here. What we can test is whether 
being qualified by a formal institutional (here proxied by the obtainment of a bachelors 
degree) rather than experience or professional qualification will segment the temporary 
employee. Table 11.3 gives evidence about educational differences in our study.
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Table 11.3 
Job Form by Bachelor Degree
Cr o s s t a b s
Bachelor’s No Bachelor’s
Degree Degree
Temporary
Firm
54
(27)
46
(23)
Total
100 Per Cent 
50
Large
Firm
81
(142)
19
(33)
100 per cent 
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X2 = 13.90839 significant at 0.0002 (after Yeates correction) with 1 degree of freedom 
n = 225
Table 11.3 shows that there is a statistically significant difference in obtaining a bachelors 
degree between Temporary Employees and Large Firm employees. This would support 
the hypothesis that large firms will only hire those accountants who have been able to 
obtain a Bachelor’s degree. This is a description of a demand or institutionalized 
segmentation, either brought about by the firm or by the education system. However, 
due to the evidence above, we must look into other aspects of this segmentation, namely 
the preference for control over working-time of those employees who do not have a 
Bachelor’s degree. If the respondents who have not received Bachelor’s degrees do not 
show a preference for control over working-time then we must accept strong evidence for 
the demand-sided segmentation. On the other hand, if there is a significant difference 
in preference for control over working-time, we must include our supply-side influences 
into the segmentation model. Table 11.4 reports findings in the same format as we used 
to test gender, to test the strength of our model taking into account education.
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Table 11.4 
Testing Model by Education
Population Dependent
Variable
Independent
Variables
X2
of model
Sig
1. All cases Participation WEEKS, HOURS
in Temp Employment
37.775 .0000
2. No Bachelor No Bachelor
Temps and all Large Participation 
Firm Employees in Temp Employment
3. No Bachelor 
Temps and No 
Bachelor 
Large Firm
4. Temporary 
Employees
5. Large Firm 
Employees
No Bachelor 
Participation 
in Temp Employment
No Bachelor
No Bachelor
WEEKS, HOURS
WEEKS, HOURS
WEEKS, HOURS
WEEKS, HOURS
28.981
14.744
3.027
0.070
.0000
.0006
.2202
.9656
These results are similar to those given on differences in preferences for control over 
working-time reported by gender. We see that the model performs nearly as well in 
predicting participation of temporary employees without bachelor’s degrees as it does for 
predicting temporary employment participation in general (compare the Chi-Square from 
Line 1 with Lines 2 and 3). Furthermore, it becomes apparent that the model performs 
poorly when trying to predict employees who have not obtained Bachelor’s degrees (see 
Lines 4 and 5 in the Table). This means that although temporary employees are more 
likely to lack a Bachelor’s degree, they are also more likely to prefer control over 
working-time. This supports our supply-side hypothesis, that job choice may be 
influenced by preferences for control over working-time.
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Because the model does not do well in predicting employees without Bachelor’s degreees 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that obtaining a Bachelor’s degree and preferences 
for control over working-time are not dependent. This means that we cannot accept that 
because one does not have a Bachelor’s degree one prefers control over worldng-time. 
This argues against the idea that preferences for control over working-time are a 
phenomena linked to being in a "secondary level" segment like "people who do not have 
Bachelor’s degrees". It does not appear that not having a Bachelor’s degree fosters the 
"trait" (see Chapter 3) of desire for control over working-time. Rather, it appears to be 
an individual preference linked to other individual circumstances rather than broad 
institutions.
FIRM  INTERNAL TESTS OF A SUPPLY-SIDE MODEL
We now look at the firm internal differences in working conditions, primarily control 
over working-time. This is done by dividing the large accountancy firm into two groups. 
The first group is designated the "core" group, in the demand segmentation theory sense. 
The rest of the participants are labelled "others"2. This is of interest since our thesis 
argues that compensation packages may be reflecting preferences and that comparisons 
of compensation packages should include this element. Our primary goal is to test our 
Hypothesis 1 about firm internal job forms and levels of control over working-time.
2 The division was produced by looking at those aspects of employees that usually designate them into 
a core group. These are: pay, years of service and job descriptions. The initial division was made by self- 
reported job descriptions. If the respondents used the word "manager" in their job description they were 
put into the core group. Because some managers may have neglected to describe themselves in this way, 
other criteria were also used. If the level of pay and years of service were similar to those who had 
reported themselves as managers then these respondents were also included in the core group. This process 
yielded 19 core group members.
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Hypothesis 1
In the internal labour market some job forms will include working-time flexibility in their 
compensation package and others will not, according to the sensitivity to time of the 
employee.
We test this hypothesis using logistic regression. Our independent variables are those 
that were used in the previous chapters. The preference variables are also those used 
before. Our binary dependent variable is defined as CORE GROUP PARTICIPATION 
(1), and others (0). The population used is only the respondents from the large 
accountancy firm. Table 11.5 reports on those variables which have significant 
predicting power in a forced single entry logistic regression, after testing the same 
variables as used in the tables above.
Table 11.5
Testing the Predictive Power of Independent Variables
Dependent Variable: CORE GROUP PARTICIPATION
F o r c e d  S in g l e  E n t r y
Statistically
Significant
Variables Coefficient
B
TIME
CONTROL 1.3365
OTHER
CONTROL 1.3224
VALUE CONTROL
OVER THE TIMES 1.9221
OF THE DAY WORKED
A CHANGE IN
LOCATION WOULD 1.8700
IMPROVE MY SITUATION 
n = 174
Wald
Statistic
20.8077
20.7336
9.8990
sig
0.0000
0.0000
0.0017
R
0.3959
0.3947
0.2563
exp(B)
3.8059
3.7525
4.9714
12.9020 0.0003 0.3011 6.4880
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Table 11.5 shows that we can reject the null hypothesis that TIME CONTROL and 
CORE GROUP PARTICIPATION are not dependent. The odds of predicting 
participation increase as TIME CONTROL increases (exp(B) > 1 and B > 0). Table 
11.5 also reports that a preference for CONTROL OVER WHICH TIMES OF THE 
DAY THAT ARE WORKED can be used to predict CORE GROUP PARTICIPATION. 
If one shows a preference for control over working-time of this type, the odds of 
predicting participation increase (exp (B) > 1 and B >  0). This is critical in that our 
hypothesis asserts that those who prefer control over working-time will exhibit control 
in their compensation package.
These two results support our Hypothesis 1 above, that different job forms internal to the 
firm will have different levels of control over working-time due to preferences for control 
over working-time. Interestingly, it is the times of the day worked that are preferred. 
Again the importance of the specific time unit is revealed. For, a preference for control 
over the other time units is not significantly different for this group.
In general, it appears that core group employees have control over their working 
conditions at higher levels than the rest of the large firm employees. The independent 
variable OTHER CONTROL was also a significant predictor for participation in the core 
group. As OTHER CONTROL increases, the probability of predicting participation 
increases (exp (B) >  1 and B > 0).
The core group also prefers control over choosing the location that they work from. 
These results are supported by Clark (1992) wherein he shows that higher level managers
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will prefer a change in their compensation packages that is more apt to be associated with 
non-pecuniary elements. They have a desire to obtain greater freedom in their positions. 
Of course, this can be associated with their work being less a product of how many hours 
they work as opposed to what they produced. Their work may be more knowledge dense 
and therefore less likely to be monitorable or necessarily improved by increases in 
monitoring.
We must also notice the absence of JOB SECURITY, and opinions about INCOME as 
being a distinguishing variable. As in the analysis of temporary employment 
participation, job security is not a significant predictor of core job form participation. 
Again this argues against the Atkinsonian model of job forms.
Having established a significant difference in the preferences for control over working- 
time, we now investigate whether an interactive model - a model which combines 
preferences and levels into an interactive term - also has predictive capacity. This is an 
essential test, since if control over working-time is greater only in general, rather than 
in the specific time unit, preferred our model loses some of its significance. It is only 
if a specific type of control is preferred and also present in the compensation package that 
we can show supportive evidence for our supply-side driven analysis.
The interaction term we use is a binary independent variable. After testing all interactive 
terms, the only significant term includes the specific form of control over working-time 
(here CONTROL OVER THE TIMES OF THE DAY WORKED) and combines it with 
a preference for that time unit. We labell this interactive term TIMES OF DAY. A
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positive response about having control and preferring that control are coded" 1" otherwise 
they are coded "0". The results are given in Table 11.6 below.
Table 11.6
Constructing a Model: Testing the Predictive Power of Indices
Dependent Variable: CORE GROUP PARTICIPATION
F o r c e d  S in g l e  E n t r y
Statistically
Significant
Variables Coefficient Wald sig R exp(B)
B Statistic
TIMES OF DAY 1.9221 12.7548 .0004 .2991 6.8354
Table 11.6 shows that the interaction term TIMES OF DAY maintains its predictive 
power (the Wald statistic of 12.7598 is significant at above the 99 per cent level). Thus 
again this supports our Hypothesis 1. It also allows us to rewrite our model for the 
internal labour market with a more specific term which more accurately reflect our study. 
Rather than writing our model of the form:
core group participation = (control over working-time, preferences for control)
we can formulate it as:
~b
Cp = f(Td * Pd)
Where:
Cp = Core group participation
Td = Control over times of the day
Pd =  Preference for control over the times of the day
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Although a model of core group participation that includes independent variables about 
control in general (like TIME CONTROL and OTHER CONTROL) produces a large 
model Chi-Square statistic (model Chi-Square =  37.855), the model which only includes 
the interaction term TIMES OF DAY also yields a significant model Chi-Sauare (model 
Chi-Square = 11.555).
When the population studied is divided so that one tries to predict employees who are 
neither a core group employee nor a temporary employee, the control over working-time 
variables, both preference and levels of control, are significant in predicting participation 
in the sense that if there is less control or less preference for control the odds of 
predicting participation decrease.
CONCLUSION
This chapter, as well as the previous two chapters, produce some remarkable results. We 
find very little support for job security being a viable predictor of job form participation, 
or that gender and education on their own describe well the differences in job forms. 
Perhaps because Atkinson’s model is developed from a manufacturing perspective, the 
segmentation described there is not applicable to knowledge based expert individual dense 
industries like accountancy.
Of course, this is our contention: that demand-sided theories may not be appropriate for 
the industries which are now a large portion of the labour market; that professional 
employees, although employed in large organizations comparable to the past giant 
manufacturing firms, do not have the same firm internal or occupational dynamics, and
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may even influence job form attributes through their preferences, since monitoring these 
knowledge dense jobs can not easily be done. Therefore, a reformulation of 
segmentation and labour market analysis may need to occur. Redesigned not at the total 
exclusion of those ideas that were developed for manufacturing, but redesigned to 
embrace those aspects that are applicable and yet allow newer aspects of work, like 
control over working-time, that may become increasingly important.
This control over working-time has been shown in the above results to be a good 
predictor of two of the job forms that we have studied. The temporary employees are 
linked to control over the weeks of the year worked, and the core employees are linked 
to control over which times of the day are worked, more so than other aspects of working 
conditions. Here job form differences can be described by a working condition that has 
been relegated to the broad term "flexible" work. A term that defies the intricate time 
units that were so important to our conclusions above. A term that masks the important 
aspects about this aspect of work.
Interestingly there is a relationship between the core employee and the temporary agency 
employee. This relationship may be used to draw a labour market group that is quite 
unique; a grouping of a time-sensitive kind. Here, job forms that have been traditionally 
viewed in demand-sided labour market segmentation (most notably Atkinson) as two 
extremes, are united in this supply-side job form choice approach. This highlights the 
impact an analysis of supply-side issues can have on drawing conclusions about the 
human resources of organizations and the definitions we apply to them.
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PART 4 - Conclusion
Chapter
12
Conclusion
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
We have suggested that issues surrounding working conditions have the potential to 
evolve toward issues concerned with more liberal working-time arrangements. More 
specifically, toward arrangements that might allow the expert employee labour market 
segment to have more input in the timing of their activities. This is meaningful when one 
looks at the changes taking place in industries, technology, and demographics: in general, 
changes in work that influence the control over working-time at work. These were 
outlined in Chapter 2.
We have deliberately avoided using the word "flexible" to describe these arrangements 
since this word has come to define only the most severe break from traditional work 
arrangements as well as the manpower adjustment capability of the firm. We prefer the 
term "working-time control", which allows for scheduling freedoms in a variety of time 
units.
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In the context of labour market segmentation theory, we address working-time by noting 
the differences in discussing work in a secondary labour market and a primary labour 
market on the industrial or occupational level. This is done to place our study in a LMS 
theory slot, to clarify the type of labour market and labour market segmentation we are 
discussing. Parts are placed in the primary sector in some levels of LMS theory and 
others are placed in a secondary level. In short, it is on a primary level when discussing 
industries and occupations and on a primary/secondary level when discussing mobility 
chains and core-periphery analysis in the Atkinsonian sense. Most importantly, we 
include in our discussion the supply-side influences on labour market job choice.
It is this supply-side theory that allows us to discuss the consequences of different 
preferences for various working-time arrangements. This is accomplished through a 
time-sensitive analysis using a time-sensitive model which allows work to take place in 
time rather than commodify time. We show how working-time freedom (of many kinds) 
might be able to increase the utility of those employees who are time-sensitive.
In the internal labour market, control over working-time may increase not only the 
employee’s utility but also his effort. Thus, control at work may not derive solely from 
competition for scarce labour resources but also from the firm’s desire to increase 
productivity, especially in knowledge based industries. More importantly for this thesis, 
it is suggested that control over working-time in compensation packages may partially 
derive from the preferences of employees in different tiers in the internal labour market. 
This is supply-side stratification of compensation packages.
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In the external labour market, market mediated employment firms (the temporary agency) 
may evolve to capitalize on the preferences of employees for control over working-time. 
These firms, by decreasing search costs which are inherent in the varying preferences 
over time of the employees and the firms, provide greater control over working-time. 
More importantly for this thesis, preferences for control over working-time may shed off 
a distinctive employee, the temporary agency worker, via an attractive working-time 
conducive compensation package. This is supply-side job form choice.
In a secondary analysis of past evidence we show that there is evidence to discredit the 
demand-sided core-periphery analysis of labour market segmentation. This gives some 
justification for theories and studies of a supply-side nature.
Ultimately, we provide a more intensive framework in which we are able to evaluate 
more closely the consequences of preferences for working-time. In the results of our 
study there is support for the propositions which were generated from this framework. 
There we show some evidence that employees who prefer control over working-time are 
provided control over working-time as part of their compensation package.
In the external labour market, there was a significant difference between the temporary 
agency employee and the large firm employee when looking at the aspects of working- 
time. More than the large firm employees, the temporary agency employees were time- 
sensitive; they preferred control over working-time and possessed control over working­
time, specifically, control over which weeks of the year that are worked. There was no 
support for job security or income differences between job forms.
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in the internal labour market (a large London accountancy firm), there was a significant 
difference between the core group of employees and the other groups, when looking at 
working-time. This difference was most marked when looking at control over the hours 
of the day that are worked. Here, more than any other group, the core employees 
preferred this type of control and the core employees were provided this type of control 
in their compensation package. Also, there was very little evidence that job security 
varied between the internal labour market tiers.
In conclusion, our study shows that two groups of employees prefer control over 
working-time more than other groups. These are the core employees and the temporary 
agency employees. We also find that these two groups are provided much greater levels 
of control over working-time in their compensation package. This, then, suggests that 
because working-time control is important to them they are seeking compensation 
packages which include working-time control.
This, then, is a suggestion of supply-side job form choice put forth in the theoretical 
portion of this thesis. Interestingly, it supports the idea of a new group of employees that 
prefer control over working-time (the professional expert protean employee), and, 
surprisingly, links two previously widely separated labour market segments (the core and 
outer-ring periphery) through the working-time control that they prefer and the working- 
time control they are provided with in their compensation packages.
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
If the expert protean employee is to become an increasingly important part of human
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resources, it may be that sensitivity to their working-time arrangements will become an 
increasingly important aspect of compensation packages for both the employer and the 
employee to consider. We suggest several ways that control over working-time may 
effect employee utility as well as employee performance.
Our findings support the idea that the time unit of control need not be the all 
encompassing flexibility arrangement of flexi-time, and that different employee groups 
may have different preferences over different time units (here the temporary agency 
employee over weeks of the year and the core employee over hours of the day). For 
organizations this means that there is some support for more explicitly including control 
over working-time as a part of the compensation package. By delineating this aspect of 
the compensation package, the benefits to both the employee and the employer may be 
made more readily apparent, and ways to capitalize on their consequences will be more 
accessible.
It also suggests that if employers would rather use more direct methods in hiring expert 
temporary employees (other than the market mediated temporary agency), this will be 
difficult because of the working-time preferences of the temporary employee. A small 
number of time-sensitive temporary employees may cause delays in finding an appropriate 
worker.
It also suggests that if employees would rather use more direct methods in finding 
temporary work (other than the market mediated temporary agency), this will be costly 
because of the information gathering costs they might incur. Knowledge of a few firms
204
(if not adequately large enough) may not sufficiently provide work for the time-sensitive 
employee.
It is only if the necessary working-time conditions are made explicitly clear, with regards 
to the unit of time, that a one-to-one arrangement can be fully capitalized on by the 
employer and the employee.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
As Wareing (1992) suggests, "the variety and extent of "non-standard" working patterns 
among employees in Britain is increasing..." and "it is important to realize that the so- 
called traditional workforce are not, by definition, inflexible" (p 89). This thesis has 
attempted to discern some of these varying working-time arrangements and varying 
working-time preferences of employees in terms of previously defined labour market tiers 
and labour market segments.
The implications of the findings to theory are that some employees may have working 
conditions, or compensation packages, that are tied to the preferences of the employee. 
This, in essence, re-defines some of the labour market tiers/segments by being aware of 
the opinions of working-time from the point of view of the employee. It suggests for 
theory a rethinking of the demand-sided analysis by suggesting the link between 
preferences for control over working time and job form.
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This was accomplished by defining more precisely the job forms under consideration. 
Not just lumping all temporary workers into one package and all core workers into 
another. Our theoretical approach was new in that we opened up Winston’s time- 
sensitive model, which allows discussion of work to take place within time, to the 
application of a plurality of personal working-time preferences by redefining his 
production environment. This produces a graphing technique which could be applied to 
various time/labour market issues. In our case, we study through this time-sensitive 
approach the phenomena of temporary work.
The methodology of studying an explicit occupation provided more accurate information 
about job forms. We believe this study calls for more studies using this approach. If 
not, some of the occupational and industry level influences which effect all job forms 
may be incorrectly inferred as job form working conditions.
This thesis supports the idea for studies of job forms to include a wider range of 
components in the compensation package as viewed by the employee (here we include 
preferences for working-time). It also, by introducing a delineation between preferences 
and traits tied to secondary market status, suggests a unique colaboration of LMS theory 
and neo-classical economics. If studies about segmentation and working conditions do 
not explicitly distinguish which of these two very different employee attributes they 
intend to be studying, continuing confusion may prevail.
Most importantly, this thesis suggests a new type of working-time job form. Its primary 
attribute is the working-time flexibility at work. This, we believe, implies the need to
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elevate the working-time arrangements in importance to at least on par with aspects like 
job security.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK
The development of the expert protean time-sensitive labour market segment may imply 
new forms of labour market barriers. For what these new jobs in this primary sector 
have, more than simply higher pay and higher job security, and primary job related 
experience (for indeed many of those jobs previously relegated to the lower segment may 
have both higher pay and higher job security than the new primary sector eg plumber 
versus accountant or salesman etc), is the working-time freedom which allows personal 
development in a broad range of categories.
This is important in that it means that rather than the employee being subjected to selling 
their skills in one market, they can develop new areas that they may foresee as being 
important to maintain their status (class) position. For the future, this adaptability, 
specifically — being able to secure the resources (working-time flexibility) to be able to 
adapt — means the continued ability of primary workers to maintain their position in a 
primary labour market segment. This may be true because, in the future, rapid change 
and innovation is what may be required to stay competitive in a world labour market. 
Further research on how these new job-forms and their accompanying working-time 
freedom imply either greater or lesser mobility among labour market segments would be
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most interesting.
Although Orpen (1981) concludes that flexi-time will not likely effect production 
adversely, there is relatively little research on its potential to increase productivity in 
knowledge based industries. There is much more room for investigation. However, 
investigation, as is suggested here, not just into "flexi-time" but investigation into a much 
broader range of working-time flexibilities, like hours of the day, days of the week, 
weeks of the year, etc. and their effects on effective work.
The revolution in working-time has not surfaced in the dramatic fashion often linked to 
flexi-time work and tele-work. It may be, as most societal changes occur, a slow 
evolution within the traditional institutions of employment — an evolution towards greater 
working-time control. And just as we look back on the 16 hour work day of the 19th 
century in utter disbelief, the people of the 21st century may look back on our present 
work day and wonder why we were so keen to make others share in our chronometric 
concepts; it may be a mystery to them.
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AEvidentiary Tables for Trends in Labour Markets
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Table A.l Estimates of the Civilian Labour Force by Age Group - UK
Numbers
(000)
Growth
(%)
Age Group 1988 1995 2000 88-95 88-00
16-24 6,154 5,021 4,827 -18.4 -21.6
25-44 13,095 14,152 14,368 8.1 9.7
45-59 6,883 7,820 8,123 13.6 18.0
60+ 1,478 1,343 1,302 -9.1 -11.9
All ages 27,610 28,336 28,620 2.6 3.7
Source: Employment Gazette, April 1989
Table A.2 Civilian Labour Force by Age Group - US
Numbers Growth
(000) (%)
Age group 1985 1988 2000 85-88 88-00 85-00
16-24 23,600 22,536 22,400 -4.5 -0.6 -5.0
25-44 59,600 64,938 70,500 8.9 8.6 18.3
45-64 29,400 30,912 44,700 5.1 44.6 52.0
65+ 3,000 3,284 3,400 9.5 3.5 13.3
All Ages 115,600 121,670 141,000 5.3 15.9 22.0
Source: Author’s table, figures calculated from numbers from Statistical Abstract o f the 
United States 1990, table 625.
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Table A.3 Civilian Labour Force by Sex - GB
Numbers Growth
(000) (%)
Sex 1984 1986 1989 1990 84-89 86-90
Women 10,545 10,886 11,631 11,733 10.2 7.9
Men 15,268 15,321 15,615 15,665 2.3 2.2
Source: Author’s table, figures were calculated from April 1992 Employment Gazette, 
table 1, page 174.
Table A.4 Civilian Labour Force by Sex - US
Numbers
(000)
Growth
(%)
Sex 1980 1985 1988 80-85 85-88 80-88
Women 45,487 51,051 54,742 12.2 7.2 20.3
Men 61,453 64,411 66,927 4.8 3.9 8.9
Source: Author’s table, figures were calculated from Statistical Abstract o f the United 
States 1990, table 625.
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Table A.5 - First Degrees Obtained GB, by Sex
Growth
(%)
Sex 1977 1984 1989 77-84 84-89 77-89
Women 20,251
(36.8)
27,715
(41.3)
28,309
(43.3)
36.8 2.1 39.7
Men 34,792
(63.2)
39,431
(58.7)
37,096
(56.7)
13.3 -5.9 6.6
Source: Author’s table, figures were calculated from University Statistics 1989-90, Vol. 
one, table 21, Feb 1991; and University Statistic 1987-88 Vol. one, table 21, Dec 1988
Table A.6 - Higher Degrees Obtained GB, by Sex
Growth
(%)
Sex 1977 1984 1989 77-84 84-89 77-89
Women 2,466
(22.3)
4,106
(30.3)
6,296
(35.4)
66.5 53.3 155.0
Men 8,570
(77.7)
9,450
(69.7)
11,487
(64.6)
10.2 21.6 34.0
Source: Author’s table, figures were calculated from University Statistics 1989-90, Vol. 
one, table 22, Feb 1991; and University Statistic 1987-88 Vol. one, table 22, Dec. 1988
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Table A.7 Undergraduate Enrolment by Subject and Sex - GB
Growth
(%)
Subject Sex 1985-86 1989-90 86-90
Medicine and Women 9,851 9,990 1.4
Dentistry Men 12,250 11,481 -6.2
Biological Sciences Women 8,246 9,929 20.4
Men 7,087 7,760 9.5
Physical Sciences Women 4,875 5,739 17.7
Men 15,163 15,078 -.5
Engineering and Women 2,509 3,610 43.8
Technology Men 24,068 25,098 4.2
Architecture and Women 777 1,059 36.2
related studies Men 2,267 2,483 9.5
Social Sciences Women 14,315 16,426 14.7
Men 16,742 17,865 6.7
Business and Financial Women 3,121 4,044 30.0
studies Men 5,074 6,207 22.0
Source: Author’s table, figures were calculated using numbers from University Statistics 
1989-90, table 5, Feb 91; and University Statistics 85-86, table 5, Sep. 87.
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Table A.8 Graduate Enrolment by Subject and Sex - GB
Growth
(%)
Subject Sex 1985-86 1989-90 86-90
Medicine and Women 594 ' 679 14.3
Dentistry Men 907 760 -16.0
Biological Sciences Women 1,140 1,427 25.1
Men 1,615 1,746 8.1
Physical Sciences Women 867 1,049 20.9
Men 3,635 3,982 9.5
Engineering and Women 335 391 16.7
Technology Men 3,000 2,476 -17.4
Architecture and Women 168 249 48.0
related studies Men 349 344 -1.4
Social Sciences Women 1,935 2,222 14.8
Men 2,237 2,184 -2.3
Business and Financial Women 543 737 35.7
studies Men 1,172 1,449 23.6
Source: Author’s table, figures were calculated using numbers from University Statistics 
1989-90, table 6, Feb 91; and University Statistics 85-86, table 6, Sep 87.
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Table A.9 Enrolment in Institutions of Higher Education - US by Sex
Growth
(%)
Sex 1980 1985 1988 1990 80-85 85-88 88-90 80-90
Women 6,223 6,429 6,904 7,042 3.3 7.4 2.0 13.2
Men 5,874 5,818 5,946 5,893 -.9 2.2 -.8 0.3
Source: Author’s table, figures were calculated from numbers in Statistical Abstract o f 
the United States 1990, table 253.
Table A. 10 Bachelor’s Degrees Conferred by Subject and Sex - US
Growth
{%)
Subject Sex 1980 1987 80-87
All Subjects Women 455,800 510,539 12.0
Men 473,600 480,800 1.5
Business and Women 62,000 112,137 80.8
Management Men 124,000 129,019 4.0
Social Sciences Women 45,300 42,321 -6.5
Men 58,600 53,864 -7.1
Physical Sciences Women 5,500 5,673 3.1
Men 17,900 14,301 -20.0
Architecture Women 2,500 3,327 33.0
Men 6,600 5,595 -15.2
Engineering Women 6,400 12,551 96.1
Men 62,500 80,523 28.8
Source: Author’s table, figures were calculated from numbers in Statistical Abstract o f 
the United States 1982-83, table 278 and Statistical Abstract o f the United States 1990, 
table 275.
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Table A. 11 Higher Degrees Conferred by Subject and Sex - US
Growth
(%)
Subject Sex 1980 1987 80-87
All Subjects Women 157,004 160,263 2.0
Men 173,692 163,414 -6.0
Business and Women 12,420 22,533 81.4
Management Men 55,944 46,061 -17.6
Social Sciences Women 5,270 4,995 -5.2
Men 10,136 8,318 -17.9
Physical Sciences Women 1,355 2,042 50
Men 6,953 7,282 4.7
Architecture Women 907 1,094 20.6
Men 2,311 2,140 -7.3
Engineering Women 1,237 3,123 152.0
Men 17,513 23,390 33.5
Source: Author’s table, figures were calculated from numbers in Statistical Abstract o f 
the United States 1982-83, table 278 and Statistical Abstract o f the United States 1990, 
table 275.
Table A. 12 Degrees conferred in Selected Professions - US by Sex
Growth
(%)
Occupation Sex 1980 1985 1987 80-85 85-87 80-87
Medicine Women 3,486 4,814 5,054 38.0 5.0 45.0
(M.D.) Men 11,416 11,167 10,056 -2.2 -5.3 -7.4
Dentistry Women 700 1,051 1,138 50.0 8.2 62.5
(D.D.S or 
D.M.D)
Men 4,556 4,302 3,603 -5.6 -16.2 -20.9
Law (LLB Women 10,754 14,421 14,529 34.0 .7 35.1
or JD) Men 24,893 23,070 21,643 -7.3 -6.2 -13.0
Source: Author’s table, figures were calculated from numbers in Statistical Abstract o f 
the United States 1990, table 276.
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Table A. 13 Employment Growth in Business and Related Services, 1984 - 1991 GB
(September of each year. Self-employed not included)
Employment Growth
(000) (%)
SIC code 1984 1987 1989 1991 84-87 87-89 89-91 84-91
All industries and 0-9 20,845 
services
21,778 22,766 21,575 4.4 4.5 -5.2 3.5
Service industries 6-9 13,542 14,684 15,641 15,232 8.4 6.5 -2.6 12.5
Banking, finance etc. 8 1,988 2,308 2,684 2,616 16.0 16.3 -2.5 31.6
Business services 83 1,037 1,285 1,526 1,519 24.1 18.8 -0.5 46.5
Legal services 8350 140 165 189 204 17.8 14.5 7.8 45.7
Accountants auditor 8360 122 146 168 171 19.6 15.0 1.7 40.1
Professional services 8370 198 238 277 290 20.2 16.4 4.7 46.5
Computer services 8394 81 109 133 160 34.5 22.0 20.0 97.5
Renting of moveables 84 104 108 127 132 3.8 17.6 3.9 26.9
Sources'. Author’s table, figures were calculated from January 1987, October 1989, April 1991, May 1992 Employment Gazette.
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Table A.14 Employment Growth in Business and Related Services, 1970 - 1986 US
Employment Growth
(000) (%)
1970 1980 1986 1970-1980 1980-1986
Total private sector 57,265 74,835 83,380 30.7 11.4
Business services 1,632 2,996 4,613 83.6 54.0
Advertising 115 140 168 21.7 20.0
Computer software, data processing na 303 553 na 82.5
Management consulting and public relations 288 324 562 12.5 73.5
Temporary employment agencies na 569 971 na 70.7
Services to buildings 288 497 636 72.6 30.0
Legal Services 237 503 746 112.2 48.3
Miscellaneous services 590 925 1,410 56.8 52.4
Engineering, architectural 261 523 706 100.4 35.0
Accounting 200 302 432 51.0 43.1
Total business and related services 2,459 4,424 6,769 79.9 53.0
Source: Noyelle, from US department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, US Summary, several years.
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Table A. 15 - Ratio of Computers to Desk-workers - US
! 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989---------------------j----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ratio ! .054 .103 .160 .207 .275 .340
i
Source: Statistical Abstract o f the United States, 1990, page 951 table XIH.
Table A. 16 - Computer (Electronic Data Processing Equipment) Sales - UK
I 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990---------------- j---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sales in j 3,720 4,924 6,341 7,363 7,805
Millions £ !
Source: Business Monitor, 1991, PQ 3302 / PAS 3441, table 1.
1991
7,933
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Table A. 17 Employee Share Schemes, Number of Schemes - GB
Numbers of Schemes * Change (%)*
1985 1990 85-90
Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High
70 266 462 90 490 890 28.5 84.2 92.6
Source: Author’s table, figures calculated from Inland Revenue Statistics 1991, Table 6.1.
Table A.18 Employees Participating in Employee Share Schemes - GB
Numbers of Employees (000)* Change (%)*
1985 1990 85-90
Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High
580 1,310 2,040 900 3,215 5,530 55.0 145.0 171.0
Source: Author’s table, figures calculated from Inland Revenue Statistics 1991, Table 6.1.
* In both tables there are three estimates given for each year and the percentage change. This is done because the 
original data from the inland revenue system cannot account for those companies that no longer use the share schemes 
nor can it account for those companies that sign up repeatedly. The low estimates are the numbers given for just that 
year. The High estimates are the total cumulative for that year and all of the preceding years. The medium estimates 
takes half the difference between the high and low estimates and adds this number to the low estimate. The per cent 
changes are respective to the low, medium and high estimates. In speaking with the Inland Revenue Officers for this 
particular program, they suggested that the authors calculated low estimates would be too low and the High estimates 
too high, and that both numbers should probably be calculated in the same manner. (In other words, it is unlikely that 
one should use the high estimate for 1985 and the low estimate for 1990). After exhaustive searching these numbers 
seem to be the best available for such programs.
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Table A. 19 Profit Related Pay, Number of Schemes - GB
Number of Schemes Growth (%)
March 1988 March 1991
615 1,277 107
Source: Authors table, figures calculated from Inland Revenue 1991, table 6.3
Table A.20 Profit Related Pay, Number of Employees GB
Number of Employees (000) Growth (%)
March 1988 March 1991
90 350 288
Source: Authors table, figures calculated from Inland Revenue 1991, table 6.4.
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Table A.21 Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Number of Plans - US 
(Stock bonus and purchase)
Number of Plans Growth (%)
1980 1988 1991 80-88 88-91 80-91
5,009 8,862 9,888 76.9 11.5 97.4
Source: Author’s table, figures calculated from unpublished data by National Center fo r  
Employee Ownership, Inc., Oakland CA.
Table A.22 Employees participating in Employee Stock Ownership Plans - US 
(Stock bonus and purchase)
Number of Employees (000) Change (%)
1980  1988 _1991 _80-88 88-91 80-91
4,048 9,076 11,329 124.0 24.8 179.8
Source: Author’s table, figures calculated from unpublished data by National Center fo r  
Employee Ownership, Inc., Oakland CA.
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Appendix
Formal Exposition of Winston Model
This appendix is mostly an abreviation of Chapter 8 of Winston (1982). The abreviation 
is used to show the important elements of that model. Of prime consideration is the 
optimal switching rule (for utility-maximizing individuals) from activity to activity in a 
time-sensitive way. This appendix is also used to show how we have incorporated 
Winston’s model to labour market segmentation and the time related aspects of job form. 
We also note those times when we depart from the perspectives of Winston’s analysis.
Winston’s model employs three activties: two consumption (or non-work activities) and 
one work activity. Although within the mathematical notation it may appear as if the 
sequencing of the activities is imposed exogenously, this is not the case. The sequencing 
itself will emerge from the model.
Accumulated household utility is:
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wWhere flows of utility from activity 1, ut, is a function of the intensity of the activty 
and the amount of goods used xt. The same holds for activity 2.
This utility is maximized subject to the constraint,
where the price, p, is exogenous and goods x{, are time sensitive. They are constrained 
by the resources, w, flow of wages and Yp wealth.
abundant. Like the allocation of labour model, the optimal quantity of consumption and 
labour services is found. However, since his terms are denoted as flows he is also able 
to distinguish the optimal moments to switch from one actviity to the next (t*). He allows 
the timing (dates) of activities into the model. In other words, we have a model of 
household activities that occurs within time.
Most noteably this is accomplished in the z^x^tjjt)) term (speed of output). This term 
denotes the efficiency of production, and Winston suggests that this is time-sensitive since 
the production environment (Winston uses E(t) to denote this) changes throughout the 
day (Winston relys heavily on cyclical variations like day to night altering the production 
environment). This changes the relative efficiency of production of the various goods 
throughout the day. Which means that "the value of time spent in any one activity will
[2 ]
The similarities between Winston’s model and regular houshold allocation models are
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change over the day" (page 172). This is because the "intensisty" (or speed) of 
production, z^t), changes via the external environment at different times in the day, 
ultimately changing satisfaction, Uj(t) (The same effect on the value of time is felt 
through the time-sensitive cost of producing the input X j( t ) .) .  This means that labour 
services are time-sensitive.
The first order condition for optimal activity choice with respect to consumption activity 
timing is,
u1( z 1(x1 ( t 1*)))  -  u2(z2 (x2 ( t 1*))) -  -  A.(p2^ ( t 1*) = 0  [3]
rearranging leaves,
X = ~ [4]
and in a different form,
“ p 2x 2 ( t 1*)
Ui (Z i (* i* ( t i * ) ))  -  A.p1x 1* ( t1*) = u2 ( z2(x1* ( t 1*)))  -  Xp2x 2* ( t 1*) [5]
we now more readily define for each activity i at each moment t of the day T its net 
utility flow:
\i±( t )  = u±( t )  - X p i s i ( t ) f t Q<> t  * t T [6]
^i(t) is the value of time spent in activity i at moment t. It is the value of the activity
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minus the cost. From this Winston states the choice rule which generates the maximum 
utility flow:
"At any moment the optimal choice rule for the household is simply to do 
what will maximize the net flow of utility, ^(t) — in other words, to spend 
time, always, in the activity in which time has the most value. From the 
m possible activities that can be done at any moment, only one is 
chosen" (page 172).
At the optimal switching moment, t*, time will have the same value in both activities,
These equations are what lead to diagrams like the ones we have used in this thesis.
In our discussions about the timing of activities and the decision to work we are 
implicitly altering Winston’s model by redefining the production environment, E(t). 
Winston’s production environment changes constantly via exogenous environmental 
rhythms, like the daily train schedule, or the yearly weather conditions etc (page 159). 
We accept this influence over the efficiency of production but find it too conservative. 
Therefore, we include in our production environment, elements like one’s father visiting, 
or an offer to play tennis, or an offer to go to lunch. To us these events which alter 
scheduling are all too common to be left out of the production environment. This has the 
effect of altering the perspective of the economic agent. Instead of solely planning all 
units of time from perfect rhythmic foresight, the agent plans different sets of units of 
time from both rhythmic foresight and production environment abberations.
This means that we also leave Winston’s analysis by implicitly redifining the function, 
Zi(Xi(t);t), the intensisty or speed of production. Since zi5 more explicitly denoted as
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z J ( t )  = fi(xi(t)tli) E1(t) = z^x^t) tl±; t) , fori = l, ... ,m, [8]
is a function partially explained by the production environment E(t).
What does this model tell us? It simply says that the agent can maximize utility in time, 
given an exogenous production environment, by optimally timing his activities. Our 
discussion in Chapter 4 uses the less formal diagramatic methods of this model. That 
chapter shows how one set of individuals easily and readily accomodate to the production 
environment; the efficiency with which they produce/consume activities is not effected 
by the timing of doing those activities. Their consumption of activities other than work 
is time-insensitive. They can adjust the timing of activities ( t/, t2*, etc.) without altering 
utility because they are not severely effected by the production environment. Therefore 
rules about working-time set by institutions and organizations have little effect on their 
activities.
More importantly, we show how another set of individuals are very sensitive to the 
timing of their activities. The production environment, we implicitly assume, is most 
constraining to them (for example seeing one’s daughter pirouette in a ballet, or taking 
French lessons). For them, the utility derived from their activities is closely tied to the 
timing of their activities. These are the time-sensitive employees. Therefore 
organizational restrictions may cause severe losses in utility (Winston (1987) hints to this 
on page 581).
This means then that these two groups, when faced with two different production
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environments and the different working time flexibilities attached to them (one job form 
produces a very constraining or restrictive production environment, another job form 
produces another freer production environment), may possibly choose, if given the 
opportunity, different job forms1. Thus, we have supply-side labour market job form 
choice and/or supply-side, firm-internal compensation package stratification, and a new 
application of Winston’s "Activity Choice" theory.
1 Winston (1982, 1987) mentions the possibility of night shift work being selected by a group of 
individuals who find night work most appealing.
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Appendix
C
How Temporary Agencies Profit From Search Costs
This appendix gives a brief numerical example explaining one hypothesis on how 
temporary agencies are able to make a profit. Most of this analysis is based on the time- 
sensitive analysis developed in Chapter 4.
THE MARKET FOR TEMPORARY WORK WITHOUT A TEMPORARY 
AGENCY
A firm will pay for a temporary worker so long as the wage offered is lower than 
alternative forms of filling the need for increased demands of labour services, for 
example, overtime1. It will also pay so long as there is a marginal benefit of the extra 
labour services. These are the two necessary conditions. More formally, a firm will pay 
a wage W(temporary) =  W*(wage offered to the temporary worker) +  search costs of 
finding temp, so long as W(temporary) < W (overtime). This implies that an increase 
in search costs then will decrease the wage offered to a temporary worker, W*.
1 Another reason noted by Abraham (1990) is taking "advantage of outsider's special expertise" which may 
be an "important factor in many contracting decisions, particularly those involving highly paid workers" (page 
10).
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The time-sensitive employee will work as a temporary employee so long as the indirect 
utility derived from work is greater than the utility derived at that point in time from 
performing non-work activities. More formally, the temporary employee will work for 
a firm at any moment in time so long as the U(W** - search cost of finding job) > 
U(non-work activities) at that moment (this is the winstonian model). An increase in 
search costs then will increase the necessary wage to induce the worker to work, and 
therefor decrease the likelihood of taking a job.
These two statements above imply that the temporary arrangement will occur if and only 
if W* (Wage offered to the worker) >  = W** (Wage necessary to induce worker to 
work) at the given moment in time (see Gronau, 1986). This condition in turn is 
dependent on the search costs for both the firm and the temporary worker, and the search 
costs, as shown above, increase as working-time inconsistencies increase in supply and 
demand. If search costs are so high for either the firm or the temporary employee so that 
W* <  W** then there will be no employment.
If W* < W** and this condition is primarily due to the high search costs an agency 
which can lower these search costs may be able to capture the gains. For example:
A firm may be willing to pay a total cost of £56/hr to hire a temporary worker. Of this 
£56/hr we’ll say that £10/hr is search costs. This means that the firm will only offer the 
temporary employee £46/hr (Total wage = paid wage +  search cost).
A temporary worker would be willing to work for £45/hr but one must add on the search
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cost of finding the job. We’ll say this is £6/hr. This means it will be necessary to offer 
the temporary worker £51/hr. (Total wage = wage +  search cost)
In this example W* (£46/hr) < W** (£51/hr) and the transaction will not occur. In this 
case it is the search costs which drive the firm and the temporary worker apart. If there 
were no search costs the firm would offer £56/hr and the temporary worker would 
demand £45/hr. A negotiated equilibrium would then occur. We’ll say at £50/hr.
The temporary agency on the other hand could get £56/hr from the firm and offer the 
temporary worker £45/hr so long as it made the search costs for both firm and the 
worker =  £0/hr. The difference between the £56 and £45, £11, is the income to the 
agency. It is because the search costs were prohibitively high that the agency was able 
to make revenues from this difference. The £11 in revenues minus the costs of the 
agency are the profits for the agency. The trick for the temporary agency is to (a) offer 
a temp to the firm that costs just less than W* 4- search cost (of firm) in finding a temp 
and to (b) offer a wage W to the tempoarry employee that is just greater than W* - 
search cost of finding job. This gives them the widest margin between the wage they get 
from the firm and the wage they pay to the employee.
In some sense it might be argued that these profits are exploitive of the labour market. 
They do not merely capture the search costs of the agency but they capture the inability 
of the individual to search efficiently. It could be argued that if the profits of the agency 
are very high this will induce other agencies to form which could drive down the profits. 
Competition then might be relied upon to drive profits down to the search costs of the
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agency.
Still, because we are talking about human beings performing work, profits like these are 
very controversial. They must be sensitively addressed as opposed to profits from a train 
load of coal. This has lead to great debates within the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) about the acceptability of temporary agencies. Although they recognize the 
agencies’ ability to provide work arrangements where it may not have been provided 
before hand, the ILO feels it is necessary to regulate these agencies2. A neoclassical 
economist might argue that if the profits are high enough this will attract other 
entrepreneurs to engage in business. Ultimately the profits are driven down to a point 
where they just cover the temporary agencies own costs. The final wage for the 
employee is determined by either a bidding war between agencies for the employee or 
a bidding war between agencies for the job. More generally, Bakels (1978) notes that 
the "ethical objection to profit making on labour is, strictly speaking, not directed at the 
temporary industry as such, but applies to practically every employee in our society" (p 
295).
2 ILO convention 69 addresses the problems of temporary agencies for workers (see Blanpain, 1976, page 
412 for more on this).
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Appendix
Sample Questionnaires
In this appendix we give an exact replica of the questionnaires used to solicit opinion’s of 
employees and managers about their working conditions. The first is the Employee Opinion 
questionnaire and was exactly as seen except that it was folded up in a booklet form. The 
second is the telephone questionairre used for the managers.
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AN AUDIT OF PEOPLE’S OPINIONS TOWARD 
THEIR WORKING CONDITIONS
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Section one
We would like you to think about your work schedule and work structure. We would like to build 
a good picture o f how your work days are constructed. Please answer the following questions with 
your current work situation in mind. Please circle the appropriate number.
very very
infrequently infrequently sometimes frequeatiy frequently
1. I work on a temporary basis. 1 2 3 4 5
2. I work part-time. (Up to and including 
30 hours a week.)
1 2 3 4 5
3. I work full time. 1 2 3 4 5
4. I work from home. 1 2 3 4 5
5. I work from a central office. 1 2 3 4 5
6. I work completely by myself. 1 2 3 4 5
7. I work with a group of people. 1 2 3 4 5
8. I use a computer when I work. 1 2 3 4 5
9. I use the telephone when I work. 1 2 3 4 5
10. I use my car when I work. 1 2 3 4 5
11. I use a portable telephone for work. 1 2 3 4 5
12.
13.
I use a Fax machine for work.
I work outside normal (i.e. 9am - 5pm)
1 2 3 4 5
working hours.
14. How many hours do you work on your job?
1 2 3 4 5
Average working week hours per week.
Average working day ___________ hours per day.
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Section two
In order to give us a more complete picture o f your present work situation, we would now like to 
know how much control you have over various segments o f your job. Please circle the appropriate 
number.
15. I have control over the times of the day 
that I work.
16. I have control over the total number of 
hours I work during an average week.
17. I have control over which days of the 
week that I work.
18. In general I have control over which 
weeks out of the year I work.
19. In general, I have control over die 
location that I work from.
20. I have control over the types of tasks 
that I perform.
21. I have control over the amount of work 
I must complete.
22. I have control over the setting of 
deadlines.
23. I can choose who I work with.
neither
strongly tend to agree tend to strongly 
agree agree nor disagree disagree 
disagree
2* 3
4 5
4 5
4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
24. Of the nine items in section two above which two do you (or would you) value the most? 
___________(Please use the statement number).
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Section three
This section allows you to express what are advantages and disadvantages o f your present work 
situation. Once again, may we remind you that this information is both anonymous and strictly 
confidential. Please circle the appropriate number.
neither
strongly tend to agree tend to strongly 
agree agree nor disagree disagree 
disagree
25. The amount of support available for my 
work is an important advantage of my 
job.
26. My ability to combine other activities 
with my work is an important advantage 
of my job.
27. My ability to work on tasks I like is an 
important advantage of my job.
28. My ability to work the hours of the day
that suit me is an important advantage.
29. My chances for promotion are an
important advantage of my job.
30. My amount of job security is an
important advantage.
31. My ability to work the days that suit me
is an important advantage of my job.
32. My commuting time and commuting 
expenses are an important disadvantage 
of my job.
33. The amount of income I receive for my 
work is an important advantage.
34. The surveillance and monitoring of my 
work by others is an important 
disadvantage of my job.
35. The amount of time left over after work 
for personal activities is an important 
advantage.
36. The status my job gives me is an 
important advantage.
37. My working peers are an important 
advantage of my job.
237
Section four
We would now like you to think o f your life as a whole. We would then like to know i f  there is 
anything you might change in your current situation so that it would generally suit your needs 
better. Please circle the appropriate number.
38. A change of my job location would 
improve my situation.
39. An increase in my responsibilities would 
improve my situation.
40. An increase in my control over which 
hours of the day I work would improve 
my situation.
41. An increase in my control over which 
days of die week that I work would 
improve my situation.
42. An increase in my control over the types 
of tasks I perform would improve my 
situation.
43. An increase in pay would improve my 
situation.
44. An increase in my job security would 
improve my situation.
45. A change in the people I work with 
would improve my situation.
46. I would prefer to work different days of
the week with no change in pay.
47. I would prefer to work more hours with
a relative increase in pay.
48. I would prefer to work fewer hours with
a relative decrease in pay.
49. I would prefer to work different hours
of the day with a 3% decrease in pay.
neither
strongly tend to agree tend to strongly 
agree agree nor disagree disagree 
disagree
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
50. Of the twelve items in section four above which two are the most important to you? 
 (Please use the statement numbers)
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Section five
This section gives you the opportunity to express how you generally feel about your present 
employment situation. Again, all answers are both anonymous and strictly confidential. Please 
circle the appropriate number.
51. My work gives me a feeling of personal
accomplishment.
52. My work is of great personal
importance.
53. My income including all assets gives me
more than enough money to feed and 
house my family comfortably.
54. My job makes me use my skills and 
abilities.
55. I enjoy the kind of work I do.
56. In my line of work there are more jobs 
available than qualified people to fill 
them.
57. Control over my working conditions was 
an important determinant in taking my 
present job.
58. My job requires expertise and unique 
skills.
59. I am very satisfied with my current job 
situation.
60. In the future my job situation will be 
pretty much the same.
61. In the next two years I will search for a 
new job.
62. In the next two years I will start again 
in a new occupation.
63. In tbe next two years I will expect to be 
made redundant.
neither
strongly tend to agree tend to strongly 
agree agree nor disagree disagree 
disagree
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Section six
This section is for general statistics. We remind you that the questionnaire is anonymous, and at 
no point should you state your name. The answers to this section will enable us to place a 
perspective on responses to other sections o f the questionnaire. Please tick the appropriate spaces.
64. Please indicate your age:
65. Are you:
66. Are you married?
67. Do you have any children?
68. If so, are any of them under 16?
69. Do you have:
25 years or under
26-35
36-45
46-55
56 or over
male
female
Yes
No
yes
no
yes
no
high school certificate or equivalent 
(ie A levels.)
technical certificate/diploma 
bachelors degree 
masters degree or higher 
professional qualification
70. At what age did you leave full-time continuous education?
71. Please state your occupation _____________________
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72. Are you:(Please tick as many as are appropriate)
white collar 
skilled professional 
skilled office help 
artist
self-employed 
manual labour
73. How long have you been with your present employer? Years Months
74. What is your net pay?
75. Does your spouse work and receive a pay cheque?
£500 per month or below 
£501 - £800 per month 
£801 - £1500 per month 
£1501 - £3000 per month 
£3001 - £5000 per month 
£5001 per month or above
Yes
No
Further Comments
Please express any comments you feel we might have missed or not paid enough attention to.
Thank you very much for your time and help in completing the questionnaire. May I  remind you 
that your responses will be treated stricdy as confidential. If you have any queries or problems with 
this questionnaire please do not hesitate to contact Steven Albert at the LSE. London (071) 955 
7744.
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T e le p h o n e  I n t e r v i e w  Q u e s t io n n a ir e
Q 1. Is your main business supplying temporary accountants? 
Yes No
Q 2. About how many temporary accountants do you have registered 
with your firm.
Q 3. About how many do you place in jobs a week?
Q 4. Do you place your temps in large firms____
medium firms ------
small firms___________
Q. 5. Would you say that temporary accountancy is a specialized 
temporary agency field? Yes No
Q 6. Do you specialize in any particular aspect of accountancy? 
Yes No
If so which?_________________
Q 7. Do you consider your self in the same market place as large 
accountancy firms? Yes No
Q 8. Is the demand for temporary accountants seasonal? Yes No
Q 9. Is the demand for accountants geographically restricted in 
any way? Yes No
Q 10. Have you seen an increase in applicants in the past two 
years? Yes No
Q 11. Are there more or less jobs in the last 18 months? ______
Q 12. Why do people come to your firm? ________________
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